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NOTES 
 
• The term Close Protection has been written with capital letters when it is used to 
describe the specific specialist field of security (one core concept). When describing a 
related aspect such as close protection team or close protection training, capital letters 
have not been used. The same would apply for the term Principal which is used to 
distinguish a core object and related aspects such as principal profiling which has no 
capital letters. 
 
• The chapters of this research report have been structured from macro concepts down 
to micro concepts. The first two chapters serve as an introduction, as well as an 
overview of the research methodology that was applied in this research. The 
following two chapters explain the close protection industry, the way it is regulated 
and provide a detailed analysis of Close Protection itself. Chapters five through to ten 
deal with specific issues and themes identified during the research and the final 
Chapter makes recommendations based on the research that was conducted.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this study was to determine the current operational skills requirements for 
Close Protection Operatives (CPOs) in South Africa. Operational skills refer to those 
skills that are vital in order for a CPO to effectively protect a designated person (this 
person is referred to as the ‘Principal’). In order to determine any shortcomings in the 
Close Protection industry, twenty in-depth interviews were conducted with current 
operational CPOs. A detailed literature review was also done in order to create a solid 
platform for the research and to assist in the verification of the information. 
 
During the research, it was found that the task of providing Close Protection could be 
divided into various sub-categories. This was necessary in order to gain a rounded 
perspective of a CPO’s roles and duties. CPO’s tasks in their entirety had to be unpacked 
into their smaller sub-components. In fact there were many ways to subdivide the skills 
requirements and functions of CPOs. It was, however, found that the actual subdivisions 
were less important than the gaining of a comprehensive understanding of how all the 
aspects are interrelated and should function synergistically.  
 
The need for regulation of the South African Close Protection industry was identified as a 
major concern among all interview respondents. In order to determine the relevant factors 
involved in regulation, the way countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia 
and Israel regulate their industries, was assessed. It was noted that the industry in South 
Africa is ‘partially regulated’. This means that there is some sort of registration process 
for CPOs but no comprehensive monitoring and enforcement of accepted minimum 
competency standards. Currently in South Africa private sector CPOs are rated on the 
same scale as security guards and must be registered as a Grade level C with the Private 
Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). This is not an effective manner to 
regulate CPOs. CPOs should be viewed as professionals and specialists since their skills 
far exceed those of a security guard (Grade C). According to South Africa’s Skills 
Development Plan all industries will fall under Sector Education and Training Authorities 
(SETAs).  
  xiii
Close Protection is grouped under the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional 
Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA). There is 
currently a South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Unit Standard for Close 
Protection (Protection of Designated Persons, Units Standard number: 11510). However, 
the research revealed that while the unit standard correctly outlines the operational skills 
requirements of CPOs there are no assessment guidelines or clearly defined minimum 
skills requirements. Before the unit standard can be effectively implemented, agreed 
industry minimum standards for the relevant skills divisions in Close Protection need to 
be identified and implemented. But currently there is some confusion regarding which 
body is responsible for, firstly developing acceptable unit standards; secondly, getting the 
industry as a whole to agree and accept such standards; thirdly, to see to it that training on 
those standards is provided; and finally the monitoring of these standards in practice.  
 
In this study various training related factors were identified and examined in order to 
assess whether the way CPOs are trained in South Africa is effective or not. Aspects such 
as the intensity, focus, duration and content were examined. In general it was found that it 
is important for the following to be implemented:  
 
1. Effective screening and pre-training evaluation of potential trainees. 
  
2. Training should be job orientated and focus on training CPOs for the functions 
that they will actually have to perform. 
 
3. Training methodologies should focus on an outcomes based approach and utilise 
the fundamentals of adult based education. 
 
4. Training should simulate reality including the related stress factors that are placed 
on operational CPOs such as lack of sleep and high levels of activity interspersed 
with boring waiting periods. 
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5. Ongoing training and re-training are vital components to a CPO maintaining 
operational competency. 
 
6. Close Protection instructors need to have both an operational background and 
training in instructional methodologies before being considered competent. 
 
It is important that in the long term international recognition of South African Close 
Protection qualifications is achieved. This is essential since many South African CPOs 
operate internationally. Globalisation and improvements in technology have made it 
easier for international networking to take place. This has meant that clients are using 
CPOs in different countries and international comparisons are inevitable. If South African 
CPOs are to be considered ‘world class’ then internationally recognised minimum 
standards need to be implemented for the South African Close Protection industry. 
 
The research indicated and highlighted various trends that may affect the Close 
Protection industry. The trends identified that seemed most relevant to the South African 
Close Protection industry were as follows: 
 
• Increased public awareness of international terrorism has resulted form acts such 
as the 9/11 attacks. This has made people more aware of the need for and benefits 
of security. Use of well trained CPOs is one of the ways that potential clients are 
able to minimise their exposure to any potential terrorist attack. 
 
• A CPO’s ability to communicate and liaise with all relevant parties involved in 
the Close Protection environment is vital to the success of any operation. 
Therefore it is vital that these aspects receive the relevant focus during training. 
 
• The CPO needs to be well trained in use of unarmed combat and alternative 
weaponry. He/she can no longer rely on the use of a firearm as the primary force 
option. 
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• A CPO needs to be able to adapt to many different situations. It is important that a 
CPO is trained to blend in and use the correct protocol in any given situation. The 
focus of operations should be on operating in a low profile manner to avoid 
unnecessary attention. 
 
• A CPO needs to be well trained in all aspects of planning and avoidance. The 
skills needed to proactively identify and avoid threats are vital to modern day 
operations. The CPO also needs to be quick thinking and adaptable in order to 
function effectively. 
 
• A CPO needs to have a working knowledge of all security related aspects that 
could enhance the safety of his/her Principal (i.e. multi-skilled). 
 
In addition to the above mentioned factors, other recommendations emanating from this 
study focused on minimum competency standards for the identified subdivisions of close 
protection. Examples of possible assessment guidelines and criteria were identified 
covering the following broad classifications: 
• Prior educational qualifications 
• Physical abilities 
• CPO skills 
• Prior experience in guarding 
• Firearm skills 
• Unarmed combat 
• Protective skills 
• First aid skills 
• Security knowledge  
• Advanced driver training 
• Protocol and etiquette 
• Management and business skills 
• Related skills
  1
Chapter 1 
 
MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The area of specialist/private security is a relatively under-researched field when 
compared to other fields in the private security industry. This is even more apparent when 
considering specialist subdivisions such as Close Protection, sometimes referred to as 
VIP Protection or protection of designated persons. Close Protection is a holistic 
approach to the protection (security/personal safety) of individuals encompassing all the 
necessary sub-sectors of security knowledge and physical skills needed to ensure the 
protection of a person from both identified and unidentified threats and risks to life and 
personal safety. 
 
The person receiving protection is referred to as the ‘Principal’ and in cases where the 
Principal is also the person financing the security operation protection services he/she 
would also be referred to as the client. It is almost impossible to keep a Principal in a one 
hundred percent risk-free state at all times. Therefore, the primary task of a Close 
Protection Operative (CPO) would be to minimise the exposure of a Principal to any 
identified risks. The CPOs tasks must also include effective planning which must take 
into account what could/should be done in the case of unexpected situations occurring or 
attacks being initiated. The CPO therefore functions in a continuous state of identifying 
and assessing all relevant risks and threats, while simultaneously taking the necessary 
preventative measures to hopefully thwart or avoid such situations.  
 
The CPO needs not only to be able to perform all necessary functions relating to threat 
assessment and risk analysis but also, if necessary, physically implement the appropriate 
counter measure within the constraints of the law.  
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This would include physical combat utilising whatever means1 are available to neutralise 
attackers and maintain the safety of the Principal.  
BACKGROUND/RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
Prior to the first democratic South African elections in April 1994, the international 
community had imposed wide-ranging sanctions on South Africa. As with other sectors 
of the economy, the private security industry was also in a state of isolation and cut off 
from international influences and development. As a direct result of this isolation 
standards and operational procedures could not easily be benchmarked with the 
international community. Conscription of young white males for military or police 
service was also in place at the time. This directly resulted in a larger base of potential 
candidates being available for training as Close Protection Officers (CPOs).  
 
Persons requiring the services of CPOs were primarily high ranking persons involved in 
one of the following sectors: political, governmental, military, police (generals/high 
ranking officers) or related agencies, visiting dignitaries and/or celebrities. The pool of 
trained candidates provided the government with enough skilled manpower to facilitate 
the vast majority of required close protection related services. Almost all close protection 
functions were carried out by military, police or related government organisations that 
provided all the necessary training for their personnel to effectively operate as CPOs. 
 
After the 1994 elections, major changes occurred throughout the entire private security 
industry. The increase in crime levels (www.SAPS.org.za, 2004)2 saw the private security 
industry in this country expand to such an extent that currently a situation of saturation 
has been reached.3 Post-1994 also saw a large number of overseas corporations opening 
up offices in South Africa.  
                                                 
1 Use of firearms, alternative weaponry or unarmed combat. 
2 Trends in reported crime statistics since 1994 as indicated on this website, accessed on 20 November 2004. 
3 “The rapid growth and expansion of the private security industry in South Africa is now an accepted fact that cannot be ignored, argued or wished away. Since the 
1970s the South African private security industry has grown at anything up to 30% per annum” (Minnaar, 2004: 12). 
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Furthermore, a number of multinational companies that opened up in South Africa 
employed close protection companies to provide protection services in order to ensure the 
safety of their expatriate employees. The dropping of all sanctions in the early 1990s also 
led to a large increase in the number of international VIPs, as well as celebrities visiting 
this country and making use of close protection services. Moreover, changes within the 
military and police structures such as the elimination of conscription and the downsizing 
of these organisations4 has meant that many officials who previously may have received 
protective services through state organisations may now have had to facilitate their own 
close protection. 
 
In addition, a large number of individuals either left the police and military protection 
units or alternately were retrenched when their organisations downsized and/or 
restructured (Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; 
Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003). Consequently many of these 
individuals sought work in the private sector. This in itself has potentially been the cause 
of operational problems such as CPOs having different operating procedures or differing 
levels of operational competency. These problems can be partly ascribed to fundamental 
differences in the way these people were trained, as well as how they perform close 
protection duties.  
 
There have been, and still are, a large number of, what can only be described as 
‘dubious’, small scale companies attempting to gain a foothold in this lucrative industry 
and turn a quick profit. They have been able to do this by employing unqualified CPOs 
whom they can pay less than well-trained specialist operators. Information obtained from 
the interviews indicates that there are also several companies and under-qualified 
individuals offering low standard close protection training. Poor quality training may be 
one of the reasons why the competency levels of the South African CPOs are so 
inconsistent with varying levels of standards and quality controls.  
                                                 
4 With the exception of the SAPS, who although losing members has lifted the moratorium on recruitment, instituted in 1996, in 2003 and have started to build up 
numbers of operational members to anticipated levels higher than pre-1994. 
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These training providers like the ‘fly-by-night’ companies offering close protection 
services prey on the naivety of potential candidates (they achieve this by claiming to offer 
CPO training in a shorter time at a cheaper price). This was confirmed by one trainer who 
has many years of training and experience in this specialist niche area of the Private 
Security Industry. 
  
They [‘fly-by-night’ training companies] offer low quality training over 
shorter time frames in order to try and gain a competitive advantage [get 
candidates who do not know the difference between good and bad training 
to utilise their services] (McGuire, 2003).  
 
The industry is currently regulated through the Private Security Industry Regulatory 
Authority (PSIRA). This body regulates the close protection industry but only according 
to standards designed for the security guarding sector. These standards are for the most 
part inapplicable (this will be expanded on in Chapter 3) to specialist operatives such as 
those that provide close protection services (specialised).  
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES: AN OVERVIEW 
 
This topic will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter dealing with international 
comparisons. However, the information below serves as an introduction in order to place 
the South African industry in the correct comparative context. 
 
It is important in this modern day and age that no research topic be analysed in isolation, 
especially when the topic involves the protection of peoples’ lives. Globalisation and the 
need for international benchmarking mean that it is vital for international trends to form 
part of this research. It is difficult to generalise about international standards and 
operational procedures as they vary substantially from country to country. The 
researcher, in the course of this study, was able to interview several international 
representatives from Israel, Britain and Australia. 
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Correspondence also took place, primarily via the email and internet, with the Home 
Office in the United Kingdom (UK), The National Institute for Criminal Justice Research 
of the Department of Justice in the United States of America (USA) and the Australian 
Institute for Criminology.  
 
A great deal of information was also obtained through local in-depth interviews. Most of 
the respondents have worked or trained internationally and/or had exposure to 
international trainers and operatives whilst working in this country. Moreover, the 
researcher has had quite extensive exposure to the international specialist security field. 
This includes either having trained in or received training from representatives from the 
UK, USA, Israel and Australia. The researcher has also provided training and/or 
performed close protection duties internationally.  
 
One of the primary points of interest when evaluating close protection operations on an 
international level is the fact that much international benchmarking takes place when 
many First World countries send international training teams around the world to train 
close protection teams in developing countries. This has occurred in the South African 
police protection units with a German instructor’s course being presented in South 
Africa, as well as several South African instructors being guests on training courses in 
several countries including Israel and Denmark. The main reason for this cross training 
occurring is usually to assist developing countries and/or benchmark competency levels 
between different countries. This has led to an interesting occurrence where certain 
countries that have no existing stated close protection standards and developmental or 
instructional capacity, are able to field fairly professional teams to protect their leaders. 
There are also existing exchange programs where cross training takes place between 
representatives or teams of different governments – many of these linked to private 
protection providers. 
 
According to one South African based close protection company director “at one stage 
South African CPOs were considered leaders in the protection field speciality of 
providing effective protection in crowds” (Steyn, 2003). 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The research question that this study sought to answer was the following:  
 
‘At what level of competency are South African protectors currently operating?’ 
 
There are currently no universally recognised standards (training and competencies) in 
South Africa for Close Protection Officers (CPOs). In the private sector CPOs are 
currently rated on the same scale as general security guards by PSIRA (this will be dealt 
with in more detail in Chapter 3), whereas generally the close protection operative is in 
fact a well trained professional, whose training and skill level requirements are 
considerably higher and more diverse than any grade rating offered by PSIRA. The 
military and police are the other major role players in close protection services and 
provision of specialised CPO training, both of which have their own standards and 
training methodologies. Accordingly, the standards applied by the various role players 
are not always consistent and in some cases may not have been recently adjusted in line 
with changing trends and demands (specifically international). 
 
Therefore, a need exists to clarify many aspects of the close protection industry since 
there is a general lack of understanding and information regarding what close protection 
work entails or the kind of client that actually utilises such a service. Let alone being able 
to assess what the necessary specialised training standards for CPOs should entail. Many 
people have a set stereotype with regards to whom and what a close protector should be. 
However, these stereotypes are most often incorrect or flawed, coloured by public 
perceptions of security guards in general or news reports in the media.5 Accordingly there 
is no professional accepted national recognition of close protection as a separate 
specialised form of security provision. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 There have been many recent reports about nightclub ‘bouncers’ who are sometimes confused with CPOs. 
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According to a number of interviewees, the ineffective regulation of the industry since 
1994 ‘made clear by the diversity in backgrounds and training of CPOs operating in the 
country today’ (Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; and Maharaj, 2004), has caused much 
contention with regard to who is actually qualified to do close protection work and what 
those holding such qualifications should be able to do. Moreover, there is considerable 
ongoing debate about who can actually provide this type of training (accreditation and 
qualified to do so). When comparing the South African close protection industry with that 
in other countries such as in New South Wales (NSW), Australia and the United 
Kingdom (UK), fundamental differences can be identified.  
 
In NSW, Australia and the UK the following standards are professionally applied in the 
specialist security industry: 
 
• Set minimum standards accepted by the industry and international community 
with regard to training and qualification of CPOs. In Australia CPOs are rated by 
the Vocational Education and Training Accreditation Board (VETAB)) and 
monitored by the Police Security Registry and in the UK rated on the National 
Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) framework and licensed by the Security 
Industry Authority (SIA). In contrast, as yet, in South Africa there are no 
universally accepted standards for CPOs.  
 
• In NSW prospective CPOs must undertake training through a VETAB Registered 
Training Organisation (RTO) and meet relevant minimum standards before being 
awarded any type of qualification. Similarly, in the UK prospective CPOs must 
undertake training through a service provider accredited with the Security 
Industry Training Organisation (SITO) and meet relevant minimum standards in 
order to be issued a NVQ rated qualification. In South Africa there is no 
consensus as to minimum standards and what accepted competencies are for 
CPOs. 
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• In Australia individuals cannot operate in the industry unless they have a VETAB 
rated certificate issued through a RTO and are registered with the correct 
regulatory body (the Police Security Registry). Similarly, in the UK, individuals 
must possess a NVQ rated certificate issued from a SITO registered training 
organisation before being able to register with the SIA. However, in South Africa 
the CPO industry is not monitored and at present any individual with a PSIRA 
Grade C (Grading levels as applied by PSIRA are explained in Chapter 3) can 
operate as a CPO. 
 
• In both Australia and the UK records of qualified CPOs are available through 
oversight and regulatory bodies that maintain industry standards. Licences and 
accreditation have to be renewed periodically and a specific type of licence must 
be held to perform close protection duties. 
 
While South Africa moves to implement the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) 
in line with the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) Act (No. 2 of 1995) unit 
standards6 (minimum definitions of competency) defining qualifications are supposed to 
be concurrently developed. The unit standard applicable, which will be discussed later in 
this research report, is not detailed or easily applied with regards to what the close 
protection industry actually needs. This issue was specifically mentioned during the 
interview with the current head of Law Enforcement and Training at PSIRA: “The unit 
standard needs far more work and adjustment before it can be applied practically” 
(Bodhoo, 2004). 
AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The research problem lies in the difficulty of developing accurate analyses of the skills, 
training and qualifications level of CPOs that are actually operating in the country today. 
This study will therefore focus on the necessary operational skills requirements needed to 
provide effective close protection in this country.  
                                                 
6 For more information on unit standards see Annexure 6. 
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Aspects such as candidate selection, training and evaluation will be examined in depth. 
The research problem itself can be stated as:  
 
What are the necessary operational skills requirements of and training 
standards for Close Protection officers currently operating in South 
Africa? 
 
In this research a study of the sub-categories that are involved in close protection have 
been made in order to determine what an acceptable minimum operational standard 
should be for each sub-category. The aim of the research is therefore to collect this 
necessary information, make comparisons, and formulate acceptable training standards 
and qualifications, skills level requirements, and competencies necessary for the 
professional services to be provided by CPOs within the regulatory framework of PSIRA 
and the Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector 
Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA). 
 
An ancillary aim of the research being to forecast future trends within the industry as well 
as what proactive measures can be taken to ensure that the South African industry is up-
to-date with international trends. 
KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
 
For the purposes of this study the following key definitions will apply. The industry 
jargon defined below is also vital for the reader to understand the research. (Additional 
terms are defined in Annexure 1: Definitions): 
 
Bodyguard  
The person on a close protection team directly responsible for the Principal and closest to 
the Principal at all times. People often confuse bodyguards with all close protectors. The 
bodyguard is one of the roles a Close Protector may assume. 
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Close Protection  
The carrying out of all necessary activities by a team or individual to ensure the safety, 
comfort and peace of mind of a Principal. 
 
Close Protection Operative 
Either an individual or member of a close protection team that facilitates close protection. 
 
Close Protection Team 
A group of well trained CPOs that operate in a synergistic manner, fulfilling all the tasks 
necessary to ensure the safety, comfort and peace of mind of a Principal/Principals.  
 
Client 
The person, body or organization that is financing the Close Protection Operation. 
 
Principal 
The individual receiving close protection services. 
 
Security  
All the applicable measures needed to ensure the safety of a country, company or 
individual against espionage, theft or other danger/threat. 
 
International community 
Within the context of this study this term refers to the organisations, groups and 
individuals that are actively involved in the facilitation, training or any other related 
activity of close protection. i.e. that carry out their respective operations internationally. 
 
Operational skills 
Those skills that a Close Protection Officer must posses in order to provide effective 
close protection to a designated Principal.  
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Threat assessment  
This is the procedure undertaken to identify, categorise, validate and plan for any threats 
that the Principal may be exposed to. 
 
Risk analysis 
This is the process of assessing the likelihood of threats occurring, based on aspects such 
as the environment, the Principal and his or her scheduled movements. 
 
VIP 
Acronym for a ‘Very Important Person’. The term is interchangeably with that of 
Principal.  
VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The following organizations, institutions and individuals can gain from implementing and 
considering the expected recommendations emanating from this research: 
 
• The Department of Security Risk Management, School of Criminal Justice in the 
College of Law at the University of South Africa (UNISA), for the results obtained 
and also the integrated approach to the security risk management process and training 
of CPOs. Research findings could also possibly be utilised by this Department for 
inclusion in either short-courses or study material for CPOs. 
 
• Police and military close protection and training units of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) since 
research in this area may assist in future training and standard setting across the 
spectrum of close protection services in South Africa. 
 
• All operational CPOs since the research results will hopefully enable them to adapt 
the training for and provision of close protection services to not only meet 
international standards but also adjust the way they currently train and operate.  
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By doing this CPOs can provide a more professional and improved close protection 
service and therefore enhance their capability to keep their Principal secure and safe 
(protected from all possible threats). 
 
• CPO trainers and instructors stand to benefit since they will have a complete 
reference to training material and standards in order to compare their current practices 
and training methods/standards. In addition, the material will provide them with an 
opportunity to be exposed to identified trends and changes, particularly from the 
international scene. This will enable them to adapt training programs and 
methodologies to ensure that at least a minimum standard is met by all trainees found 
competent which will hopefully be applied and monitored by the POSLEC SETA and 
PSIRA. 
 
• The Private Security Industry as a whole, by using the results for the better regulating 
and professionalisation of the CPO sector in the industry. 
 
In terms of the research it is hoped that the following value and benefits will be 
forthcoming: 
 
• The establishment of a format that provides minimum standards regarding 
training across the spectrum through the relevant sectors in the close protection 
sector of the private security industry in South Africa. 
 
• By the forecasting of trends that will dominate training in the future. This will 
assist in determining what steps should be taken to ensure that the South African 
industry is able to effectively respond, implement and plan for these trends. 
 
• By providing a guideline for PSIRA and the POSLEC SETA will enable the 
categorising and recognition of Close Protection Operatives as a separate and 
specialised sector of guarding.  
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• Currently CPOs are being rated, based on the so-called ‘Grade A to E’ guarding 
system. At present a CPO needs only to be a Grade C guard to work in the close 
protection industry. The setting of professional standards can mean the 
establishment of a new higher and more skilled grade carved specifically for 
qualified close protection specialists. 
 
• By formulating minimum required training standards, skills requirements and 
qualifications as a point of reference can assist in the regulation of the industry as 
required by various organisations (SAQA, POSLEC SETA and relevant education 
providers) for the further specialisation and professionalisation of this sector of 
the industry. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Security as a whole is a very neglected field of research, when compared to many other 
industries and their sub-sectors in the private security industry. Therefore, the specialist 
area of close protection is an area which has completely been ignored with regard to 
formal research. There have also been many technological developments, global changes 
and other changes that may not be have been included or may have been overlooked in 
current close protection training methodologies. 
 
Confusion over governing and regulatory bodies and the lack of formal industry 
standards are also identified problems. This research has indicated that, even though there 
is an existing unit standard, it is not easily applied in the work place. The limited 
monitoring and quality control of the close protection industry has led to a severe drop in 
the quality and standards of close protectors and close protection operations as a whole 
(Bodhoo, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; Maharaj, 
2004; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Jaarsveld, 
2004).  
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Local and international trends have seen a large scale growth in the close protection 
industry and private security industry in general. There are several relevant factors that, 
have contributed to this trend, which have in turn led to a need for the regulation of a 
growing industry. 
 
The researcher has been able to identify that, before accepted industry and competency 
standards for close protection can be implemented, the relevant operational skills 
requirements for close protection must first be determined. These identified operational 
skills could then serve as a platform to develop industry-accepted minimum competency 
requirements and regulator practices for close protection. 
 
Accordingly, the benefits of this research will assist and benefit not only the regulatory 
bodies in achieving fair and valid standards and practices but also individual CPOs, as 
well as close protection trainers. 
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Chapter 2 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, CANDIDATE SELECTION 
AND INTERVIEW FORMATS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The majority of information obtained in this research study was gained primarily from 
using qualitative research methodology. The primary research tools utilised being in-
depth one-on-one interviews, a literature review and Participant Action Research (PAR). 
 
Due to the exploratory nature of this research the vast majority of information was 
obtained from the in-depth interviews, in many cases the interviews lasted for two hours 
or more. Throughout the interview selection process and the interviews, the researcher 
attempted to adhere to the principles of ethical and valid research in order to ensure an 
unbiased and applicable sample had been selected. 
VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY OF COLLECTED 
INFORMATION 
 
The requirements for internal validity and reliability, as discussed by Welman & Kruger 
(1999: 100), were applied during all research conducted. Every effort was made to ensure 
that the research information collected was valid and accurate while maintaining all 
ethical considerations. 
 
In brief, much care was taken in the selection of relevant persons to be interviewed. 
Furthermore, the same interview schedule of questions was applied to each interviewee 
without the interviewer (the researcher in all cases) influencing the respondent's answers 
in any way, be it by means of body language, tone of voice or facial expressions or 
negatively formulated or leading questions.  
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In addition, attempts were made to create a relaxed interview environment whereby 
respondents were encouraged to be open and frank in their responses. Accordingly, every 
effort was made to make the atmosphere comfortable and non-confrontational. Accuracy 
and reliability of information received was enhanced in the interviews by conducting 
several interviews with representatives from each sector identified or until saturation 
levels were reached.  
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Ethical considerations in the research were addressed by adhering to the Code of Ethics 
for Research at Technikon SA (Technikon SA, 2002: 128-134). This was achieved by 
emphasizing those aspects of protecting the identity of respondents (anonymity) if so 
requested by them. All respondents gave permission for their names to be listed as 
references and for the researcher to quote on information that was obtained in the 
interview. 
 
Moreover, respondent participation in the interviews was at all times emphasized to be 
voluntary. All respondents were also informed that information received would be treated 
as strictly confidential. In addition, high standards in the research were maintained by 
means of focusing on implementing the proper referencing and acknowledgement of 
sources of information, avoiding plagiarizing of information and obtaining the consent of 
respondents to participate and permission to undertake the research from the relevant 
authorities.7 These factors all aimed at increasing the acceptance of the information 
received by respondents, as well as to enhance the validity of the research conducted.  
 
It became clear during the preliminary literature review that in order for the research to 
effectively answer the identified research problem, that the focus would have to be on in-
depth, one-on-one interviews. The benefits of utilising this methodology meant that the 
researcher was able to capitalise on the many years of accumulated experience and 
knowledge of the selected interview candidates.  
                                                 
7 Permission to undertake interviews with SAPS personnel was obtained from the SAPS office for strategic research, as well as the relevant officials in the SANDF 
and SAAF. 
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The researcher has been involved in both close protection training and operations for the 
past eight years. In this time he was able to gain operational experience at all levels of a 
close protection operation, namely: single operative, member of the personal escort 
section, member of an advance team, driver, bodyguard, planning officer, team leader 
and group leader. Moreover, the researcher has been involved in teams providing 
protection for presidents, celebrities and high level corporate executives both locally and 
abroad. He is a certified close protection instructor with qualifications8 from Task 
International UK and the former Technikon Pretoria (now Tshwane University of 
Technology (TUT)). The researcher has been a member of training teams who have 
trained presidential, African royal family, civilian and military operatives in close 
protection and related skills. At present he is one of the directors of a specialised training 
and close protection provider company in South Africa and has links to a number of 
similar companies in the close protection field internationally.  
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WHILE DOING RESEARCH 
 
Availability of candidates 
Due to the nature of close protection work many of the candidates interviewed, who were 
still operational, were not always available or could not attend to pre-arranged meetings. 
This meant that the researcher had to be flexible, and in order to interview certain 
candidates several dates had to be booked until the interview could finally be conducted. 
In certain cases, for the interview to be completed, up to three meetings had to be 
arranged and rearranged since the candidate was constantly called out to perform work 
duties. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The qualifications include: Basic Close Protection Instructor (Technikon Pretoria); Tactical Firearms Instructor (International Firearms Training Academy); 
Instructor in Security Management and Close Protection (Task International UK, which is a preferred training provider for the British Ministry of Defence and is a 
United Nations training contractor); Advanced Driving Instructor (Franco Plan Services); Tactical Baton Instructor (Armament Systems and Procedures, USA); 
Pepper Spray Instructor (Oleoresin Capsicum Aerosol Training); and an Unarmed Combat and Defensive Tactics Instructor (2nd Degree Black Belt Taekwondo, 
World Taekwondo Federation; 3rd Degree Black Belt Gendai-Ryu Ninjitsu, South African Ninjitsu Survival League; 4th Degree Black Belt Koga-Ryu Ninjitsu, 
Black Dragon Fighting Society USA; and 5th Degree Black Belt, Dennis Survival Jujitsu, Israel ).  
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Geographical difficulties 
Certain of the respondents interviewed operate internationally and it was logistically 
quite difficult to interview them. The researcher was fortunately in Australia and Israel 
during the research period which enabled him to conduct face-to-face interviews with 
respondents in these countries. Attempts were made to interview candidates in different 
regions of South Africa, e.g. Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, in order to get a 
more rounded perspective and draw on different regional experiences. It was possible to 
interview respondents in the three cities mentioned because the researcher’s work 
schedule involved intensive local travelling during the research period. 
 
Personal training background of respondents favoured during interviews 
Many of the candidates would not accept that other CPOs from different backgrounds 
and training may have received quality training. It was a common trend for the majority 
of candidates interviewed to quote only their own training experience as valid and the 
quality benchmark, as well as having value above other training by disregarding other 
operatives training as perhaps being ‘inferior’. As a result of this it was left up to the 
researcher to analyse and assess the different opinions and views put forward by those 
interviewed in order to gain an unbiased overview of the industry as a whole. 
 
Respondents using differing terminology to describe the same thing 
Many of the respondents utilised different terminologies that may have been applicable or 
relevant only to the specific operational or training backgrounds in which they had served 
most of their professional life. Background reading, as well as the researcher’s personal 
experience, assisted greatly in eliminating misinterpretation of the information received 
and standardisation of the applicable terminology. 
 
Difficulty in certain cases of validating of interviewee credentials 
In certain cases respondents were interviewed that claimed to possess certain credentials 
or experience such as operational history and training backgrounds. However, it was 
sometimes difficult to validate the authenticity of claims made by some of the 
respondents. In most cases it was possible to verify credentials through other respondents. 
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An example illustrating the difficulty of verifying operational backgrounds was apparent 
when one of the respondents claimed to have had operational close protection experience 
with a military unit from another country. In such cases the researcher attempted to verify 
the information provided since it would have impact on the validity of what such a 
respondent claimed and the information he provided. 
 
Interviewees getting off topic 
Many of the respondents interviewed had vast operational experience in close protection 
as well as in other related security functions. It was therefore often a problem to keep 
candidates focused on the research problem and questions posed in an interview since 
they were inclined to go off on tangents and talk about other security issues not related to 
the specific focus of this study. This caused a problem since often interviews took far 
longer to complete than anticipated. This made it far more difficult and time consuming 
to sort the information obtained into relevant themes linked to the study focus. 
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR CANDIDATES 
 
In order to provide a representative sample from the overall target population the 
following key operational subdivisions were identified from which interview candidates 
to be selected: 
 
• Police 
• Military 
• Airforce  
• Intelligence agencies 
• Private security sector 
• PSIRA and POSLEC SETA regulatory bodies 
• Security training centres 
• Clients utilising the services of CPOs 
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For the purposes of this study the focus was primarily on the interviewing of currently 
active and operational CPOs as the scope and access to all of the areas was not deemed 
realistic or feasible in the allotted research period. In addition, with the delays 
(postponements and work demands) in setting up interviews with individuals also 
impacted on the time available to conduct interviews. Furthermore, since the research 
problem focuses on ‘operational skills requirements’, it was decided that it would be most 
beneficial for study requirements to focus the interviews on the sectors where actual 
CPOs are providing services on a daily basis. 
THE SELECTION CRITERIA FOR CPO RESPONDENTS 
 
For the CPO sub-category for interview candidates, whether service personnel (police, 
military or airforce) or civilian (private sector), the selection criteria were basically the 
same. This sub-category of interview candidates was selected based on the following 
criteria: 
 
1. They must be/have been involved in some way with the close protection industry 
as a whole. 
2. Possess previous or current experience in one of the above mentioned industry 
sub-sectors. 
3. A minimum of five years’ experience in training or operations related to the close 
protection of VIPs and other designated persons. 
 
Variable factors 
As far as possible, and when a hierarchy or rank structure could be established, 
individuals that were in senior positions were selected as preferred candidates to be 
interviewed. However, if candidates in senior positions were unavailable or unwilling to 
be interviewed the next most senior person was identified and interviewed. In order to be 
as representative as possible at least three candidates from each sector were targeted to be 
interviewed (if such candidates were available and willing to participate in interviews). 
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While conducting the research it was found that most of the private sector CPOs that 
were interviewed had some sort of operational service history.9 This made it simpler for 
the researcher to identify common themes in both close protection operational practices 
and CPO training. In certain cases, it also served as a platform to assist in the verification 
of information since claims made by several respondents could be checked with persons 
who had been or still were operational with the various military or police close protection 
units. 
 
Intelligence agencies were not targeted to provide interview candidates as preliminary 
research indicated that almost all relevant information could be collected by interviewing 
respondents from the other relevant sub-sectors. It was also determined that since 
intelligence type agencies usually operate in an isolated manner as compared to the rest 
of the industry, they would have little impact in terms of providing the necessary 
information needed to answer the stated research problem.  
 
Controls and international comparisons 
Originally, as a control measure and in order to provide a tool for measurement it was 
planned to interview at least one candidate who met the above criteria but who was not 
South African and had primarily international experience (not including experience on 
the African continent). However, the researcher was in fact able to personally interview 
three candidates fitting into this subgroup since the researcher travelled internationally 
while conducting the research. Candidates from the United Kingdom, Australia and Israel 
were interviewed. 
 
Moreover, the vast majority of respondents that were interviewed in South Africa also 
had extensive cumulative experience in international close protection operations. This, as 
well as ongoing interaction with international operatives working or visiting South 
Africa, was also commonplace for most respondents. 
 
                                                 
9 Operational service history refers to experience gained by a CPO while serving in any of the close protection units of the military, the police, or related government 
agencies. 
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Several of the respondents interviewed had also received close protection or related 
training and/or been exposed to trainers from countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Germany and the USA. Additionally, among the interviewees there were 
specialist close protection instructors that had trained persons from many other countries 
outside of South Africa i.e. Angola, Equatorial Guinea and the United Kingdom. 
 
Due to international business trips that the researcher was obligated to attend to during 
the research period, on the ground research was also carried out in Israel and Australia. 
Research into the regulation and governance of close protection industries in these 
countries was possible only at varying levels of detail. Where on the ground research was 
not possible liaison with officials in the Home Office from the UK and various other 
international bodies (these will be outlined below) was undertaken in order to gain as 
much information as possible.  
 
In most cases there was a limited response but a certain amount of useful information and 
further references was obtained as a result of these enquiries. All available information 
obtained from these sources was than correlated and analysed in an attempt to assess 
what actually happens on an international platform with regard to the aspects of close 
protection that have been identified as relevant to this study. This information from 
international contacts was supplemented by accessing various official websites (see 
reference list for details). 
 
Several countries were assessed in order to make comparisons with the applicable 
operational skills requirements for CPOs abroad as compared to CPOs in South Africa. 
Gaining information on the related training standards was, in most cases, exceptionally 
difficult. In certain cases no civilian access to such standards is allowed. An example of 
this is in Australia where access to the unit standard on Close Personal Protection is not 
accessible to civilians.10 Accordingly, it was also decided not to utilise the USA as a 
control group. 
                                                 
10 This is perhaps because specialised fields of security such as close protection are primarily considered the domain of government agencies or government cleared 
private companies and organisations. 
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This decision was made after email communication with the Institute for Criminal Justice 
Research of the Department of Justice in the United States. It was determined that each 
state in the USA actually sets its own standards and licensing requirements for CPOs i.e. 
there is no national or federal body regulating CPO activity in each state or setting 
national standards and competencies. As a result, CPO activities differ from state to state 
and are generally quite inconsistent with some states having strict requirements and 
others none at all.  
 
Subsequently, it was decided to only use Israel, Australia and The United Kingdom as 
reference points for comparative purposes primarily because it was possible to have face-
to-face interviews with CPOs and trainers from each of these countries. Much additional 
information was also collected from the Internet by accessing websites such as the UK 
Home Office and the Australian National Training Information Service (NTIS). 
 
Data collection methods and fieldwork practice 
The majority of data was collected by means of in-depth one-on-one interviews of 
selected candidates that met the established criteria. Every attempt was made to make the 
interview process as convenient and comfortable as possible. In several cases interviews 
took place in informal surroundings such as coffee shops or restaurants. Other interviews 
took place at the respondent’s offices in order to ensure the minimum disruption of 
respondent’s work activities. 
 
The interview process was based on utilizing the interview framework schedule of 
questions (see Annexure 2) and then asking probing or clarifying questions in order to try 
and extract as much relevant data as possible. In most of the interviews the researcher 
used an informal approach to gather as much information as possible from the 
respondents during the interviews.  
 
This data was then processed and collated in order to identify and formulate the following 
concepts aimed at answering the identified research problem, namely: 
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• The minimum standards regarding training across the spectrum through the relevant 
sub-sectors of the close protection industry in South Africa today 
 
• To assist in the forecasting of trends that will dominate the training of CPOs in the 
future. Furthermore, to determine what steps can be taken to ensure that the South 
African industry is able to effectively implement the relevant strategies in order to 
adjust to these trends. 
 
• To provide a set of minimum standards as a point of reference, which could be used 
to assist in the setting of national standards and the regulation of the CPO industry as 
required by various organisations (South African Qualifications Authority, POSLEC 
SETA, PSIRA as well as relevant training and education providers).  
SELECTION OF CLIENTS (CPO USERS) 
 
It was originally planned to interview several clients (the users or contractors of close 
protection services and not to be confused with a Principal who receives the actual close 
protection service). It was determined after the preliminary research that access to clients 
would be extremely difficult and sensitive. It was than determined that several of the 
CPO respondents actually worked directly for several clients and part of their duties was 
to select CPOs to provide Close Protection to designated persons. Accordingly, it was 
then established that these respondents could provide information from dual perspectives 
enabling the researcher to gain information from both CPO and client perspectives. The 
interview schedule of questions (Annexure 2) was then revised and adapted with 
additional questions being added (Annexure 3) to the identified respondent interviews. 
SELECTION OF REGULATORY BODIES  
 
 The two key bodies recognized as being responsible for the regulation, setting of 
standards and control of the South African private security industry are the POSLEC 
SETA and PSIRA. 
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It was possible to interview officials from both organisations, namely Mr Hennie 
Richards, CEO of POSLEC SETA; and Mr Ash Bodhoo of PSIRA. (The interview 
questions posed to these officials can be viewed in Annexure 4).  
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide the reader with a broader understanding of 
the way in which the research was conducted. Every attempt was made to ensure the 
validity and reliability of the research information collected in the course of the study. 
 
All ethical considerations ranging from plagiarism to interview ethics were taken into 
account in an attempt to get open and honest responses from the interview respondents 
while striving to eliminate any interviewer bias. The majority of interviews were carried 
out in an informal manner in order to create a comfortable and relaxed environment. This 
assisted the researcher in gaining as much relevant information as possible from the 
respondents. 
 
There were certain setbacks and barriers that were encountered throughout the research 
process. These included logistical and CPO specific availability problems, as well as the 
fact that it was not always possible to validate or cross-substantiate all information 
collected from the various respondents. When information that was collected could not be 
validated it was separated out during the collation phase and was therefore not utilised in 
the forming of conclusions and making of recommendations. 
 
The majority of information was gained via in-depth one-on-one interviews from a wide 
variety of organisations, companies and people (mainly close protection operatives). In 
order to ensure that an unbiased view of the CPO industry was obtained by the researcher 
respondents representing a cross spectrum of organisations who are actively involved in 
the close protection industry were selected. Every effort was made to ensure that fair 
representation from the different role players was achieved. This was made easier by the 
fact that most private sector respondents had some sort of service background, i.e. served 
in either the military or police. 
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Several of the respondents employed in the private sector also performed the functions of 
clients utilising the services of CPOs. This enabled the researcher to gain a wider base of 
information including data that focused on the close protection skills requirements from 
client perspectives. Information was also obtained from the two identified regulatory 
bodies that have an impact and effect on the close protection industry, namely PSIRA and 
the POSLEC SETA.  
 
The information from the interviews was supplemented via a comprehensive in-depth 
literature review of all available literature from both international and South African 
sources on the topic (see List of References for details). The information obtained in the 
literature review and the in-depth interviews was eventually correlated to provide the 
basis of the recommendations outlined later in this report. 
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Chapter 3 
 
REGULATORY ASPECTS CONCERNING THE CLOSE 
PROTECTION INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a widely accepted concept both locally and internationally that almost all industries 
need to have a recognised body to serve as a watchdog. This is important to ensure 
quality, fair play and ethical practice for all parties involved, as well as to set training 
standards and levels of professional conduct. It could be said that this is even more 
relevant for the close protection industry, where bad service or incompetent CPOs may 
cost a Principal their life.  
 
It is important to understand the overall situation in South Africa before unpacking the 
fundamentals of regulating the close protection industry. A practical understanding of the 
relevant bodies and legislative aspects needs to be gained in order to apply a workable 
regulatory approach.  
 
The following legislative Acts have been identified as relevant to the current regulation 
of the close protection industry and will be explained in this chapter: 
 
• The South African Qualifications Authority Act (No. 2 of 1995) 
• The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Act (No. 56 of 2001). 
 
The following organisations and structures as well as their key functions will also be 
clarified in this chapter: 
 
• Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) 
• The Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector 
Education and Training Authority (POSLEC SETA). 
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The following organisations and structures are considered relevant for the overall 
understanding of qualification and training standards development and recognition in 
South Africa today (These bodies and their functions are explained in more detail in 
Annexure 6): 
 
• The National Skills Authority (NSA) 
• The National Qualifications Framework (NQF) 
• National Standards Bodies (NSBs) 
• Standards Generating Bodies (SGBs). 
 
(For a more detailed overview on role player organisations and the overall approach 
adopted by South Africa with regard to education, qualifications and recognition process 
see Annexure 6: Introduction to the National Skills Development Plan). 
 
In terms of this research report regulation refers to the following concepts: 
 
• The setting of an industry accepted minimum standard of competency for Close 
Protection officers 
• Guidelines for the core competency levels in each of the relevant subdivisions 
relating to close protection work namely: firearms, first aid, driving, unarmed combat 
and relevant theoretical and practical protection skills.  
• Policies and procedures for the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) for CPOs 
currently working in the industry. 
• Enforcement of an established Code of Conduct and accepted industry standards. This 
enforcement could take place by regular monitoring of providers, inspection of 
providers and applicable disciplinary action (suspensions, fines, etc.) if providers are 
found to be in contravention. 
• Establishing of re-qualifying and re-registering time frames, policies and procedures 
in order to ensure that only competent CPOs are providing protective services in 
South Africa. 
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BACKGROUND TO CLOSE PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Prior to the 1994 elections almost all close protection services were carried out by 
government-related departments. The introduction of a new government after these 
elections created a different infrastructure.11 The military, police and related government 
organisations went through a major restructuring process whereby members of former 
‘resistance groups/liberation armies’ security divisions such as the ANC and PAC were 
integrated into their ranks. This restructuring shifted much responsibility away from 
police and military close protection units and saw private industry providers step in to fill 
the resulting gap in provision of such services. This restructuring, combined with the 
dropping of sanctions against South Africa by the international community, led to an 
increase in demand for not only close protection but also the provision of private security 
in general. 
 
Today, levels of violent crime in South Africa are comparatively quite high 
(www.saps.org.za). In fact the United States Travel Advisory Service advises visitors to 
South Africa to be aware that “criminal activity, sometimes violent, occurs routinely [in 
South Africa]” (http://travel.state.gov/travel/safrica.html). There is without doubt a stable 
market demand for close protection services in South Africa today. Currently, most 
international clients that utilise close protection services draw their teams from the 
private sector (the exception would be guests of the South African government who 
would receive protection directly from the SAPS VIP Protection Services). In certain 
interviews it was even commented that South African CPOs are in high demand 
worldwide for their professional services and skills (Jacobs, 2003; Smith, 2004; and 
Steynberg, 2003).  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The democratically elected ANC Government replaced the old Apartheid regime and aimed to adjust the existing discriminatory infrastructure in order to provide 
opportunities for previously disadvantaged persons. 
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The need for regulation 
The need for regulation and setting of minimum standards for the operational skills that a 
CPO must possess was repeatedly mentioned throughout all interviews conducted by the 
researcher with South African CPOs. While preliminary research indicated that this was 
the primary research problem, it was interesting to note that the majority of respondents 
interviewed mentioned, in one way or another, that if this was not addressed it would be 
impossible to fully professionalise this particular sector of the private security industry.  
 
The quotes below, emanating from the interviews are selected examples to verify this 
point: 
 
There can be no way forward unless we ensure that only those people that 
are capable and competent to perform all aspects of Close Protection 
operations are the ones actually doing the work (Jacobs, 2003). 
 
Because you only see how good a Close Protection Operative is, is when 
things go wrong. A lot of people who are doing close protection in South 
Africa today are not qualified (Van Eck, 2003). 
 
The above two quotes reiterate the fact that a well-regulated industry ensuring the 
competency levels of operational CPOs is a vital component needed in order to 
professionalise the industry.  
 
Quantifying the problem 
In the target group of CPOs that were interviewed in South Africa the question: “In your 
professional opinion what percentage of the CPOs operating today have been trained 
effectively and could be considered fully competent to effectively provide Close 
Protection services” was asked (Question 7 from the interview schedule of questions for 
CPOs, see Annexure 2 for details).  
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Here the respondents were asked to give an honest estimate, based on their experience 
and interaction with other CPOs, of realistically how many CPOs across all the sub-
sectors in South Africa were actually qualified (i.e. have the relevant experience, training 
or on-the-job expertise) and able to perform Close Protection duties effectively. In the 
interviews ‘competency’ was clarified as a CPO being able to effectively fulfil all roles 
and duties needed in a Close Protection operation. (These roles and duties are outlined in 
more detail in Chapter 4: Literature review.) 
 
The answers varied with the highest percentage of CPO competency being an estimated 
50% and the lowest being 10%. Perhaps one of the most disturbing responses came from 
interview twenty (Van Jaarsveld, 2004). The response from this interview graphically 
outlined the answer in terms of operationally competent members of the Police VIP 
Protection Services. The respondent’s answer was a frighteningly low 3,6%. When asked 
how such an exact figure was reached the respondent explained that, he had taken the 
percentage of persons in the unit that were totally up-to-date with all training and 
applicable evaluations as competent, persons who were not up-to-date with all training 
were therefore not fully competent. This yielded an approximate figure of 186 out of 
nearly 3000 policemen and women in the Police VIP Protection Services units who could 
be considered competent. This is fairly disturbing if it is taken into consideration that in 
terms of active CPOs the South African police possess the largest contingent in South 
Africa. 
 
When taking the responses from all the South African respondents into account and 
working out the average an approximate figure of 20% of all CPOs operating in South 
Africa today was reached that could be considered as competent to effectively act as 
CPOs. This means that in the opinions of the interview respondents only one in five 
CPOs working in South Africa are actually competent and should be allowed to be active. 
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The concept of what being a ‘competent CPO’ should entail is very broad. Below are a 
number of the interviewees’ views on this aspect of competency. For example: “CPOs 
protect peoples lives, there is no middle ground between being capable and not [being 
capable], when peoples’ lives are at stake” (Hugo, 2003), while another remarked: “The 
bottom line is people die if CPOs don’t do there jobs correctly, standards must be put in 
place to ensure that the client gets what he pays for” (McGuire, 2003). 
 
The above two statements are merely examples selected from the interviews that were 
conducted in order to reinforce the point that competent CPOs are a vital component to 
professionalising the South African close protection industry. Sooner or later persons 
performing CPO duties, who are not adequately qualified, will become a hazard to a 
Principal’s safety. However, it was a unanimous opinion with all respondents that were 
interviewed, that the only way to make sure that the Principal is getting qualified CPOs is 
to have an overall regulatory body set standards for the specific specialisation of Close 
Protection. Monitoring of these standards would also be a vital component since failure to 
do so and enforce training standards could cost people their lives. The provision of Close 
Protection services without some sort of minimum competency standards and 
enforcement is not something that can be taken lightly or ignored any longer. 
 
Regulatory options 
When looking at the available options it is vital to remain practical since many concepts 
and systems of standard setting and industry regulation as applied in other countries, may 
not be applicable within the South African or the African context. 
 
Over 80% of the CPO respondents interviewed felt that it was necessary to have all or 
some of the following in place: 
 
1. A minimum standard covering each accepted area of close protection training to form 
the basis for a recognised qualification. 
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2. A regular re-evaluation and competency assessment framework to maintain up-to-
date records of qualified CPOs, as well as to clarify their operational status (ability to 
perform skills in terms of minimum standard requirements). 
 
3. A penalty system or perhaps a disciplinary system with fines and sanctions that would 
serve as a deterrent to companies or individuals that do not comply with the above. 
 
4. A validation database for clients to check if CPOs are current and registered. 
 
Information from several countries and the experiences of many of the interviewed 
respondents have been correlated in an attempt to provide the reader with an international 
overview of close protection regulation and standard setting. The following information 
is aimed at assisting the reader to view the South African situation in context with the 
international environment. 
INTERNATIONAL OVERVEIW 
 
Introduction 
Technology and many other factors have created what is often referred to as the global 
economy. It is an accepted fact and well known that occurrences in countries half way 
around the world can have far reaching international effects. Many people utilising the 
services of individual CPOs or protection teams, are people that travel frequently and, 
more often than not, have business or other interests in several countries. The 
combination of these aspects means that CPOs need to think in global terms and utilise 
international benchmarking in order to be effective and to keep up-to-date with current 
developments in their industry sector. Accordingly, it is vital that close protection 
training and operations are not assessed in isolation. This is necessary if operational 
competency standards are to be recognised internationally. 
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It is no easy task to create a set format to assess what is happening in the close protection 
industry in South Africa and then compare it internationally. The researcher was able to 
identify, from the various assessments of international close protection industries, that 
there seem to be three major groupings in terms of regulation and governance, into which 
a country could be fitted. These three groupings are based on assessing levels of 
regulation and standards in the private security industry focusing on close protection. The 
first grouping can be referred to as ‘regulated’; the second ‘partially regulated’; and the 
last group ‘not regulated at all’. 
 
Regulated countries 
When assessing the first classification of ‘regulated countries’ the following are 
examples: the United Kingdom, Australia, most of the countries in the European Union, 
as well as certain states in the USA. The term regulated can be described as having a 
minimum standard of competency (usually a unit standard or several relevant unit 
standards) for persons that are considered trained CPOs against which they can be 
measured and evaluated on a regular basis.  
 
There is also usually some sort of national regulatory body with which persons providing 
close protection services must register in order to be able to legally work within the 
private security industry. Examples of this are agencies such as the Security Industry 
Training Organisation in the United Kingdom (SITO) or the Security Industry Registry 
run by the police in New South Wales in Australia. These organisations are responsible 
not only for registering CPOs but also for the enforcement of set industry practices and 
standards.  
 
The concept ‘regulated’ can therefore be summarised by clarifying what a CPO must do 
to be able to work in the industry of a ‘regulated country’. He/she must undergo and 
successfully complete a training course run by a recognised (accredited) training 
organisation. The trained CPO must then apply to and gain the necessary accreditation 
(licensing) from an overseeing regulatory body that would enforce and monitor the set 
standards for the industry. 
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Partially-regulated countries 
The second grouping is classified as ‘partially regulated countries’ such as Israel and 
South Africa. Partial regulation means that there may be certain of the relevant aspects 
and practices in place as implemented in a regulated country but not all of them. These 
aspects and practices would mean a set competency standards are in place and having 
regulatory bodies that enforce predefined industry practices.  
 
The typical way in which these industries are run is that persons actually doing close 
protection duties must register with an overseeing general private security regulatory 
body. There are usually no standards that differentiate these persons from normal security 
guards or providers of other security services. Within the classification of ‘partially 
regulated’ countries, there may even be certain minimum standards that exist for related 
CPO competencies. However, these usually apply specifically to firearms and not to close 
protection as a specialist industry in itself. 
 
Non-regulated countries 
The last grouping is where there is no governing and registering regulatory body 
overseeing the close protection industry and enforcing set industry practices at all. There 
is also no accepted minimum standard or recognised qualification in this classification. 
Most developing countries including many of the countries, in Africa, would fit into this 
grouping.  
 
The vast majority of information with regards to international regulation has come from 
personal interviews and internet research. When referring to the international community 
it can be seen that this is on the whole too large a group and it is necessary to be more 
specific. It is clear that when comparing South Africa with the majority of Third World 
countries that South Africa appears to be ahead with regard to the development of set 
training standards and a well regulated industry for the provision of close protection 
services.  
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There seem to be four key points relating to the provision of close protection services in 
Third World countries (non-regulated) which were identified and outlined in a report 
authored by L. Jacobs and G. Schneider. This report emanated from experience gained 
after providing training and close protection at presidential level in Equatorial Guinea 
during November and December of 2002.  
 
The points mentioned in this report are as follows: 
 
• The tendency to appoint untrained family members as CPOs as opposed to selecting 
and training the best possible candidates for the job. 
 
• The belief that the more loyal the persons are around a Principal the better protected 
and therefore safer the Principal is. 
 
• The focus on excessively tight information security and secrecy during all operations 
and movements (travelling) of the Principal, to the point where the CPO team is 
uninformed, which negates effective planning and development of close protection 
contingencies. 
 
• The belief that training, retraining and minimum actual competencies are vital for 
effective operation is on the whole ignored and security is handled in an ad hoc, 
unplanned and therefore unprofessional manner (Jacobs & Schneider, 2002: 2). 
 
When the above-mentioned points above are considered it is clear that in South Africa 
they are for the most part not applicable. Therefore, the focus in this study with reference 
to international standards was based on available information and accessibility to the 
relevant people within First World (regulated and partially regulated) countries – that are 
considered by most to be leaders in the field of close protection services. Accordingly, no 
firm comparisons were made between South Africa and non-regulated (largely Third 
World) countries. 
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Table 1: Differences between regulated, partially regulated and non-
regulated countries 
  
REGULATORY 
OPTIONS 
CRITERIA 
Regulated 
 
• Industry accepted minimum competency standards 
• Industry supervision and regulation by oversight body 
• CPOs must re-register with the regulatory body within a given 
period (e.g. once every three years) 
Partially 
regulated 
• There may be regulation but not specifically for the CP 
industry (usually regulated within the security industry as a 
whole) 
Non-regulated  • No accepted industry standards  
• No set regulatory bodies 
 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
 
Several countries were assessed in order to draw a comparison with the applicable 
operational skills requirements for CPOs in South Africa. The three countries that were 
selected were the United Kingdom, New South Wales in Australia and Israel.  
 
The United Kingdom 
 
…when compared to the UK, the primary problem in South Africa is the 
overall low standards and lack of regulation within the close protection 
industry (Sharp, 2003). 
 
In the UK the security industry is governed by the Security Industry Training 
Organisation (SITO) which oversees standards of training and the Security Industry 
Authority (SIA) which is responsible for licensing and regulation.  
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There are also qualifications level ratings based on the National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQ) system which correspond to South Africa’s National Qualifications 
Framework (NQF). The primary difference being that the NQF takes all qualifications 
into account while the NVQ concentrates on vocational qualifications and not on tertiary 
level qualifications such as university degrees. 
 
Israel 
 
In Israel the problem at the moment is that everyone who comes out of the 
military [thinks he] is a close protection expert (Allon, 2003). 
 
At a superficial level it appears as if the close protection industry in Israel is as 
unregulated as it is here in South Africa. However, on closer examination CPO 
candidates in Israel must still meet minimum firearms’ competencies which have, at the 
time of writing, not yet been implemented in South Africa.12 The fact that military service 
is compulsory in Israel seems to have created a surplus of persons claiming to be trained 
CPOs. The common sentiment seems to be that as a direct result of having undergone 
military training a person would be a trained CPO.  
 
The infrastructure of private security regulation in Israel is quite capable of creating a 
separate database and regulatory body for CPOs (in terms of established regulatory 
bodies, potential inspectors and penalty systems for non-compliance). However, it seems 
that it has been the Israeli authorities’ choice to regulate Close Protection as part of the 
whole private security industry, much as South Africa has been attempting to do. 
Moreover, Israel has a far stricter implementation of regulating the private security 
industry (i.e. sight inspections and penalties or prosecution for utilising non-registered 
operatives).13 
 
                                                 
12 The relevant regulations of the Firearms Control Act (No. 60 of 2000) have come into effect as from the 1 July 2004. The process of accrediting training and 
competency assessment service providers to implement the regulations is being handled by the POSLEC SETA.  
13 In South Africa the PSIRA Act (No. 56 of 2001) does in fact make provision for sight inspections and penalties for companies that utilise non-registered 
operatives but the lack of enforcement, shortage of inspectors and limited number of inspections make these for the most part ineffective. 
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When the respondent in Israel was asked during the interview as to whether all security 
guards are registered and firearm-qualified, the response was they have to meet the 
minimum standards but the standards are too low to effectively ensure only the best i.e. 
most competent persons do the work (Allon, 2003). 
 
Overall, the key information extracted from the interview seems to indicate that the 
infrastructure for regulation seems to be in place but it is the lack of suitable standards, 
specifically for CPOs, that fails to separate qualified CPOs from the rest of the private 
security industry operatives in Israel (Allon, 2003). 
 
Australia 
 
The industry in Australia is very closely monitored and tightly knit; there is 
not a lot of work for civilians, if anything the industry is over-regulated 
(Garvey, 2004).  
 
Again, like the case of the USA, it was difficult to utilise Australia as a base for 
comparison since each state (seven) in Australia has different laws, standards and 
regulation procedures.14 On the whole the demand for private sector close protection 
officers in Australia appears quite low compared to South Africa. In Australia the vast 
majority of close protection tasks are performed by the relevant authorities, police or 
other government agencies such as the Federal Protection Service on either a federal or 
state level.  
 
The majority of information gathered was focused on New South Wales (NSW) since the 
researcher was based in Sydney. The regulations in place in NSW seem to be more or 
less consistent with the other states in Australia that seemed to have relatively minor 
differences (i.e. registration fees, renewal procedures, scope of duties that private security 
officers can apply, etc.) in terms of this research.  
                                                 
14 There is reciprocal recognition of qualifications between most of the Australian states. In certain cases additional requirements may need to be met by persons 
wanting to be registered in more than one state.  
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The key consideration is that there is a unit standard equivalent titled: Perform Close 
Personal Protection Duties (PUAPPP001A), which is in place and listed on the Australian 
National Training Information Service. It is, however, not available for civilian perusal 
(see Chapter 2, controls and international comparisons). The fact that a standard exists 
clearly indicates that there are set minimum standards for operational competency of 
Close Protection Operatives in place for Australia as a whole. 
 
In NSW, a regulation and licensing procedure for CPOs is in place with an expiry period 
(the duration of a licence varies from one to five years) applicable to such licences. The 
overseeing body is the Security Industry Registry which is administered by the NSW 
police service (http://www.police.nsw.gov.au). Each state in Australia also recognises 
licenses from one another. However, in order to operate in different states a CPO must 
register with the relevant authority in each state (i.e. the Security Industry Registry in 
Victoria) before being able to work in that state.  
 
On a superficial level, the Australian close protection industry seems to conform to all 
aspects that were mentioned as concerns by the South African respondents. However, 
interesting questions seemed to have been raised in the Australian context on aspects 
such as:  
 
1. Is over-regulation making it too difficult for potential CPOs to enter the market? 
 
2. Is the highest level of training actually being offered since there is not really a 
competitive environment? 
 
3. With the majority of training in Australia being provided by state agencies and 
very little private sector training taking place (as compared to other countries), the 
scope of career development for CPOs is very limited e.g. the highest tertiary 
qualification is a Diploma in Security Management with no further security 
related qualifications being available. 
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The above issues are not relevant to the current situation in South Africa but may well 
become so in the future. 
CURRENT REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
There is no doubt that there is some sort of evolutionary process is currently causing 
countries to move away from totally unregulated to partially regulated and finally have 
the necessary infrastructure enabling them to revert to a fully regulated industry with 
internationally recognised qualifications. This is in fact what South Africa has been 
experiencing and/or trying to implement since 1994. Over time South Africa has seen the 
following progressive process from 1994 to the present take place in the close protection 
industry:  
 
1. Prior to 1994 there was a certain amount of government regulation15 in place but after 
1994 with all the changes in the industry, a state of uncertainty existed with almost all 
close protection providers not being registered with any oversight body. The Security 
Officers Board (SOB) was only being established in 1987 as a result of the Security 
Officer’s Act (No. 92 of 1987). 
 
2. Establishment of SAQA (Act no. 2 of 1995). 
 
3. Compulsory for CPOs to register with the SOB at a guarding Grade level C which 
was implemented shortly after the passing of the Security Officers Amendment Act 
(No. 104 of 1997). This has no relevance with regards to actual CPO competency 
standards since it is designed to regulate the standards of static guards and not well-
trained CPOs. 
 
4. Establishment of the POSLEC SETA in 2000 (POSELC SETA’s functions and duties 
will be outlined later in this Chapter). 
 
                                                 
15 Pre-1994 the following legislative Acts had been passed: The Security Officer’s Act (No. 92 of 1987), Security Officers’ Amendment Act (No. 25 of 1990) and 
the Security Officers’ Amendment Act (No. 119 of 1992). 
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5. In 2001 a name change from SOB to Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
(PSIRA) occurred. In addition the scope of this body’s duties and responsibilities 
were broadened. 
 
6. Standards generating bodies (SGBs) established in 2001 by SAQA (Close Protection 
was classified under National Standards Body 008 which was tasked to draw up unit 
standards for the security industry as a whole). The unit standard for Close Protection 
was registered on 9 October 2002. 
 
Currently South Africa is also at the stage where minimum competencies must be agreed 
to by the industry as a whole, implemented by recognised and accredited (POSLEC 
SETA) training organisations and enforced by the specific industry regulatory body 
(PSIRA). At present South Africa has a regulatory body (PSIRA) and a set unit standard 
for CPOs. However, currently there is no enforcement of industry practices or of the set 
minimum competencies. POSLEC SETA is in the process of accrediting training 
providers based on the existing unit standard for Close Protection. Currently South Africa 
is moving towards the status of a fully regulated country. Once that status is achieved it 
will also be possible to have South African close protection qualifications recognised 
internationally. 
 
The implications of a regulated industry would include aspects such as the overall 
professionalisation of the industry, the possibility of tertiary qualifications emanating 
from training qualifications, the establishment of a professional body to represent 
qualified members, etc. There are other international and globalisation factors that were 
identified during the research process. Some of these factors are either aspects that have 
occurred as a result of international networking, such as the sharing of knowledge 
initiatives between countries and international benchmarking. 
 
Other factors are CPOs working internationally, training with each other and being forced 
to standardise working methodologies when international events are held (international 
sporting/entertainment events or political gatherings such as the World Aids conference 
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or the Non-Aligned Movement Congress). These aspects will be outlined below and the 
critical factors that have influence over the training and operational functioning in South 
Africa will be highlighted.  
 
These concepts can be used to forecast future trends and ensure that standards in South 
Africa, are internationally benchmarked. 
THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (PSIRA) 
AND THE POLICE, PRIVATE SECURITY, LEGAL, CORRECTIONAL 
SERVICES AND JUSTICE SECTOR EDUCATION & TRAINING AUTHORITY 
(POSLEC SETA)  
 
There are currently two government appointed bodies that deal with the regulatory, law 
enforcement and standard setting for the security industry in South Africa namely the 
Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) and the Police, Private Security, 
Legal, Correctional Services & Justice Sector Education & Training Authority (POSLEC 
SETA). They will be discussed in more detail below: 
OVERVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE POSLEC SETA 
 
The POSLEC SETA is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring 
of learnerships and skills programmes, as well as the accreditation and quality assurance 
of courses, training and education providers in the policing, private security, legal, justice 
and correctional services sub-sectors in South Africa. Currently, the existing unit 
standard for Close Protection (existing minimum competency standards) and 
accreditation of Close Protection training providers falls within the scope of the POSLEC 
SETA. 
 
An overview of POSLEC SETA's roles, functions and history will be outlined below. 
(For more details on Sector education and Training Authorities (SETAs) and Education 
and Training Quality Assurance bodies (ETQAs) see Annexure 6) (www. 
Poslecseta.org.za). 
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The POSLEC SETA was established by the Minister of Labour on 20 March 2000 in 
terms of section 9(1) of the Skills Development Act (No. 97 of 1998). It is an accredited 
ETQA with SAQA and responsible for quality assurance in its allocated sectors. 
 
The scope of coverage of the POSLEC SETA, as approved and set out in the Government 
Gazette Notice No. 265 of 20 March 2001 include the following areas: 
 
Policing - includes the South African Police Services, the Independent Complaints 
Directorate, the Secretariat for Safety and Security (inclusive of both national and 
provincial ones), the various metropolitan policing agencies and the Directorate for 
Special Operations (DSO) otherwise known as the Scorpions of the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA). 
  
Private Security Services - including all private security companies, companies providing 
personal protection and intruder detection companies. 
 
Legal Practice - including all advocates, attorneys, paralegals, intellectual property 
practitioners and commercial legal advisors. 
 
Justice - including all judicial officers (e.g. judges, magistrates and prosecutors), the 
Department of Justice, sheriffs, registrars/masters of courts, interpreters and public 
defenders. 
  
Correctional Services - including the Department of Correctional Services, private 
prisons and detention centres (private and public).  
 
In terms of section 10 of the Skills Development Act, the POSLEC SETA has to perform 
the following functions: 
 
Develop a sector skills plan within the framework of the National Skills Development 
Strategy for the POSLEC SETA;  
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Implement the skills sector plan by – 
• Approving workplace skills plans  
• Establishing learnerships16  
• Allocating grants (for aspects like worker skills development and research in 
POSLEC related subject matter) in a prescribed manner to employers, education 
and training providers, and workers; and  
• Monitor education and training within the sector.  
 
Promote learnerships by –  
• Identifying workplaces for practical work experience;  
• Supporting the development of learning materials (up to NQF level 4);  
• Improving the facilitation of learning; and  
• Assisting in the conclusion of learnership agreements.  
 
Register learnership agreements: 
• Be accredited as an ETQA as contemplated in section 5 (1) (a) (bb) of the South 
African Qualifications Authority Act to ensure that quality levels are maintained 
by accredited training providers. 
• Disburse the skills development levies (See Annexure 6 for more details) in the 
POSLEC sector. 
 
Liaise with the National Skills Authority on –  
• The national skills development policy;  
• The national skills development strategy; and  
• Its own sector skills plan.  
 
Report to the Director General of Labour on -  
• Its income and expenditure; and  
• The implementation of its sector skills plan.  
                                                 
16 Learnerships are aimed at improving the skills of the South African workforce. Unqualified persons are trained by companies in an apprentice type model. The 
companies receive tax breaks for providing learnerships (Behaviour Systems and Development, 2003: 20).  
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Furthermore, it has to liaise with the employment services of the Department of Labour 
and any education body established under any law regulating education in South Africa 
to improve the dissemination of information on -  
• employment opportunities; and  
• serve as a liaison between education and training providers and the labour market.  
 
Finally, The POSLEC SETA is tasked to appoint such staff as is necessary for the 
effective performance of its functions and perform any duties imposed on it by the Skills 
Development Act (www.poslecseta.org.za).  
OVERVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
PSIRA 
 
The core functions of PSIRA are listed in the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 
(No. 56 of 2001), with its primary objectives being to regulate the private security 
industry and to exercise effective control over the practice of the occupation of security 
service providers in the public and national interest of the private industry itself and for 
that purpose, subject to the Act to: 
 
a) Promote a legitimate private security industry which acts in terms of the 
principles contained in the constitution and other applicable law; 
 
b) Ensure that all security service providers act in the public and the national 
interest in the rendering of security services. 
 
c) Promote a private security industry which is characterised by professionalism, 
transparency, accountability, equity and accessibility. 
 
d) Promote stability of the private security industry 
 
e) Promote and encourage trustworthiness of security service providers; 
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f) Determine and enforce minimum standards of occupational conduct in respect 
of security service providers; 
 
g) Encourage and promote efficiency in and responsibility with regard to the 
rendering of security services 
 
h) Promote, maintain, and protect the status and interests of the occupation of 
security service provider; 
 
i) Ensure that the process of registration of security service providers is 
transparent, fair, objective and conducted timeously; 
 
j) Promote high standards in the training of security service providers and 
prospective security service providers; 
 
k) Encourage ownership and control of security businesses by persons historically 
disadvantaged through unfair discrimination; 
 
l) Encourage equal opportunity employment practices in the private security 
industry; 
 
m) Promote the protection and enforcement of the rights of security officers and 
other employees in the private security industry; 
 
n) Ensure that compliance with existing legislation by security service providers 
is being promoted and controlled through a process of active monitoring and 
investigation of the affairs of security service providers; 
o) Protect the interests of the users of security services; 
 
p) Promote the development of security services which are responsive to the 
needs of users of such services and of the community  
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q) Promote the empowerment and advancement of persons who were historically 
disadvantaged through unfair discrimination in the private security industry 
(Government Gazette, 2002: 8-9). 
 
Currently all CPOs operating in the private sector must be registered as Grade C in the 
guarding rating system as utilised by PSIRA. A Grade C license qualification permits a 
Security Guard to carry a firearm while on duty.  
 
The grading system as applied for security guards is explained below.17 At present there 
is no universally accepted close protection standards registered by PSIRA for Close 
Protection training. The grade level security guard training material (Gloria, 2004) that 
was assessed is not explained in terms of the different specific outcomes for each grade. 
In the manuals the grades are not classified as below, but in order to make it easier for the 
reader to understand the rating system, the following differentiations have been allocated 
to each grade level: 
Table 2: PSIRA grades and descriptions 
 
 
Grade  Description 
Grade E Entry level static guard 
Grade D Guard able to perform access control and foot/ bicycle patrols 
Grade C Guard is able to carry a weapon provided he/she is in possession of a 
Firearm Competency Certificate, as required by the Firearms Control Act 
(No. 60 of 2000)18 
Grade B Site security manager 
Grade A Area security manager 
 
                                                 
17 The majority of this information below was obtained from the UBUNTU Training Academy manuals, Grade A, Grade B, Grade C, Grade D and Grade E, which 
cover all the requirements for grade level training by PSIRA (Gloria, 2004) and the PSIRA website (http://www.sira-sa.co.za). 
18 The firearms control regulations were only implemented as from 1 July 2004 at which stage competency training service providers had not yet been fully 
accredited by the POSLEC SETA and the SAPS Central Firearm Registry. 
  49
The training material in the training manuals A-E Grades (Gloria, 2004) bare similarities 
to some of the content in a comprehensive close protection training manual. Some of 
these similarities include access control, search procedures, protocol, bomb and 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) recognition, unarmed combat, report keeping, risk 
management and communication. However, the detail and additional specialised 
operational aspects that would be specific to close protection are not covered and those 
aspects (such as immediate action drills, principal profiling, firearms tactics, team 
structures, etc.) do not conform to the necessary detail that would be required to train a 
fully competent CPO.  
 
The Grade A-E training would definitely serve as a good format or base for preparatory 
training in close protection. The fact that close protection training aims to produce a well 
rounded operative who is capable of protecting a Principal’s life under extreme 
circumstances means that a far more detailed training program is necessary. Close 
protection training should therefore be seen as advanced specialist further training to the 
Grade level A-E training.  
FEEDBACK AND ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PSIRA AND POSLEC SETA 
 
You cannot regulate trained close protection professionals with the same 
standards utilised to regulate guards (Higgins, 2003). 
 
The above statement was a sentiment echoed by most of the South African respondents 
interviewed for this study and who were up-to-date with the legislative requirements 
pertaining to CPOs. There are no additional legislative requirements that are specific to 
CPOs in the PSIRA Act, the specifications refer generally to armed persons protecting 
persons or assets. When correlating the excerpts (seen above) of POSLEC SETA and 
PSIRA’s roles, functions and duties, it would appear as if some overlapping occurs 
between these two institutions. An example appears to be that, subject to the PSIRA Act, 
PSIRA is to ‘promote high standards in the training of security service providers and 
prospective security service providers’. This clearly falls within the scope of POSLEC 
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SETA’s functions which are primarily involved in training standards and quality related 
issues.  
 
It becomes quite apparent when analysing the relevant literature available and cross-
referencing the applicable interviews, that POSLEC SETA’s main function is in fact to 
oversee the development of standards and qualifications that are applicable and 
transportable through the various sub-sectors that this SETA is responsible for. The 
POSLEC SETA has made it clear that they will be solely responsible for the setting of 
training standards. This may be done by consulting with established SGBs or sourcing 
external subject matter experts (SMEs) to assist in creating industry applicable standards 
and qualifications. POSLEC will also be responsible for the establishment of set 
competency levels and maintenance of standards by their accredited training providers. 
They will achieve this by compiling a base of assessors, moderators and verifiers to 
maintain training standards as well as regular scheduled and unscheduled inspections and 
site visits by POSLEC officials. This view was substantiated by the then head of this 
SETA: 
 
The POSLEC SETA is the government appointed body responsible for the 
setting of relevant standards and implementing such standards in the 
applicable industries (Richards, 2003). 
 
Currently, there is a Unit Standard (with the title: Provide close protection of designated 
persons (Unit Standard Number 11510)) registered with the South African Qualifications 
Authority (SAQA) (see Annexure 4). The unit standard will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, but in brief it describes four specific outcomes namely: 
 
1. Ascertain the Principal’s brief and risk profile. 
2. Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a Principal.  
3. Protect a Principal during transit/foot/venue movement.  
4. Terminate and review protection operation. 
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These outcomes are generic and should be implemented on any Close Protection 
operation. The unit standard refers to ‘learning assumed’ to be in place which directly 
correlates to the applicable entry requirements that will be discussed later in this report, 
in the chapter on training methodology. During discussions with some of the interviewees 
it was quite clear that the unit standard is at an acceptable level. However, neither 
minimum competencies nor a set of clearly defined assessment criteria are included in the 
unit standard. 
 
This is a major concern since the specific outcomes that are stated in the unit standard can 
be demonstrated in various forms, ranging from a one hour, one protector/operative, low 
risk task at the bottom of the scale to a high risk, multi-team operation at the top of the 
competency requirements. The fact that there are no clear specifications in the unit 
standard actually means that no minimum standards have been clearly defined.  
 
In other words, there needs to be some sort of specifications that outline exactly what a 
CPO should be able to do, at what level he/she should be able to do it and exactly how 
these competencies should be measured. These aspects are vital in order for the unit 
standard to be implemented effectively. In order to apply effective assessment criteria 
(definitions and specifications of how to measure the levels of operational skills 
requirements), the criteria would have to be universally accepted across all spheres of the 
close protection industry in South Africa. It would also have to be implemented in such a 
manner as to facilitate the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL).19 This would be a vital 
component for any unit standard to actually be implemented effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The need for effective monitoring and regulation of the close protection industry in South 
Africa was clearly established during the preliminary research process and was verified 
by respondents throughout the research. There were two clear industry role player 
                                                 
19 Recognition of Prior Learning is the process of determining competency and knowledge based on a persons experience and similar qualifications. The premise is 
that if a person already had the relevant knowledge they should not have to be taught it again. This is particularly relevant for persons with extensive on the job 
training and experience (Behaviour Systems and Development, 2003: 28 and 78). 
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organisations that were identified namely PSIRA and the POSLEC SETA. These 
organisations have the dual role of regulating/monitoring and setting training standards 
for the South African private security industry as a whole.  
 
The POSLEC SETA primarily focuses on the setting of standards and the regulating of 
training providers by implementing an accreditation process, ongoing monitoring and 
regular site and quality inspections. PSIRA in contrast concentrates on enforcing the 
minimum competency standards and even operational practices (regular re-evaluation or 
re-qualification) that will be set by the POSLEC SETA. PSIRA will also ensure that all 
service providers are registered with them and that they only utilise personnel that are 
registered and qualified. This is done through a penalty and fines systems that could 
include prosecuting on criminal charges for offenders. PSIRA is also responsible for 
seeing to it that the registered service providers and their personnel adhere to the Code of 
Conduct for the private security industry.  
Most of the South African interview respondents felt that the majority of CPOs operating 
in the country today are not competent enough to perform their duties effectively and if 
something was to go wrong during a close protection operation/assignment the 
consequences could well be disastrous and life threatening for all concerned. Whilst there 
is a unit standard for close protection training it has no clear designation of minimum 
competency requirements nor set assessment criteria to demarcate how to assess the 
competencies of CPOs or to conduct any Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) exercise. 
When analysing the international situation of regulation of close protection it was 
determined that there are three broad classifications of countries: 
 
1. Regulated countries that have set minimum standards and regulation/ licensing 
requirements for CPOs. For example Australia. 
 
2. Partially-regulated countries having some sort of licensing structure. This may not be 
specific to Close Protectors but rather focus on the private security industry as a 
whole. For example South Africa. 
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3. Unregulated countries have no set minimum standards and have no overseeing bodies 
responsible for regulation of the industry. For example Equatorial Guinea. 
 
It was mentioned earlier in this Chapter that it is a process to move from totally 
unregulated to a regulated industry. It was also identified during the interviews that it is 
important that any South African close protection qualification be recognised 
internationally and that CPOs skills are transportable across international boundaries 
(Bodhoo, 2004; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 
2003; Richards, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Van Eck, 
2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004.). This international recognition is important if South 
African CPOs are to operate globally. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 THE CLOSE PROTECTION INDUSTRY 
 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
Close Protection is as old as mankind and warfare. Quotes referring to persons fulfilling 
close protection roles can even be traced back to the Bible. A clear example of this is the 
reference to King Solomon’s bodyguards protecting him while he sleeps: 
 
Behold his bed, which is Solomon’s; threescore valiant men are about it, of 
valiant Israel. They all hold swords, being expert in war; every man has his 
sword upon his thigh because of fear in the night (Song of Solomon, verses 7 
and 8, Chapter 3).  
 
Fairly comprehensive historical summaries can be found in several publications on the 
subject (Oatman 1997; and King, 2001). In essence, as soon as the proliferation of 
survival instincts came to the fore of people’s behaviour, it was inevitable that the 
stronger members of primitive clans would protect the weaker members from any outside 
threats or attacks. Some of the earliest written records of protectors refer to the ancient 
Roman Praetorian Guards who were responsible for the protection of the ruling emperor. 
It is fair to say that as soon as rulers of almost any race in any region came into power, 
there were probably a select few chosen to protect these rulers (the operative term being 
‘with their lives’). These ‘Protectors’ were probably chosen for their physical strength 
and martial skills, which obviously favoured the weapons of that day. For example the 
use of the sword by Samurai in ancient Japan.  
 
Many key principles of Close Protection can even be traced back to the ancient text 
known as The art of war which was written over 2000 years ago by the Chinese military 
strategist Sun Tzu.  
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Among the many applicable concepts and tactics which are as relevant today as they were 
when the book was written, is the idea of proactive planning and avoidance to achieve 
objectives. 
 
On this point Sun Tzu stated the following: 
 
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be 
defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your 
chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and 
yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle (Tzu, 500BC: 106).  
 
The above quote can be directly translated to the well accepted close protection adage 
often mentioned in close protection training material and sometimes referred to as the 
‘Seven Ps of Close Protection’, namely “Prior planning and preparation prevents piss 
poor performance.” (Dynamic Alternatives, 2003: 20). In the modern day world of 
specialist security, Close Protection is as accepted as any other relevant security function. 
However, many of the interview respondents when asked about outside perceptions of 
Close Protection made comments similar to the one below: 
 
The overall objectives, the attributes of the operatives and the manner in 
which the job is performed are still for the most part misunderstood by those 
not directly involved (Sharp, 2003). 
 
Films such as ‘The bodyguard’ and ‘In the line of fire’ have added to the mystique of 
Close Protection. However, even though there are certainly aspects of Close Protection 
that are accurately portrayed in such films there are in fact many more questionable 
practices that are demonstrated in these films (e.g. in ‘The Bodyguard’ only one CPO 
attempts to protect the Principal in a high threat situation that clearly would require a 
close protection team). These misconceptions are understandable since the films were 
created purely for entertainment value and not meant in any way to be realistic portrayals 
of close protection operations.  
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There is no doubt that over time many variables including technology and experience 
have led to the improvement and adaptation of protective practices. Based on the 
researcher’s personal experience and validated in almost every interview conducted 
during the research, the realities of modern day close protection are quite different from 
the purely physical function (body protection of client/principal) that was performed by 
early ‘Protectors’. When describing what can be termed the ‘modern approach’, much 
time is spent on advance planning, paperwork and the like as opposed to the glorified 
images seen in the movies. The realities of long hours, poor treatment and very often 
relatively low remuneration seem to be common place in the way that protective services 
are being currently provided in South Africa. 
 
Moreover, when considering the professional attitude and focused approach of modern 
day close protection specialists it is difficult not to be impressed. The individuals 
providing protection have developed the ability to blend in to almost any environment. 
They might look like everyone else in a crowd or on a street, both in dress and 
mannerisms but at the same time are capable of quick thinking reactions and decisive or 
rapid decision making. Accordingly, well-trained operatives in the close protection field 
have the ability to deal with dangerous situations in a very effective manner. 
 
As this field developed and adjusted to meet the demands of a changing South Africa so 
too have the needs requirements of the Principals seeking this service. It is vital that the 
link between provision of service and client demands/needs be addressed. This is 
required in order to make sure that CPOs are providing protection in the most effective 
manner for today’s environmental and situational demands. 
INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONAL 
CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVES 
 
There are several aspects that need to be outlined when looking at the increase in demand 
for Close Protection Operatives both locally and internationally. Several of these are not 
new ideas.  
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However, globalisation and the ease of access to information through the internet and 
other media sources have made the previous reasons (these will be outlined later in this 
section) for why Principals may have needed protection even more applicable. The 
rationale discussed below is not listed in any order of priority, importance or preference. 
It should be noted that in different regions each reason may be more or of lesser 
importance. 
 
i) Kidnap and ransom 
The first key reason for the need for protection services by individuals, families or 
companies to be discussed is the threat of kidnap and ransom. In general the victims of 
kidnap and ransom situations would be high profile and fit into one of the following 
group classifications: political, celebrity or wealthy. It is accepted and outlined in most 
relevant literature that one of the most effective ways of minimising the chances of 
kidnap occurring is to utilise the services of a well-trained close protection detail. This 
has become even more important as the earnings of most prominent public company 
CEOs and directors have become public knowledge (forced disclosure for reasons of 
transparency and good governance) and at times even being published in newspapers.  
 
This aspect is a trend that was identified during the in-depth interview process. Several of 
the respondents predicted that kidnapping would increase in the future. The reasoning 
behind this was that as physical security measures and prevention technologies for 
current common crimes become more effective (for example at private homes or 
company offices), criminals will seek other ways to make money and kidnapping is an 
obvious lucrative alternative currently having less of a security threat (being caught by 
the police or deterred by security measures) to the perpetrators. 
 
ii) Terrorist activities 
The second key reason is the proliferation of international media coverage of terrorist 
activities and criminal violence. This has made people more aware than ever before of 
terrorist threats and has led to people, who may not have utilized CPOs in the past, now 
making use of their professional services. 
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A sentiment often mentioned by respondents in interviews was that the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001 (the so-called 9/11) have forever changed the worlds’ view on 
security and the existing threat of potential terrorist attack. Whilst terrorism is not new 
the attacks of September 11 demonstrated that many people who considered themselves 
safe were actually still vulnerable since most (future) terrorist activities would be very 
difficult for anyone to forecast and therefore avoid. Effective and ongoing threat and risk 
analysis, which forms the backbone of any close protection operation, is probably one of 
the most reliable ways of minimising exposure to potential terrorist attack. 
 
For this reason alone many clients, who previously may have felt that employing CPOs 
was an unnecessary expense and inconvenience may have changed their approach, post-
9/11. An example of this is how it has become policy for many American and other 
companies to provide more stringent security for their top executives worldwide in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks and Bali bombings (in Indonesia on the 12 October 
2002). 
 
iii) Levels of violent crime 
The third reason is increased levels of violent crime (perceived and otherwise) and the 
associated feelings of insecurity and safety. The proliferation of violent crime and terror 
worldwide are definite reasons why clients may feel the need to seek close protection 
services. Even though crime occurs worldwide the topic is particularly relevant within the 
South African context.  
 
Most [high profile] visitors to South Africa that utilise CPOs, do so to 
ensure that they do not become victims of crime during their stay 
(Rootman, 2004). 
 
A common theme that is echoed by criminals is that they target persons who seem 
unaware or ‘easy victims’. Awareness and observation are fundamental functions of any 
close protection initiative. Close protection specialists are constantly scanning the 
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environment and applying effective awareness techniques to identify any potential threats 
or hazards and then take necessary action to avoid them. 
 
It would therefore make logical sense that most criminals who are looking for easy 
victims would probably not target a person who was utilising a close protection detail. 
 
With the comparatively high levels of violent crime in this country certain international 
companies with operations in South Africa have made provision for close protection 
services to be provided, not only for visiting high profile executives, but also for 
expatriate employees that are residing in this country for brief periods. One American 
company has gone as far as to allocate each expatriate family with a dedicated Close 
Protection Operative to handle all of their security needs for the duration of their stay in 
this country (Higgins, 2003; and Steyn, 2003). In addition, it is becoming a valid risk 
management activity for large companies to employ CPOs tasked with the safeguarding 
of top company executives from becoming the victims of everyday crime.  
 
There is also the advent of international criminal syndicates, which utilise acts of terror to 
achieve their criminal objectives. These organisations are operating across borders in 
certain cases their activities could be classified mainly as criminal acts since the primary 
aim may be extortion for profit. They may use acts of terror as a tool to achieve 
intimidation of potential competition or law enforcement agencies. Therefore, in such 
situations all the benefits and approaches of utilising close protection professionals that 
have been previously discussed would be as relevant for minimising the risks of 
becoming a victim of international crime as for acts of terror. 
 
iv) The paparazzi and media phenomenon 
The fourth reason given for the need and use of close protection services result from the 
activities of the so-called paparazzi20 and media phenomenon. This aspect is primarily 
applicable to celebrities or high profile persons.  
                                                 
20 Paparazzi is the term used to describe journalists and photographers that basically ‘stalk’ celebrities in order to obtain controversial stories or take revealing or 
contentious photographs. 
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Although public interest in famous persons is nothing new, the methods of access to 
information (for example easy access to information on the internet) have made it far 
easier for members of the media to obtain information on persons of public interest 
(information could include their movements, where they are staying, what functions they 
are attending, etc.).  
 
In their ongoing pursuit of information and photographs many paparazzi in effect stalk 
celebrities. This results in the celebrity having almost no privacy and being constantly 
inconvenienced. A relatively effective countermeasure is to employ a close protection 
detail that, along with providing the standard personal security, will put in place the 
relevant physical security measures (such as access control and perimeter security 
thereby enhancing the privacy of the Principal and making access for unwanted persons 
extremely difficult). 
 
v) Government outsourcing 
The fifth reason for the growth in demand and the use of CPOs has been an increase in 
government outsourcing of such services. This is an international trend which sees close 
protection tasks that were originally considered the sole preserve and responsibility state 
agencies (police, military, intelligence or other government organisations/institutions) 
being outsourced to private companies. 
 
Some examples of this are South African close protection companies deploying teams 
which provide protective services in Iraq on behalf of the United States and the President 
of Equatorial Guinea utilising a protection detail from Morocco to provide his personal 
close protection. The concept of a growing global economy can also be seen as a major 
contributing factor for this phenomenon. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The majority of literary material available fits into one of two broad categories. The first 
is autobiographical or anecdotal which generally involves operatives recounting their 
personal experiences while providing protective services.  
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The second are non-fiction books or training manuals which focus on the instructional 
and relevant operational skills required to effectively provide protection to a designated 
person. After a comprehensive review it was found that the autobiographical material 
contained very little usable information as related to the specifications of this research. 
This forced the literature study to concentrate on the instructional material in order to 
compile the necessary information that is relevant to this study. 
 
The literature research was done in order to create a platform from which to launch the 
field research. The literature review contributed a large portion of information obtained 
for this study (with most issues and points being substantiated or confirmed by means of 
the interviews). The literature review demonstrated that in most of the instructional 
literature, even though there may be a focus on certain aspects of specialist security, there 
is also much standardisation i.e. generic information. Generally there are standard 
concepts that are universally applicable across the spectrum that detail the vital 
components necessary to provide effective Close Protection.  
 
The primary aim of the literature review, as pertains to this research, has been the 
consolidation of the information available into a generic format to enable the reader to 
have a summarised overview of what Close Protectors do and how they are trained to do 
it. Basically this is in order to highlight the established operational skills requirements of 
CPOs, since this is one of the key focus areas outlined in this research. 
 
This chapter is therefore a consolidation of many literary sources (for full details see the 
reference list). The vast majority of information utilised has come from the following: 
 
• The researcher’s personal notes 
• Instructional notes and handouts made available by Mr D.M. Sharp (see 
references) 
• The Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd, Basic Close Protection Manual (the 
researcher was a co-author of the manual)  
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Overall with reference to the four specific outcomes which will be outlined below, the 
concept of gathering as much information as possible before planning and/or attempting 
to conduct an operation makes obvious sense. This format is followed by many other 
books and manuals that were reviewed. The Principals brief would include conducting a 
comprehensive Principal Profile, assessing and collecting as much information on the 
principals’ itinerary or movements and lastly conduct a comprehensive threat assessment 
and risk analysis. 
 
The manuals, reference books and articles reviewed are, for the most part largely 
different in structure and layout. Certain manuals subdivide the training into the same 
tasks described in the unit standard namely: protection on foot; protection in transit; and 
protection at venues. The necessary hard skills like firearms and unarmed combat 
actually needed to protect a principal during these movements usually then fall into these 
subdivisions respectively. 
 
Some of the other literature subdivides their content based on the theoretical and practical 
modules aspects of providing Close Protection. Identified problems with this format are 
that it sometimes causes the reader or student CPO to not effectively link together the 
theory and practical subject matter and skills. Without the understanding of this link it is 
impossible for a Close Protection Operative to apply the theory in a practical fashion 
which can sometime lead to a lack of fundamental understanding and reasoning as to why 
things are in fact done or need to be done in a certain way. In the bigger picture this could 
cost a Principal their life or an Operative their job. 
 
Further methods of categorisation of training and reference material identified sometimes 
divide skills knowledge based on the role, duty or function being taught. In other words 
the content is broken down according to specific job descriptions. For example, the role 
of personal escort section, role of residence security team, etc. These individual job 
descriptions are obviously systematic in application. 
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The last point of interest with regards to the various layouts encountered in the literature 
is that in many cases training manuals are further formatted into basic, intermediate and 
advanced sections or are separate manuals on their own based on the level of instruction 
and or competency required of the student. 
 
It is perhaps not as important to debate on the merits of subdivision as it is to identify the 
congruencies in the various structures and methodologies. Almost all manuals concur that 
each subject or subdivision is simply a part of the whole package. The vast majority of 
literature reviewed, at some point, emphasises that each aspect of Close Protection needs 
to be applied synergistically. This by its very nature refers to an integrated and holistic 
application of all protective and security concepts when being implemented.  
DEFINITION AND JOB DESCRIPTION 
 
The definition selected for this study is a summary and compilation from the available 
literature that was reviewed, as well as from the interviews conducted. Accordingly, the 
definition formulated for the purposes of this study is as follows: 
 
Close Protection can be defined as implementing all necessary tasks and 
related activities by trained professionals in order to primarily ensure the 
safety and security of a designated person (‘Principal’). This safety also 
implies the Principal’s peace of mind and if possible physical comfort.  
 
There are many different variations in definitions of CPOs and their job description. 
However, irrespective of the complexity, detail or even simplicity of any of these 
definitions, there appear to be three factors that are common throughout. All three are 
contained and can be discerned from the above definition, namely: 
 
1. Ensuring the Principal’s safety 
2. Ensuring the Principal’s peace of mind 
3. Ensuring the Principal’s comfort 
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All three are expanded upon and discussed in greater detail below: 
 
Ensuring the Principal’s safety 
This is the key fundamental which at first glance may appear fairly straightforward and 
simple but even some of the best presidential protection units in the world cannot give an 
absolute guarantee of safety to their leaders. It is often stated that all that can be offered is 
the best possible protection in any given situation. When referring to safety we are not 
only referring to the safety from physical attack but also the health of the principal, the 
safety of his family and the security of his possessions and business interests. 
 
Ensuring the Principal’s peace of mind 
This refers to the protection of the Principal’s integrity, public standing and associated 
aspects. The CPO is a representative of his/her Principal and any actions of the CPO 
could have possible negative repercussions for the Principal. This could have serious 
implications if the media reports these actions in a negative light. A Principal has to know 
and trust that his/her CPO has the Principal’s best interests in mind all the time.  
 
During the course of protecting a Principal a CPO may be exposed to classified and/or 
sensitive information about the Principal and his business interests or even 
family/personal life. It is vitally important that the CPO has the discretion and integrity to 
keep this information to him/herself. If the Principal cannot even trust the persons 
assigned to protect his life what sort of peace of mind would he/she have. 
 
Ensuring the Principal’s comfort 
This is the third concept outlined in the job description definition. Even though this is 
most definitely not the primary function of a CPO. However, if it does not expose the 
Principal to higher risk the CPO should try to make sure that the Principal is physically 
comfortable. If the principal appears to be safe then the majority of a CPO’s duties will 
be focused on ensuring the physical comfort of the Principal.  
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As an example to clarify this point, certain specialists feel a CPO should never carry 
shopping bags for the principal but if it is a low level client with very little risk and 
he/she would struggle to walk because of being overloaded with parcels, it would be most 
improper for the CPO to not assist since even if an attack took place the CPO could drop 
the bags and engage the threat. 
PROFILE OF A CPO 
 
“The CPO must conduct him/herself in a manner synonymous with the Principal at all 
times” (Sharp, 2003). 
 
By consolidating the key concepts in most of the documents that were reviewed the 
following job description for a CPO was compiled: 
 
• The modern day21 Close Protection Operative must be able to blend into any manner 
of situation.  
 
• Since the modern day protector spends a great deal of time with a client, he must 
carry him/herself with an air of professional authority, which can only be gained 
through realistic, thorough training and experience.  
 
• The modern close protector is a security specialist proficient in all areas related to 
protection. He/she must be able to operate as an individual or as part of a high-risk 
protection team.  
 
• A Close Protection Operative must be as functional on the shooting range, as at 
diplomatic functions or dinner parties. When a protector is assigned to a high level 
client, he/she not only assumes the risks of that client but also becomes a 
representative of the client.  
                                                 
21 The stereotype of a large aggressive individual wearing a suit and dark sunglasses and brandishing a firearm is far removed from the modern-day professionals 
who are trained to provide a comprehensive service in this highly specialised industry. 
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This means that all the actions of the protector are considered a direct reflection on the 
client. Therefore the actions, behaviour and public relations skills of the modern day 
protector must be in line with those of his client, in order to perform effectively in the 
modern day protective environment. 
METHODOLOGY USED TO ASSESS AND ANALYSE 
LITERATURE 
 
It was exceptionally difficult to subdivide the training and operational requirements of 
CPOs into workable formats. It was found that each author or training institution lists 
(prioritises) their material differently with the focus usually being specific to their own 
individual/personal ideas and methodology. Regardless of this almost all the reviewed 
training and instructional material tended to agree that in order to provide effective 
protection to a client, the close protection initiative (i.e. operation or assignment) needs to 
be holistic with all aspects of the protection being equally important. 
 
In order to consolidate the information into an easily understandable format, two primary 
methods were focused on: 
 
• The first method was to group similar training and operational ideas into the format as 
prescribed by the SAQA Unit Standard. Number 11510: ‘Provide Close Protection of 
Designated Persons’.22 
 
• The second method implemented was to group consistent ideas together and than 
explain all the relevant concepts to the reader. 
 
Each of these will be described in more detail below. 
 
                                                 
22 For more information see Annexure 6 on the National Skills Development Plan as well as Chapter 3: Regulatory aspects of Close Protection in South Africa. 
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SPECIFIC OUTCOMES AS STATED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY (SAQA) UNIT STANDARD 
 
A unit standard can be defined as a description of the necessary knowledge and skills 
needed to demonstrate competency in a given task. Since Close Protection is actually the 
cumulative effect of many synergistic tasks it is not as easy to explain all required tasks 
and set standards in a single unit standard. According to the existing unit standard23 for 
CPOs the specific outcomes for a CPO to demonstrate competency are as follows: 
 
Specific outcome 1: Ascertain the Principal’s brief and risk profile 
 
Specific outcome 2: Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a Principal 
 
Specific outcome 3: Protect a Principal during transit/foot/venue movement 
 
Specific outcome 4: Terminate and review protection operation 
 
Each of these will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
Specific outcome 1: Ascertain the Principal’s brief and risk profile 
The concept of gathering as much information as possible before planning and/or 
attempting to conduct an operation makes obvious sense. This is the format followed by 
many of the books, publications and manuals that were reviewed. The ‘Principal’s 
Brief’24 would include conducting and formulating a comprehensive ‘Principal Profile’,25 
assessing and collecting as much information on the Principal’s itinerary or movements 
and lastly conduct a comprehensive threat assessment and risk analysis. Such analysis to 
include aspects of the Principal’s business interests, political contacts or any other 
relevant information or external factors that could have an impact on the levels of risk 
associated with the persona of the Principal. 
                                                 
23 The unit standard is registered by SAQA and is currently being used by the POSLEC SETA to accredit service providers and trainers. 
24 The Principal’s Brief explains the way in which the Principal would like the protection detail to be run and his/her specific preferences.  
25 The Principal Profile is an ongoing process of gathering all useful information regarding all relevant aspects related to the Principal such as lifestyle, personality, 
history, personal relationships, etc. These would be formatted into a document that would outline all the applicable information. 
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Specific outcome 2: Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a principal 
Once the threats, risks and movements of the Principal have been determined 
comprehensive planning needs to take place. In order to provide comprehensive 
protection, planning needs to encompass the three aspects outlined above, namely 
protecting the Principal whilst at venues, in transit or moving on foot. The principal needs 
to be protected wherever he/she goes. Therefore arrangements must be made in order to 
be able to protect the Principal while in transit (flying, driving, etc.), while moving on 
foot and lastly at any venues or places where the Principal may be staying or visiting. 
 
Specific outcome 3: Protect a principal during transit/foot/venue movement 
Once comprehensive planning has been conducted and available resources have been 
allocated the actual protection operation must be conducted. A key idea that is applicable 
at this stage is the implementation of a flexible and adaptable approach. Performance of 
protection operations need to have extensive back up and contingency plans available and 
worked out in advance. It is assumed that the persons being utilized to provide the 
protection are all trained professionals and competent in all the sub-areas of protection 
(the latter will be described in the second part of this literature review.) 
 
Specific outcome 4: Terminate and review protection operation 
After the operation is completed it is necessary to conduct a debriefing in order to learn 
from any mistakes that may have occurred and to receive feedback from all the parties 
involved. All relevant documentation needs to be collected and consolidated in case they 
will be used for another operation, as well as to maintain operational security. At this 
stage CPOs normally submit task reports to be utilized by the team leader who will 
normally compile a full Operational Review document. 
 
A more practical example being that it does not matter whether the Principal is attacked 
in his/her hotel room or his/her house since the bottom line is that planning should have 
identified the likelihood of either occurrences and put in place the necessary avoidance or 
counter measures, i.e. contingency plans. 
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Even if this was not done the Close Protector’s should have been sufficiently trained to 
effectively manage (spontaneously respond as their training has taught them to) the attack 
and keep the Principal alive.  
GROUPING OF CONSISTENT THEMES 
 
In order to effectively summarise and group the relevant information into a workable 
format a generic categorisation was chosen. This format does not represent a 
recommended method of grouping but is simply the manner in which the researcher has 
chosen to present the relevant material in a logical manner. It is important to note that 
subject matter breakdown into the categories below will be further broken down into 
additional sub-divisions and that these categories are not listed in order of priority or 
importance. 
SUBJECT MATTER BREAKDOWN 
 
1. Protective skills 
2. Unarmed combat and Close Quarter Battle (CQB) skills 
3. Firearm and relevant tactical skills 
4. First aid and relevant medical skills 
5. Security 
6. Driver training 
7. Protocol and etiquette 
8. Written fieldwork 
9. Related skills 
 
These individual yet inter-related topics will be explained in the following section. This 
subject matter breakdown refers to the aspects of Close Protection that are standard 
within the majority of texts that were examined. In the various publications and manuals 
there are often differences in technical jargon but once analysed it became clear that the 
operational principles, outline and job descriptions are generally consistent. (The above 
mentioned subdivisions will be outlined below.) 
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PROTECTION SKILLS 
 
This field comprises the following subjects:  
 
Protective team formations – individual and group 
This provides an overview of how protective teams are manned, the general roles and 
duties as well as certain concepts as applied to team dynamics. The aim of the material 
dealing with this subject is to provide an overview of team and operational structure. 
Moreover, it is impossible to understand the structure of a protection detail fully unless 
the key roles and duties of Close Protection are understood. These are explained in more 
detail as stand alone concepts in the majority of literature reviewed therefore they are 
further explained below. 
 
The Protective/Personal Escort Section (PES) 
Often referred to as the moving shield around a Principal, these are the members of the 
Close Protection team that move around with the Principal. CPOs operating in this role 
attempt to fulfil six primary functions and tasks namely: 
 
• To protect the Principal by shielding him/her physically with the CPO’s body 
• To divert potential attack away from the Principal by being an extra target for the 
attacker to deal with 
• To rescue the Principal by removing him/her from the immediate vicinity/ scene 
of the incident 
• To neutralise an attacker by means of any methods of combat skills (only if this 
preserves the Principals’ life and no other alternatives are available) 
• If necessary support the Principals’ life by providing first aid until more qualified 
help arrives. 
• To liaise with authorities in order to enlist their assistance in preventing or 
combating an incident.  
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The Personal Escort Section (PES), as a direct result of the duties they perform, represent 
the Principal in the public perception more then many other of the close protection 
functions. This can be directly attributed to the close proximity to the Principal in which 
PES members operate. 
 
The Secure/Security Advance Party (SAP)  
The role of the Secure Advance Party (SAP) is primarily to provide as much information 
as possible before a Principal undertakes any action, activity or excursion. Information to 
be collected by the SAP includes details on the routes, venues, logistical considerations, 
liaisons with applicable contact persons, situational and environmental threats and/or any 
other relevant information that may concern the Principal or the PES team. The SAP may 
travel from location to location before the PES and the Principal arrive or once the 
Principal arrives merge with the PES team and than primarily operate in that role. 
 
The Residence Security Team (RST)  
The Residence Security Team’s (RST) duties are primarily to secure and protect the 
Principal’s residence. It does not matter what or where the Principal’s residence is 
(mansion, flat, yacht or hut) the team designated to protect this is fulfilling the 
operational definition of a RST. Residence security itself focuses mainly on the 
application of physical security measures such as alarms, lighting, access control, etc. 
The RST are the persons who run and manage these physical measures as well as handle 
the relevant human factor security issues such as patrols or access control.  
 
Venue protection 
Venue protection involves all the applied security actions taken to ensure the safety of the 
Principal when he/she is visiting places or locations other than his/her home or working 
environment. The concept of protection at various venues focuses primarily on the 
positioning of manpower in different situations according to the physical layout, 
information collected during advance work, available manpower, the Principal’s wishes 
and of course the relevant threats. Most reviewed literature provides preferred positioning 
of manpower in the following situations:  
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• at restaurants  
• movies or theatres 
• functions and ceremonies  
• rallies or events  
• presentations or speaking engagements.  
 
The principles taught using these examples provide a basis for understanding of how to 
position the protective detail in almost any situation. 
 
Protection principles and techniques 
In several of the texts that were examined there were additional chapters and modules 
covering specifically concepts such as Immediate Action Drills (IADs) which are 
planned, trained responses to an attack or specified situation. In certain of the manuals 
several IADs were explained in considerable detail but the primary examples described 
and explained were:  
 
• an attack with a firearm at different ranges 
• an attack with a knife  
• hand grenade attack  
• unarmed close quarters attack (Braunig, 1993; Consterdine, 1995; Dynamic 
Alternatives, 2003; Rapp and Lesce 1995; and Thompson, 2003). 
 
There are slight differences in the way that the various literature recommend IADs be 
performed. However, there is common ground in all of them when describing the key 
aspects such as awareness techniques, communications and reactions. Almost all of these 
include engagement and evacuation as well as applied team tactics based on the number 
of team members involved. 
 
Counter Action Teams (CAT) 
Counter Action Teams (CAT) refer to a team that accompanies the Principal and the PES, 
usually found at the rear of a motorcade or at the back of the close protection detail. The 
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CAT team have usually received more extensive training and therefore have increased 
capability with regards to counter attack and tactical intervention techniques. Their 
primary function would be to respond in the case of an attack situation.  
 
In an attack the CAT team would aggressively counterattack the ‘active opposition’ (AO) 
while the PES and Bodyguard evacuate the Principal. In extreme situations members of 
the CAT team may also function as counter snipers providing cover for the close 
protection detail. 
UNARMED COMBAT AND CLOSE QUARTER BATTLE (CQB) 
 
This subdivision is often referred to as self defence. However, most of the literature 
reviewed seems to identify the importance of a comprehensive approach to this sort of 
training. It is a logical concept to understand that before an individual is capable of 
protecting someone else they must first have the capability to defend themselves. Certain 
manuals advocate a martial arts approach, but the more progressive literature focuses on 
the practical application of effective techniques and principles necessary to restrain, 
incapacitate or neutralise an attacker.  
 
This subject can be further subdivided as follows:  
 
Unarmed combat  
Unarmed combat refers to the use of natural body weapons (e.g. hands and feet) and 
similar defensive strategies to effectively disengage from confrontation or disable and 
neutralise an attacker if necessary. Natural body weapons include any part of the body 
that could be utilised to inflict harm on an attacker (head, hands, elbows, feet, etc.). It 
also includes all relevant techniques found in combat applicable martial arts such as joint 
locking, throwing and wrestling.  
 
Certain manuals concentrate on the accessing of pressure and nerve points as an effective 
part of their unarmed combat strategy. This topic will be expanded on in Chapter 9 (Use 
of force and close protection).  
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Edged weapon combat 
Edged weapon combat applies to the use of bladed weapons like knives or any other 
implement that can be utilised in a cutting or stabbing like motion. This topic is totally 
absent from a fair amount of the literature reviewed. This is possibly due to the 
complexity of its nature and the conflicting opinions on what is effective and what is not. 
The concept of ‘knife fighting’ as applied to Close Protection focuses primarily on the 
capability to defend against edged weapon attack. It should be noted that in order to 
effectively defend against a weapon an operative must first understand how it works. This 
is vital otherwise there is no way of knowing what to expect and it is impossible to 
defend against something when the methods of application are not known by the 
defender. 
 
Improvised weapon combat 
Improvised weapon combat includes the use of any environmental tool that can be 
utilised with which to defend yourself in the case of an attack, e.g. pens, sticks or 
stones/rocks. This becomes very important in Close Protection since when operating 
internationally a CPO may not be allowed to carry any ‘weaponry’ at all with him/her 
into another country. Therefore the CPOs ability to deal with attack has to become more 
reliant on the use of weapons that can be found in the general or immediate environment. 
This topic is not widely discussed in most literature. However, the increasing importance 
for CPOs to possess this capability is becoming universally accepted.  
 
Use of alternative weapons 
‘Alternative weapons’ refers to weaponry other than firearms and edged weapons that 
may be utilised by CPOs as part of their operational equipment. Examples of alternative 
weaponry are tools such as the ASP baton, stun guns, handcuffs, mace or pepper spray.  
The CPO’s ability to utilise alternative weapons provides a platform from which it is 
easier to comply with legalities such as use of minimum force during self defence. It also 
enables the CPO to better defend against such weapons should the need arise as he/she 
would have a working knowledge of how an attacker would effectively utilise such tools. 
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Team tactics and applied unarmed combat 
The concept of team tactics refers to the manner in which a Close Protection team would 
implement their unarmed combat and close quarters battle (CQB) into their IADs. 
Applied unarmed combat means that whatever techniques and tactics that are taught to 
CPOs need to be practiced and implemented into the Close Protection function as a 
whole.  
 
All these concepts become increasingly important when considering close protection 
operations in crowds and when multiple attackers are involved. A small minority of the 
literature reviewed included unarmed combat and related IADs for various contingencies. 
The main example cited in most manuals was that of restraining overzealous fans who do 
not wish to hurt the Principal but may land up doing so as they are not in control of their 
actions, i.e. pressure or force of crowd behind them pushing to get near a Principal. 
  
Restraint and control techniques 
‘Restraint and control tactics’ are those techniques and practices that enable an attacker to 
be subdued without any permanent damage or injury being inflicted on him/her. This 
subfield is of more importance to strictly law enforcement personnel than to CPOs. There 
is, however, a trend for certain close protection details that have enough manpower to 
focus on utilising these techniques. An example of this would be in applying the tactic of 
‘swarming’ where a large number of CPOs literally swarm all over the attacker/s, 
overwhelming him/her by sheer numbers and weight but not actually striking or inflicting 
injury on the attacker in the process.  
FIREARM SKILLS 
 
The use of firearms in close protection situations has become a topic of considerable 
debate and controversy all over the world. This has huge ramifications for CPO training 
and operations. When reviewing the literature it was found that this topic is treated very 
inconsistently. This is primarily because most manuals are written for persons to operate 
in a specific environment. As a result certain manuals concentrate on this in great detail 
whereas others would leave it out almost entirely. 
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Much of the European literature does not refer to use of firearms in any great detail. This 
being stated the majority of the literature reviewed still attempts to provide a relatively 
comprehensive platform for the use of firearms while performing close protection 
functions. The generic subject divisions of related firearms training are outlined below: 
  
Basic firearm understanding and training 
The key concepts that are taught under this heading would fall primarily into one of two 
areas namely: safe handling of firearms; and maintenance of firearms. The concepts and 
principles taught in this subfield form a foundation for further training to build on. Due to 
the nature of close protection work an armed CPO must possess quite a high level of 
competency with regards to the usage of firearms. This is vital within the context of the 
following aspects relevant to CPO work. 
 
• Crowds: Work in crowds, which means that inaccurate firing of a firearm or over 
penetration (i.e. bullet going right through a target) could harm innocent 
civilians/bystanders. 
 
• Firing and movement: The majority of IADs utilising firearms involve firing and 
movement which is difficult to perform unless good training and constant retraining is 
in place. 
 
• Firing distances: The range (distance) at which the CPO will have to shoot often 
varies, meaning that a CPO has to have the necessary skills to compensate for sudden 
changes in range and conditions (e.g. visibility, rain, wind, trajectory 
‘downhill/uphill’, etc.) (Braunig, 1993; Consterdine, 1995; Dynamic Alternatives, 
2002 and Thompson, 2003.). 
  
Target shooting skills 
Target shooting skills specific to Close Protection refers to the ability of a CPO or team 
to be able to effectively shoot and hit various targets from different positions in different 
places and conditions. 
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This denotes fire and movement, shooting from cover and vehicles, as well as 
implementation of IADs with firearms. The ability of a CPO to be able to fire quickly and 
accurately is vital. 
 
There are different schools of thought with regards to targeting. However, most 
professionals seem to agree that the focus of training should be to hit ‘centre mass’ (the 
centre of the human body) with the additional ability to fire accurate head shots being 
secondary. In other words the CPO must be able to accurately hit the centre mass with 
multiple shots while moving and implementing the appropriate immediate action drill. 
 
Firearm Close Quarter Battle (CQB) skills 
‘Close Quarters Battle’ (CQB) denotes the use of the firearm at extreme close ranges in 
conjunction with unarmed combat (this includes not only firing the weapon but striking 
with it as well as utilising unarmed combat). As stated above in the sub-section on ‘the 
range of engagement’, the distance of an attack may vary and change very quickly. This, 
as well as the fact that in many situations CPOs operate in crowds, means that the 
capability of a CPO to effectively draw and use a firearm (the ability to draw the weapon 
and engage valid targets as quickly as possible is vital at short distances) at close range is 
an important part of his/her ability to effectively deal with attack. 
 
Urban movement and house penetration skills 
This concept refers to utilising the firearm in combat related situations that may occur in 
built up areas where the CPO may have to move through obstacles and buildings safely. 
The main principle focuses on how to keep yourself behind cover and move when 
necessary while still being able to effectively engage and neutralise the enemy. When 
looking at this skill in the context of a Close Protector’s role it is clearly not the same as a 
tactical or intervention operator whose roles may include tasks such as engaging in 
hostage rescue. Rather the CPO may need these skills primarily when separated from the 
Principal who may be under attack and the CPO must get to and evacuate a Principal in 
such a manner that would provide the minimum exposure to the existing threat. 
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Night shooting skills 
The ability to fire accurately in low light conditions as well as utilise torches or 
illumination devices (such as laser pointers or illuminated sights) while engaging the 
attacker is an important skill for Close Protection Operatives that may have to work in 
varying environments at different times (i.e. in a hotel, at an office, at the Principal’s 
residence or even whilst in transit). There has been much technological advancement in 
the field of low light shooting, including red-dot sights, laser sights and torch attachments 
clipping directly onto the firearm. In extreme circumstances even night vision scopes are 
available. However, these would not really be applicable to the protection role of CPOs. 
 
Protection team and single operative firearm skills 
This sub-field focuses on the use of firearms as related to Close Protection. This involves 
various techniques as a single operative or team integrating protective strategies and 
techniques. The generic aims would be to provide cover for the Principal, divert the 
attack away from the Principal, neutralise the attacker and then evacuate the Principal 
while firing or being in such a position to be able to fire. These could also include actions 
while driving and getting into or out of vehicles. These drills need to be rehearsed until 
they are instinctive.  
 
This is vital since if a CPO or team is not well versed in such tactics and able to respond 
instinctively there could well be delays in providing protection to the Principal which in 
itself could have disastrous outcomes. Innocent civilians, the Principal and/or team 
members could get shot or hurt if these drills are not effectively conducted. 
 
Firearm disarming skills 
When considering the huge advantage that attackers will have over the Protection Team 
as a result of surprise, it is vital for a CPO to have the ability to disarm an attacker who is 
pointing a firearm at either him/herself, another CPO, his/her principal or at a crowd. 
This aspect goes hand-in-hand with effective unarmed combat skills. Competencies 
should include being able to stop a potential attacker from drawing a weapon as well as to 
disarm an attacker that may already have their firearm out.  
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Firearm retention skills 
Retention refers to the CPO’s ability to prevent an attacker from disarming him/her. The 
CPO needs to have the necessary skills to maintain control of their own firearm whether 
in the holster position or drawn and in use. This skill is also closely linked to the CPO 
having effective unarmed combat ability. As with disarming techniques the CPO must 
possess techniques to retain the weapon when moving through crowded areas while the 
weapon is holstered, as well as when the CPO has to draw the weapon.  
 
Choice of holsters may have a large influence on this and many manuals recommend a 
holster with a retention clip for CPOs working in crowds since the clip would make it 
more difficult for an attacker in the crowd to remove the firearm from the holster whilst 
the extra time taken to draw the weapon is negligible. When considering the risks of the 
firearm being taken off an operative in such a situation a holster designed to make a 
disarm more difficult would definitely be an advantage for a CPO. 
 
Weapon integration skills 
Depending on the threat level to a Principal a CPO may need to have access to heavier 
weaponry than pistols (e.g. assault rifles, shotguns, etc.).  
In addition to such instances the CPO, if correctly trained, will be carrying alternative 
weaponry (such as batons and pepper sprays) and should be able to switch from weapon 
to weapon as the situation and use of force levels dictate.  
 
The key competency when describing weapon integration skills is the ability to transition 
smoothly from one weapon to another while applying applicable principles of close 
protection. This provides for contingencies that may occur and takes into account laws 
governing the use of force, as well as the guiding principle of limiting any harm 
occurring to innocent bystanders in crowded areas. 
FIRST AID 
 
A CPO needs to be able to provide not just emergency first aid but also deal with any 
medical related problems affecting his client until more qualified medical assistance is 
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available. Comprehensive first aid knowledge is vital for the protector in order to be able 
to perform all first aid related duties that may be required by the Principal or his family.  
 
In the literature that was reviewed there was inconsistency as to what level of medical 
competency a CPO should have. The majority of manuals covered only the basic key 
concepts of first aid as relevant to close protection, namely: 
 
• Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation 
• Dealing with choking 
• Dealing with wounds and bleeding 
 
In certain cases it was suggested that CPOs need to undergo more comprehensive first aid 
training which would be done through external first aid training bodies such as the Red 
Cross or St Johns Ambulance Service.  
SECURITY AND PLANNING  
 
Most of the literature examined follows a similar outline with regards to planning and 
security assessments. There are slight differences in approach and layout of the different 
material but very little difficulty was experienced in identifying the key points and 
common trends. These trends can be summarised as follows: 
 
• In order to successfully plan security, effectively allocate resources and hopefully 
prevent attacks on the Principal the first step is to gather all necessary information in 
order to conduct a thorough risk and threat assessment. 
  
• This would happen together with a comprehensive principal profiling exercise. 
Principal profiling involves gathering as much information as possible on the 
Principal and formatting it into a workable structure to be used as an aid to 
determining a Principal’s exposure to various threats and risks. 
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• A comprehensive risk analysis and threat assessment then needs to take place in order 
to determine the best manner in which to provide protection.  
 
• Once these documents have been compiled, a summary of available resources must 
be collated. It is important at this stage to determine budgetary constraints and 
logistical considerations in order to maximise the use of resources to take place 
within a set budget. 
 
• It is then a process of deciding how best to allocate resources according to the 
identified risks and threats and to minimise the potential of those threats happening. 
This must take place while planning around the Principal taking into consideration 
such factors as his/her likes or dislikes and the need for the Principal to try and 
function with the minimum disruption to his or her routine or itinerary. 
 
In order to gather the necessary information, analyse, collate and structure that 
information into a practical format from which a comprehensive plan as well as the 
necessary contingency plans can be drawn up, the following aspects need to be not only 
understood but applied in the correct manner: 
 
• Understanding security as a whole  
• Basic intelligence collection and processing  
• Terrorism and assassination 
• Bomb and Identification of Explosive Devices (IED) 
• Threat analysis (obtaining information and carefully analysing it) 
• Risk assessment (obtaining information and weighing up or assessing the 
analysed information) 
• Surveillance and counter surveillance.  
 
The above subjects form separate yet interrelated parts of conducting a well run security 
operation. It is important to stress that all these aspects must be viewed holistically and 
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that when applied there is an intrinsic synergy in the way that each aspect enhances the 
manner in which the final planning is produced. 
ADVANCED DRIVING 
 
Provision of close protection in South Africa is often confused with the services that a 
Security Driver (see Chapter 5 for more details on a Security Driver) might provide. 
However, there is no doubt that many CPOs that are currently operating in South Africa 
today function primarily as drivers. This is probably because most clients perceive this as 
the biggest risk area, i.e. when in transit between a safe location to a secured venue (this 
has to do with the vulnerabilities of such transporting and the high risk of vehicle high-
jacking especially in the Gauteng Province of South Africa). 
 
In addition to the specialist skills of convoy and evasive driving it is fundamental that a 
CPO is a well trained defensive driver capable of recognising and avoiding any potential 
collision before it occurs.  
The concept of ‘defensive driving’ is centred on identifying potential hazards before they 
pose a problem. The driver would than implement the necessary avoidance and 
management skills to ensure the safety and smooth journey of the Passenger/Principal.  
 
Evasive driving includes all the necessary skills that would be applied when dealing with 
attack, surveillance or ambush situations. Lastly convoy driving refers to the tactics, 
practices and application of formations utilised by a close protection detail when 
travelling with multiple vehicles. This is all done to minimise the chance of attack on the 
Principal while in transit from being successful. 
 
Each of these will be explained in more detail below: 
 
Defensive driving 
This is the ability to handle a vehicle in a safe and competent manner. It involves learning 
to pre-empt the mistakes that other drivers might make and take preventative action 
before they happen. The focus of defensive skills is on being sufficiently aware to 
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proactively identify any hazards in the environment with enough time to avoid or at the 
very least manage them. It is important to emphasize the vehicle control skills that are 
relevant under this heading such as managing skids, effective breaking procedures and 
emergency lane and direction changes. A CPO must at least be able to perform these 
skills to be considered competent. 
 
Security awareness and preventative driving 
This involves the integration of security concepts into defensive driving application. It 
means implementing knowledge a trained CPO should possess of anti-ambush, sniping 
attacks and vehicle security into every day driving practice. 
  
Convoy/motorcade driving 
This is also often referred to as motorcade driving. This aspect describes the manner in 
which a Principal is transported when there are two or more vehicles available to provide 
protection.  
The methodology is designed to provide maximum security to the Principal by strategic 
positioning of the vehicles during all aspects of travel (stopping, cornering, intersections, 
etc.).This combined with planned immediate action drills should enable the convoy to 
effectively manage as many potential attacks and contingencies in the most practical 
manner while ensuring the Principal’s safety 
  
Evasive driving 
Sometimes called offensive driving, evasive driving refers to the techniques employed 
when utilising the vehicle itself as a weapon, shield or evacuation tool. It includes 
advanced handling, high speed driving, and the use of techniques such as handbrake and 
reverse turns to effectively avoid or engage an attacker.  
 
Various manuals go into the topic of driving at different levels. However, it is by nature a 
very practical subject. Therefore many of the important nuances cannot be found in the 
literature itself but only becomes apparent when interviewing close protection trainers 
and by observing the actual training (driving of vehicles) of CPOs. 
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PROTOCOL AND ETIQUETTE 
 
This aspect is emphasised in all the literature reviewed and includes a wide range of 
subjects. The aim of training in ‘protocol and etiquette’, as defined in several manuals, is 
to enable the CPO to conduct him/herself in a manner synonymous with the Principal and 
fitting for any situation/environment that the protector might find him/herself in. The 
modern day protector must be able to blend in at ambassadorial house parties or on a 
bush safari. A CPO must be thoroughly versed in protocol to prevent embarrassment or 
discomfort to his/her Principal or other associated party.  
 
The broad topic of protocol not only covers the obvious aspects of appearance and 
behaviour but goes deeper into the correct manner of liaison with various parties. Another 
factor to consider is the practical application of protocol. In other words how protocol 
influences the CPO’s ability to effectively protect the Principal and respond to attack 
situations if necessary.  
It is vital that a CPO is able to relate to persons of different cultures and backgrounds, as 
the majority of persons utilising CPOs are international visitors to South Africa. Protocol 
can be subdivided into the following areas: 
 
• Dress or appearance  
• Communication skills 
• Personal hygiene  
• Habits 
• Behaviour  
• Social skills  
• Customs and traditions. 
 
All of the above are important in order to develop sophisticated, professional and well-
rounded CPOs that can interact at any social level with their clients and Principals. Below 
the basic requirements and skills for each sub-division are discussed in more detail. 
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Dress and appearance  
The overall appearance of a CPO is vital to his/her ability to function in a professional 
manner. The Principal needs to be able to respect and trust their CPO. This is very 
difficult to do if the CPO does not look the part or is unhygienic and untidy or does not 
dress suitably for the situation in which he/she is working. The CPO also needs to be able 
to blend into the immediate environment, i.e. not be conspicuous, and must thus dress 
accordingly. The need to blend in is accentuated by the fact that the majority of close 
protection operations in South Africa are performed in a low profile manner. A CPO not 
able to blend in would attract undue attention and therefore not be able to perform their 
duties very effectively, i.e. compromise the security of an assignment. 
 
A key guideline for CPOs regarding dress and appearance would be to rather over dress 
than under dress as you can always dress down to blend into a situation but it does not 
necessarily work the other way around. Another consideration is that the CPO should 
attempt not to dress in a way that overshadows the Principal.  
The bottom line is that the CPO must dress appropriately for the situation and according 
to the Principal’s wishes while still being able to react tactically if necessary (draw 
weapons, run or fight, etc.). 
  
Communication skills 
This concept includes much more than simply being able to verbally communicate with 
persons. It involves all aspects of communication namely verbal, non-verbal, written and 
the subtle skill of utilising body language to communicate. Much of a CPO’s work will 
involve liaising with not only the Principal but any person that can contribute to the 
success of an operation in any way.  
 
Therefore it is vital that the CPO is not only able to verbalise his/her requests in a concise 
and effective fashion but is also able to relate to people of different cultures, backgrounds 
and experience. This is made even more important by the mix of cultures and 
backgrounds of people living in and visiting South Africa these days.  
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Personal hygiene  
Most literature includes the topic of ‘hygiene’. Even though to most persons the simple 
act of maintaining personal cleanliness and a professional appearance seems obvious it is 
a topic that cannot be ignored. Due to the fact that a CPO may be mixing with persons of 
high standing, it is essential for him/her to maintain a sufficient level of grooming to 
blend in and not attract undue attention to themselves or their Principal. It has been the 
experience of the researcher that many CPO trainees from previously disadvantaged 
backgrounds (through no fault of their own) need the basics of personal hygiene 
explained to them in detail. 
 
Habits 
 ‘Habits’ refer to activities that are done so often that a person does not consciously 
realise that they are being performed.  
 
It goes without saying that good habits such as constant scanning and utilising proactive 
awareness are vital for a CPO to carry out their job effectively. While positive habits are 
very important this section is primarily concerned with negative habits such as smoking 
or swearing. Certain literary sources go as far as to list and describe a whole range of bad 
habits that could offend or embarrass the CPO and his/her Principal. Some key guidelines 
that were included were aspects such as drinking of alcohol, physical habits (i.e. 
scratching inappropriate parts of the body), verbal habits (e.g. swearing) and learnt habits 
(smoking). Many of the manuals reviewed did not assume that the trainee would know 
these things and therefore explained them in a fair amount of detail. 
 
Behaviour  
Behaviour primarily refers to the manner in which a CPO conducts himself when around 
the Principal. The idea is for the CPO to have the capability to behave in the correct 
manner in a wide variety of situations (social and business). For instance the CPO needs 
to know how to behave at embassy parties, in the business environment, as well as when 
exposed to the Principal’s private and family lifestyle. The better trained the CPO the 
more at ease he/she is in whatever the environment he/she must operate in. This enables 
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him/her to effectively perform the required protection duties without causing 
embarrassment to him/herself or the Principal. 
 
An interesting point included under the subheading of ‘behaviour’ is that it is equally 
important for a CPO to conduct him/herself ‘correctly’ not only while working but all the 
time (i.e. even while off duty and in private life). The rationale behind this is that a CPO 
may be observed by clients while behaving inappropriately and might then not again be 
utilised by that client on operations in the future. 
 
Social skills  
A social skill refers to the way in which the CPO interacts with people in different 
environments. It also includes the correct etiquette that is involved when greeting 
persons, the correct manner to eat in formal environments as well as the correct 
behaviour when mixing with persons of high standing.  
There are many guidelines for CPOs that fall under this heading. Some of the more 
generic concepts that apply here are concepts such as: “when confused mirror the people 
around you”; and “when unsure rather be more formal in approach and language use” 
(Dynamic Alternatives, 2002: 234-236). 
 
Customs and traditions 
 It is vital for a professional CPO to have at least a rudimentary understanding of the 
customs and traditions of different persons that they may interact with during the course 
of performing close protection duties. This is important since people may be offended by 
a CPO’s actions without the CPO even realising it. Ignorance is not an excuse since once 
a person has been offended it may be difficult to undo the damage caused. This may 
cause embarrassment to the CPO and the Principal, as well as make any future interaction 
with the offended party difficult.  
 
Some of the literature reviewed classifies customs and traditions into cultural, 
geographical and religious categories. Specific behavioural guidelines for the CPO under 
each of those headings were outlined in the literature that included the sub-heading of 
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‘Culture’. It is a well accepted fact by active members of the close protection industry 
that more CPOs lose their jobs over protocol and etiquette related transgressions than for 
any other reasons. This fact is easily explained as a Principal will probably never see a 
CPO’s hard skills ever being applied (shooting, tactical driving, unarmed combat, etc.) 
unless something goes drastically wrong during the protection assignment. Therefore the 
interaction between the Principal and his protectors will be limited to the facets of 
protocol and etiquette as outlined above.  
WRITTEN FIELD WORK  
 
Compiling of relevant documents is something covered in almost all literature reviewed. 
The newer textbooks and manuals also now include computer and internet skills as a 
‘must’ (required skill) for all CPOs. The ability to collate collected information and 
format it into usable documents that can be disseminated to all the parties that require the 
aforesaid information is a ‘must have’ for any professional CPO.  
Most of the reviewed literature primarily groups the applicable written documents under 
their relevant operational subject group. For example threat assessments fall under 
planning. For the sake of practical classification under the sub-heading of written 
fieldwork, the relevant documents are outlined as a group. The general written documents 
that are covered and explained in most literature are as follows: 
 
Warning order 
This is usually a short document drawn up before confirmation of an operation is 
received. The content of a warning order is usually verbally communicated to the relevant 
team members or may be passed on telephonically. The warning order serves as an 
indicator to the team members as to what may be expected of them, when it will take, 
place a brief overview of the principal and of the threats known at that stage. In other 
words a warning order serves to alert CPOs to the basic details of a future assignment and 
that such an assignment is in the offing.  
 
An outline of what is going to happen next (order of proceedings) is usually included 
covering aspects such as the chain of command and relevant contact people. Because a 
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warning order is often given verbally or telephonically specific details are often not 
included or pre-arranged code words are used. 
OPERATIONAL APPRECIATION 
An ‘Operational Appreciation’ is an activity designed to provide an overview of the 
situation and then enable the persons planning an operation to determine what resources 
are needed and than allocate them effectively. The Principal Profile, the threat assessment 
and risk analysis, categorising of the Principal and task as well as determining what 
security should be implemented, all fall under the heading of ‘Operational Appreciation’.  
 
Each of these will be outlined below: 
 
Threat assessments 
There are several formats for threat and risk assessments that were identified in the 
literature reviewed. However, they generically seem to have four key components. The 
first component is the Principal profile which can be a stand alone document and is 
explained in the next heading.  
 
The second is a risk and threat analysis which involves determining all the relevant 
threats that a principal could be exposed to and then correlating them with the Principal 
Profile to determine the risk factors (actual likelihood of an identified threat occurring). 
The next step is referred to as categorising or designation of threats. This process 
involves several systems of analysing the threat and risk as well as correlating these with 
the Principal Profile and Principal’s proposed itinerary. The outcome of Principal 
categorisation is to allocate the Principal and the operation (assignment) into a pre-
defined category. 
 
The classifications into various categories can get quite complex but as a simple 
overview the Principal and/or operation could be grouped into a low threat, medium 
threat or high threat category. Each of these would involve different logistical and 
operational requirements. This last aspect involves deciding on the security and way that 
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it will be applied in order to minimise the likelihood of the defined threat and risks 
occurring or at the very least minimising the effects of the threat should it occur. 
 
Principal profiling  
It is impossible to plan for an effective close protection initiative if nothing is known 
about the Principal. There are several systems and methods used to profile the Principal. 
Profiling in its simplest form is an attempt to find out as much as possible about a 
Principal in order to determine what sort of person they are and what factors linked to 
his/her persona might impact on the safety and security of the close protection operation. 
In the close protection context this is vital since not knowing relevant information about 
the Principal could lead to the unwitting exposure to threats that could have been avoided 
or planned for.  
 
When referring to the definition of Close Protection it would be almost impossible to 
ensure the Principal’s peace of mind and comfort if nothing is known about his/her likes 
and dislikes.  
 
In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the concept of Principal 
Profiling a method commonly utilised known as the ‘7 Ps of Principal profiling’ 
(Dynamic Alternatives, 2003, 53-55)26 will be described. The fundamental concept is that 
under each heading as much relevant information regarding the Principal as possible 
should be collected. This information will then be sorted and classified before being 
converted into the final format. 
 
The seven Ps of Principal profiling are as follows: 
 
1. Places 
Places refer to all places associated with the principal, i.e. where he/she likes to go, where 
they work, live and play. 
                                                 
26 The ‘7 P’s’ were originally taken from the instructional handouts of Mr DM Sharp (for details on Mr Sharp see References: Interview 1) of Task International UK 
and were utilised by Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd with his full permission. 
  91
2. People 
Under the heading of people as many people that are related to, associated with or at 
some time or other have had interaction with the Principal should be included. 
  
3. Political and religious persuasions  
This refers specifically to the relevant political and religious persuasions of the Principal.  
 
4. Prejudices  
Prejudices concerns what the Principal likes and dislikes (e.g. extreme dislike for people 
that smoke). 
 
5. Personal history 
Personal history covers where the principal has been and what he/she has done to get to 
where he/she is now. 
 
6. Private Lifestyle  
Private lifestyle refers to what the Principal does in his/her spare time including 
recreational activities hobbies and pastimes. 
 
7. Personality  
Personality overviews what sort of personality characteristics the Principal exhibits, i.e. 
quiet and withdrawn, outspoken and extroverted, etc. 
 
Once all this information has been collected it can then be analysed eliminating what may 
be considered superfluous or not relevant to the specific task at hand. The process would 
than be to transform the information into a workable document to assist in operational 
planning and the briefing of the operational team. 
 
Operations order 
An Operations Order (Ops Order) is the finalised document outlining the whos, whats, 
whens, whys and hows of a close protection operation. It should provide as much 
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information as possible including the operation specific Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs). The Ops Order should be detailed enough to cover most of the contingencies that 
may occur. It should also cover any additional information with regards to protocol, 
dress, communications and logistical information. 
 
Record and report keeping 
In most situations each operative would submit a report at the end of each operation or 
segment of an operation. The procedure for this would be outlined in the Operational 
Orders SOPs. After receiving each CPO’s report the team leader would prepare a 
comprehensive operational report which could serve as feedback for the client.  
 
Another benefit of receiving feedback and compiling an operational report is that it 
provides a platform for the review of mistakes that may have occurred. It also provides an 
opportunity to clarify how such mistakes can be avoided in the future.  
 
Information documents should than be stored in a secure environment as information 
gathered and lessons learned may very well be applied on future operations even if the 
operation is not with the same Principal. Secure storage of documents is vital since if the 
information obtained in these documents should fall into the wrong hands it would be 
relatively easy to plan an attack on future Principals. Once again it is important to note 
the way that technology is influencing the approach to compiling these documents and 
formatting them into information databases which can easily be accessed and utilised in 
future operations. Accordingly, a modern CPO should as a matter of course be at least 
reasonably computer literate and be proficient in the use of basic computer programmes. 
RELATED SKILLS 
 
In several manuals and other literature sources that were reviewed certain topics that 
could not really be grouped into the above broad categories were identified. These topics 
and subjects have thus been grouped under the heading of ‘related skills’. The inclusion 
of such topics may be controversial to some close protection practitioners since in certain 
manuals some of the skills listed were described as superfluous and not actually 
  93
applicable for close protection work. With the aim of being impartial during the review 
process the following topics have been included: 
 
Hostage crisis and management 
This subject makes reference to the accepted operating procedures that apply to hostage 
situations and the role that a CPO will play should the Principal and/or themselves be 
taken hostage. The following key aspects are outlined in the literature that contained 
information on this topic: 
 
• Negotiation techniques   
• Hostage survival  
• Stress identification and coping 
• Escape and evasion was also covered in certain manuals but very superficially and 
mainly relating to the operations of specialist military units that may perform 
close protection tasks in areas where there is minimal support and infrastructure. 
 
Anti- and counter-terrorism 
The topic of terrorism is covered in almost every training manual reviewed but in varying 
detail. However, certain literature goes into much greater depth than others by outlining 
the roles and duties that would be necessary to implement in order to prevent acts of 
terrorism from taking place (‘anti-terrorism’) and how to manage and deal with terrorist 
attacks and situations that may occur (‘counter terrorism’). It should be noted that whilst 
a CPO may not need comprehensive anti- or counter-terrorist training he/she should at 
the very least have a basic knowledge of terrorist activity. Most manuals included notes 
and background information on the following aspects of terrorism: 
 
• Terrorist groups 
• Terrorist selection and training  
• General modus operandi 
• Effects of terrorism on security and close protection. 
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The literature which included anti- and counter terrorism also focused on tactical 
responses to terrorist threats. Some literature also provided comprehensive notes on the 
mindset of terrorists as well as some of the strategies to identify terrorist activity and 
prevent it from affecting a CPO’s Principal. 
 
Counter-sniping 
In certain texts counter-sniping is also referred to as selective tactical marksmanship. 
This subject could also be placed in the section on firearms training (dealt with later in 
this report). However, the texts that contained information on this subject had it as a 
separate module.  
In order to employ counter sniping principles it is important to know the basic 
fundamentals of sniping. This is taught and explained in order for CPOs to know how to 
implement counter measures and plan against a sniping attack. 
 
Specialised tactical training 
A few of the manuals reviewed included information on some of the topics below, while 
others mentioned these aspects as ‘nice to haves’ but not really necessary for Close 
Protection Operations. Some of these skills would be more applicable when the training 
of Counter Action Teams (CAT teams) is considered. It was also stated that if there was a 
high enough threat level to warrant the use of a person with the skills below, they could 
be sub-contracted and brought in to assist on a temporary basis. More comprehensive 
tactical training may include some of the following aspects: 
• Rope work (rappelling and abseiling, use of ropes to gain access or egress to a 
structure) 
• Foreign weapons training (if operating abroad where the weapons may be 
different to what the CPO is trained to use. This specialised knowledge could be 
important). 
• Team tactics 
• Parachuting  
• Scuba diving 
• Survival training in different environments. 
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Waterborne security 
The concepts behind application of ‘waterborne security’ as it relates to close protection 
refers to providing security and ensuring the safety of a Principal while on any 
waterborne craft, e.g. yachts, speed boats, ocean liners, etc. This may involve the Close 
Protector being trained in some of the following: 
 
• Scuba diving 
• Life saving techniques 
• Sea survival. 
 
There is extensive literature available on theses topics but for the purposes of this report 
it is enough that the relevance of the link to close protection is identified and understood. 
 
Aviation security 
Aviation security refers to the necessary security measures that need to be implemented 
when a Principal is travelling via aircraft. Most of the literature reviewed seems to agree 
that due to the complexity of modern aircraft it is almost impossible for a CPO to do an 
effective search of an airplane (for any signs of sabotage of the plane itself) without the 
hands-on assistance of a pilot and mechanic.  
 
In most cases, unless the Principal has their own aircraft, this topic is not necessary for 
CPOs and would be limited to the vetting of the airline that the Principal chooses to fly 
on. Within the context of recent terrorist threats it would also include an evaluation of the 
airline not only on safety record but also on current threat levels, as well as the perceived 
risk of a terrorist group targeting that specific airline. More comprehensive training in 
this topic could include training in: 
 
• Aircraft search procedures 
• Parachuting 
• Emergency procedures i.e. evacuation and crash procedures. 
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The field of aviation security is a specialist field in its own right and if it was deemed 
relevant it would be more logical for a CPO to utilise the services of an expert in the field 
than attempt to learn all the necessary skills. 
INFORMATION SECURITY  
 
Almost all relevant literature mentions ‘information security’ but it is attributed various 
levels of importance in the different literature that was reviewed.  
Information security refers to all relevant aspects that control access to information on the 
principal and his/her movements. The increasing importance of this topic as it relates to 
close protection, means that even though this aspect could have been included in several 
other broader topics as a subfield, it is not. This is perhaps because it is a specialised field 
into itself and the ease of access to information through modern technology (i.e. the 
internet) has made the need for information security even more pertinent. 
 
As a result, the research has shown that it should receive its own separate section to 
ensure that it is covered in the necessary detail. The field of information security can be 
broken down into the following areas: 
 
• Intelligence gathering 
• Surveillance and counter-surveillance 
• Document security 
• IT/computer security 
 
Certain key concepts are universal when security as a whole is evaluated but are even 
more relevant when referring to close protection. Some of these are concepts such as 
‘need to know’ and restriction of access to sensitive information. Once again this topic 
and its relevant subdivisions constitute a specialist field in its own right.  
 
With modern technology and specialist surveillance equipment (bugs, high resolution 
cameras, etc.) becoming so advanced, it may be almost impossible to locate such devices 
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using only a hand-eye search. If threats at this level are identified it is necessary to 
employ the services of competent electronic counter measures (ECM) professionals that 
have the relevant sophisticated equipment and experience to locate such devices. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It has been quite a complex procedure to consolidate the information regarding all the 
relevant aspects of close protection training and operations from the available literature 
and manuals into a comprehensive format that provides the reader with an understanding 
of close protection per se. The aim has been to provide a broad overview of what has 
been found in the texts that were examined. Many of the topics listed above are viewed as 
add-ons in many manuals and are not usually considered to be absolutely necessary or a 
core competency for a CPO in order for them to provide effective close protection. 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to serve as a foundation for the chapters that follow. 
These chapters will relate the above theoretical breakdown into a practical format by 
analysing feedback from research conducted by interviewing specialists in the field. As 
can be seen from the many topics and subjects mentioned above, modern day Close 
Protection is a comprehensive discipline. It requires its operatives to not only have the 
necessary hard skills to perform the work but also possess the soft skills needed to keep 
the client satisfied and prevent potential embarrassment to the Principal by blending into 
the environment.  
 
The breakdown above in no way is a recommended training format but simply provides a 
framework from which to explain all the relevant aspects that combine to make an 
effective and professional CPO. Many of the topics outlined in this chapter are re-
examined in more detail later on in this report. This was necessary as focus during 
interviews would correlate to the information reviewed and identify certain aspects that 
recurred as important themes relating to the operational skills requirements of CPOs in 
South Africa today. 
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Chapter 5 
 
CLOSE PROTECTION TRAINING AND RELATED ISSUES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of the Close Protection Operative may involve the application of many different 
operational skills. In order for a CPO to gain these skills he/she needs to complete a 
comprehensive training program. This training can be explained in a three-step process, 
namely: 
 
1. Training is the ongoing process of learning and developing skills  
 
2. It is also the gaining of the relevant theoretical and background knowledge  
 
3. It is undergone in order to ensure that the skills and knowledge can be applied in 
practice.  
 
In many cases this training process would often have to occur under duress, since 
effective training should prepare students for the actual situations where they would have 
to apply what they have learned in training, i.e. simulate the conditions of real-life 
situations.  
 
As far as close protection is concerned the field of necessary skills and knowledge in its 
entirety is very broad. This is so because almost any aspect or subfield of security could 
be considered relevant to close protection. During the interview process many of the 
respondents felt that their personal individual speciality should be trained to the highest 
level since in their opinion it was the most important skill for a CPO to possess.  
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On analysis, in terms of the South African Close Protection industry, all the relevant 
operational skills and related knowledge that was mentioned in the interviews could be 
grouped into one of three subdivisions, namely:  
 
1. Vital for performance of effective close protection duties in the South African 
environment. 
 
2. Nice for a CPO to have but more of an add-on than a necessity when compared to 
vital skills. 
 
3. Related to close protection but would not really be necessary for a CPO to perform 
his/her duties. 
 
A comprehensive initial training course should be considered as the starting point for 
almost any CPO’s career. It would be fair to say that a CPO’s initial training would 
probably determine operational practices for the rest of that CPO’s career. The 
importance of ongoing training and retraining is also a vital training component if a CPO 
is to remain at a level of operational proficiency. The need to determine what CPOs 
should actually be able to do and at what level they should be able to do it at, in order to 
be considered competent, was a point of concern for almost every respondent interviewed 
(Allon, 2003; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; 
Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Richards, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 
2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 
2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004).  
 
Much of the information collected during the in-depth interviews focused on identifying 
actual current training practices and shortcomings. Although most of the respondents had 
slightly different opinions on some of the different aspects of training, the responses 
concerning the need for training were for the most part consistent.  
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The research concentrated on the different aspects and points of concern that were 
identified during the interviews. These were than correlated and analysed into relevant 
themes and associated points. The themes and points associated with close protection 
training were identified as:  
 
• screening of candidates before training/pre-selection 
• the duration of training 
• the intensity of training  
• the content of training 
• the focus of training 
• regulatory aspects and standards related to training.  
 
Each of the aspects mentioned above will be unpacked and explained below. Wherever it 
was possible to do so, individual subjects were identified and every attempt was made to 
quantify and outline the key aspects necessary for competence with reference to that 
subject. This was done by correlating feedback from the various interview respondents. 
The process then involved finding a middle ground in what the respondents felt were 
acceptable standards for each subject (for more information on training standards see 
Chapter 11: Recommendations). 
CAN CLOSE PROTECTION BE DIVIDED ACCORDING TO TASKS 
AND COMPETENCIES? 
 
Respondents were asked if they felt it was possible to subdivide the level that potential 
CPOs could operate at based on the training they received, their performance during their 
training and their prior experience. Feedback from the respondents indicated that there 
are two primary schools of thought on this issue.  
 
The first school of thought is that it is not possible to subdivide the roles and duties at all. 
The motivation behind this is that in order to work as a CPO, a person must be able to 
perform every necessary function that may be related to providing effective protection.  
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A common example given to illustrate this concept, is that you cannot have a person who 
is only trained as a driver as he/she may have to fight to protect the Principal’s life just 
like a normal CPO. In other words the driver would have to be cross-trained as a CPO 
anyway. The converse could also apply meaning that if a driver was shot or wounded 
another CPO would have to instantly perform the duties of the driver. The underlying 
assumption here is the need for CPOs to be multi-skilled. Moreover, most of the 
respondents who advocated this school of thought felt that with more experience and 
training, a CPO with the correct attributes would develop into a team leader. This 
approach demonstrates that there is chain of command in place and the possibility of job 
progression. 
 
A CPO must be able to perform all relevant duties. He[she] may be a 
specialist in a certain field but should be able to operate in any function on 
a team (Sharp, 2003). 
 
The second school of thought felt that you could subdivide the roles and duties according 
to competency and task. There were a few variances in this position but for the most part 
respondents outlined the following generic subdivisions that illustrate how they suggest 
the division, according to task, should occur: 
 
1. Static protector 
2. Security driver 
3. CPO 
4. Team leader 
5. Group/Operational leader 
 
Each of these will be outlined below: 
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Static Protector 
A Static Protector was identified as an individual working as part of a larger team 
providing protection at a venue or a residence. He/she would perform these duties 
whether a Principal was at the venue or not.  
Persons providing static duties do not move around with the Principal and have very little 
personal interaction with him/her. In most cases this would be considered the starting 
point for a CPO’s career. 
 
Security Driver 
A security driver would be a person trained in both security related and driving skills. 
His/her primary responsibility would be to facilitate the smooth transfer of the Principal 
from venue to venue. A security driver’s roles and duties would not extend to actually 
walking around with the Principal or protecting the venues that the Principal was visiting. 
A slightly different mix of competencies is necessary for a person to perform either static 
or security driver functions. A driver would obviously need driving skills but also must 
have a well developed sense of protocol. This is vital as in some cases a security driver 
would be alone in the car with the Principal. 
 
Close Protection Operative 
A CPO is a person who is trained to provide the maximum possible protection in any 
given circumstance. The most common breakdown would be to provide protection while 
a Principal is static, at a venue or at his/her residence, in transit and/or on foot. A CPO 
must be able to operate as an individual or member of a team. By definition, a CPO 
should be able to perform all the necessary tasks of both a security driver and a static 
protector. 
 
Team leader 
A team leader is a person who is able to coordinate the running of a Close Protection 
team. He/she should be thoroughly versed in the planning, transit, venue, foot and debrief 
aspects of a Close Protection operation. The team leader should also have more 
developed communication, managerial and leadership skills than a CPO. The general 
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consensus among respondents was that a team leader should have at least three years of 
operational experience, show a natural flair for leadership and perhaps undergo additional 
training focussing on subjects like communication, management, leadership and 
administration. 
 
Group/Operational leader 
An Operational Leader would usually have been a CPO who has had experience as a 
team leader and is considered capable of coordinating several close protection teams at 
the same time. The consensus among the interview respondents (backing this school of 
thought) was that a group leader should have at least two years experience working as a 
team leader as well as undergo additional management skills training programs. 
 
Training should be broken down into three subdivisions namely; Protection 
on foot, in transit and at venues. This means [that] a trainee could start 
working in each area as soon as they complete that [specific] subdivision. It 
makes it [training] more cost effective and applicable for trainees (Jones, 
2003). 
 
There is merit to both schools of thought with each having definite advantages. 
According to the first school of thought, considering operatives competent only when 
they can perform all necessary CPO duties would ensure that a more professional service 
would be offered to the client. This means that the Principal would probably be safer as 
the security personnel on the protection team would all be cross-trained (multi-skilled) 
CPOs.  
 
The second school of thought endorses the utilisation of persons who are maybe only 
trained as security drivers or static guards, i.e. one specialisation. There could be 
potential pitfalls should things go wrong as these security persons would not be cross 
trained to perform all close protection functions. However, the advantages are obvious 
when considering costs, length of training and utilising of a wider resource pool of 
security personnel. 
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It is the opinion of the researcher that both schools of thought have advantages and 
disadvantages and it should be left up to the client to decide what level of security staff 
he/she would like. 
SCREENING OF CANDIDATES BEFORE TRAINING (PRE-
SELECTION) 
 
All respondents agreed that there must be some type of pre-evaluation before potential 
students are accepted on a close protection training course. The respondents seemed to 
agree on what the aspects to be assessed should be, even though certain respondents 
placed more emphasis on the need for pre-evaluation than other respondents did.  
 
The relevant aspects with which a prospective CPO candidate should be able to comply 
with are outlined below (in no particular order of preference): 
 
• Should not have a criminal record (this could be verified through a background 
check via the SAPS Criminal Records Centre) 
• Pass a full medical examination and a basic fitness evaluation test 
• Possess a valid drivers licence 
• Matric (some respondents said that a Standard 8/Grade 10 was sufficient) 
• Demonstrate an ability to cope with stress and fatigue 
• Exhibit basic competence with a handgun. 
 
The subject of pre-selection requirements and prior educational qualifications will be 
expanded on in Chapter 11: Recommendations, in the section covering whether 
prospective CPOs need to have had prior experience in guarding before being accepted 
for CPO training.  
DURATION OF TRAINING 
 
The duration of training refers to the time frame necessary to train a person from totally 
unskilled to the level of a competent close protection operative. Whilst ongoing training 
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and retraining are key considerations when discussing time frames, they will be discussed 
in a later section of this chapter.  
 
Determining of a universally accepted time frame for basic CPO training is exceptionally 
difficult without set standards of minimum competency for all of the relevant aspects 
involved in providing close protection. This is so, primarily because if it is not known 
exactly what a prospective CPO should be able to do and at what level of competency it 
should be performed at, it is almost impossible to determine exactly how long it would 
take to achieve the necessary level of competency or the required intensity or length of 
training required. 
 
Therefore, in order to gain input on relevant time frames from the interview respondents, 
they were asked to apply the parameters set in the following question: 
 
“How long would it take to train an individual, who possessed all the 
correct physical and psychological attributes, to achieve the competencies 
necessary for the provision of effective Close Protection?” 
 
It is important to clarify that a respondent’s feedback on training course duration was 
based on his/her opinion on whether CPO duties could be subdivided or not. It is 
interesting to note that respondents who came from a service (military or police) 
background were usually of the opinion that training should be much longer in duration 
than what was felt sufficient by their civilian counterparts. This could be attributed 
primarily to resources and budget differences between the way training and courses are 
run in the military or police in comparison to the private sector, i.e. the government sector 
is far better resourced in terms of CPO training and equipment. The suggested time 
frames have been correlated from the respondents’ feedback and divided according to the 
different schools of thought outlined above. 
 
Training course time frames vary and are largely based on such factors as course content, 
time worked per day and number of students per course (student-to-instructor ratio). 
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Some interviewees felt that training could be done in a matter of weeks. In such cases it 
then had to be further clarified to determine whether students worked weekends as well.  
Many respondents also felt that before a prospective CPO could be said to be competent 
he/she should undergo an apprentice (in-service training) period where he/she would be 
supervised and guided by an experienced operative. The relevant time frames will be 
discussed below: 
 
(For the sake of uniformity, number of days not weeks was used as the measuring tool for 
duration. Eight hours of training was considered one day.)  
 
Fully competent CPO 
If a candidate selection process was applied and the initial training is followed with a six 
month in-service apprenticeship (supervision of a trainee CPO by an experienced CPO), 
the shortest possible training time mentioned during the interviews was an initial training 
course of twelve full days. Other respondents felt that this was not sufficient and that a 
six-week training course was necessary for successful graduates to be considered fully 
competent CPOs.  
 
The average accepted duration for a candidate to achieve the necessary competence in the 
required operational skills of close protection was 18–25 days. This was based on 
including a short (either one full day or half-a-day), student selection and vetting process 
prior to the commencement of training. It was also mentioned that advanced training 
programmes could be developed that would enhance the CPOs skills and knowledge that 
were imparted in the initial training.  
 
Subdivision of roles and duties 
The most logical approach to the training of CPOs in the various subdivisions of close 
protection is to look at this method (training according to role and duty) of training in a 
progressive manner. In other words meaning that once a candidate has completed the 
skills requirements for static, transit and foot protection, he/she would have fulfilled the 
  107
requirements to operate as a fully competent CPO (as above). Each of the previously 
mentioned task subdivisions has been given a training duration (as explained below). 
 
The initial starting point for a prospective CPO would be to qualify as a static protector (a 
static protector was identified as the starting point for training a CPO in a sub-divided 
manner). Once qualified as a static protector the prospective CPO would then undergo 
training to qualify as a security driver. However, several respondents did mention that 
whilst it would be preferable for static protection to be the starting point, this is not fixed 
and could still be changed (flexible approach). It would not really make a difference 
whether a potential CPO qualified as a security driver or static protector first. The 
recommended training time frame for each of these close protection aspects was 
estimated to be between seven and ten days. 
 
In order for a candidate to then further qualify as a CPO, he/she would have to undergo 
additional training in the provision of close protection to a Principal while on foot. The 
recommended training time frame for protection on foot was also between seven and ten 
days. This would mean that for a new student to qualify as a fully competent CPO, he/she 
would have to undergo an overall training period of between 21 and 30 days.  
INTENSITY OF TRAINING COURSES 
 
The concept of intensity refers not only to the duration of training each day but also to the 
level of physical, emotional and psychological stress that is placed on the candidate 
during the training, as well as the detail of the course content. The intensity of the 
training seems to be a controversial issue with almost every training provider interviewed 
stating that the training that they offer is the most ‘intense’ on the market. Respondents 
who were not involved with training of CPOs obviously referenced the training that they 
had been through. Their individual training was usually described as ‘being more intense 
than other CPOs training may have been’ (Hugo, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; 
Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; 
Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004). 
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A topic of interest which was mentioned during several of the interviews was whether 
training candidates at a consistently high intensity is actually the best way to produce the 
most competent CPOs (Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; 
Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van 
Jaarsveld, 2004). Even though it may have been worded in different ways, of the 
interviewed respondents many, made statements similar to the one below: 
 
When the focus of the training is to produce ‘Special Forces type’ operatives 
[CPOs], much of the point may be missed as the students are not actually 
being trained to do the job [of close protection] that they will have to 
perform (McGuire, 2003). 
 
Moreover, other relevant factors that were discussed during some interviews focused on 
the skills progression of students while they undergo training. Issues such as the logical 
progression of training, as well as the focus on training the prospective CPO for the 
actual job requirements of close protection, as opposed to the perceived requirements, 
were raised. It is vital that the training builds up progressively to a point where the 
realities of the close protection world are experienced by trainees. 
 
Some of these would include aspects such as little sleep, irregular eating patterns, and 
monotonous periods of time followed by frantic activity, team interaction and coping 
with frustration while staying alert. 
  
Information obtained in the interviews and literature as well as the researcher’s personal 
experience indicated that it is possible to train CPOs in a shorter time frame i.e. eight to 
twelve days providing that the intensity is high. In other words training time would be 
approximately 15 or 16 hours a day (the number of hours is not necessarily shorter but 
more hours of training are crammed into less days). It was also mentioned that the CPO 
should then have to spend time undergoing an apprenticeship and be mentored by a more 
experienced CPO.  
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For training based on applicable competencies to be successfully presented in this 
framework, it must be assumed that candidates have undergone a pre-selection evaluation 
and posses all the preferred attributes (these attributes will be discussed in Chapter 6) of a 
CPO. 
CONTENT OF TRAINING COURSES 
 
Content refers to the actual subject matter that is taught to the students during a close 
protection training course. For the purposes of this study, content will be grouped 
according to its nature into either being theoretically or practically based. A common 
concern expressed by several of the respondents, was that much of the theory taught on 
Close Protection training programs was either irrelevant27 or did not relate to what was 
actually done in practice. This concern was mentioned mainly by respondents who had a 
more operationally based, than training based backgrounds.  
 
Furthermore, another area of concern mentioned in several interviews was that the 
content in many close protection training programs was not reality based. It was stated 
that: 
 
Training material is not tailored to what working CPOs actually do but 
rather on what the instructor or training institution feels is important 
(Higgins, 2003).  
 
Statements like the one above could lead us to believe that in many cases, training 
content is either not outcomes based or in line with the way that CPOs are actually 
operating in South Africa today. In the in-depth interviews, respondents were first asked 
to identify what they considered, in order of importance, to be the required operational 
skills a CPO should possess in order to effectively perform his/her duties. They were then 
asked to explain what training a person would have to undergo in order to be able to meet 
the skills requirements that they had just identified.  
                                                 
27 It was mentioned on several occasions during interviews that there is a perception that time spent on theory aspects in training does not prepare candidates for the 
realities of close protection work (Higgins, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; and Van Eck, 2003).  
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Based on the respondent’s replies, two basic key grouping criteria for skills requirements 
could be identified, namely: 
 
1. Personal attributes and personality traits 
Certain of the skills requirements were based on physical attributes and appearance and 
others on psychological or personality characteristics. Most of these cannot actually be 
taught (not a learnt skill). However, if a candidate did have them, even on a rudimentary 
level, they could most probably be developed. 
 
2. Learnt skills 
The relevant CPO skills that could be taught conform almost exactly to those covered in 
the literature review section of this research report (Chapter 4). These skills are consistent 
with almost any close protection training program that was examined. What differs 
between the different training programs is the focus and time spent on each aspect (focus 
will be discussed in the next section). Several of the respondents mentioned that content 
could be divided into different levels of candidate proficiency e.g. basic, intermediate and 
advanced. This is, in itself, a controversial issue as respondents differed in their opinion 
on whether you could subdivide the competencies required of CPOs at all. Certain 
interviewees stated that there is no such thing as basic level since a CPO is either 
competent or not (he/she can either protect somebody effectively or cannot). 
 
However, even if this argument is applied, it still leaves room for higher levels of 
proficiency over and above what can be considered the minimum level of competency for 
a CPO. The wide scope of subject matter that would fit into the ‘nice to have’ and 
‘related skills’ categories are almost endless. Therefore a CPO could constantly be 
expanding his/her knowledge base of close protection related knowledge and skills. “A 
CPO should always be learning, the process of broadening skills and knowledge should 
be ongoing for all CPOs” (Hendricks, 2003). 
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THE FOCUS OF CLOSE PROTECTION TRAINING 
 
It would stand to reason that the focus of training should be on the subjects that would be 
vital for performance of effective CPO duties in the South African environment. One of 
the primary identified problems is that even though most respondents agreed on the basic 
subjects that would fall into this category, they differed on the focus that should be given 
to each aspect. These differences were mainly on the amount of time that should be spent 
on each aspect, the detail at which the subject should be taught and what could be 
considered the level of competency for each subject. 
 
As previously stated (section in this chapter on training intensity) the focus issues 
mentioned be each respondent seemed to directly correlate to each respondent’s training 
and operational background. Respondent’s opinions and beliefs on training focus differed 
quite extensively, several examples of this are as follows: 
 
1. One respondent expressed the opinion that if a CPO was not trained to paramedic 
level than he/she would not be able to perform effectively as a CPO (Smith, 2004).  
 
2. Another respondent felt that a CPO needed full and comprehensive training as a 
sniper in order to effectively implement counter-sniping principles during a close 
protection operation. (Jones, 2003) 
 
3. A third respondent expressed the opinion that if a CPO has not worked on a 
presidential level protection team, then he/she could not be considered competent. 
(Hendricks, 2004) Conversely another respondent stated that he felt that CPOs 
working in the private sector that came from presidential protection teams were not 
very effective since they were used to having extensive resources available and were 
used to operating in one specific role on a close protection detail (for example as a 
driver). This differs from the civilian sector where CPOs have to perform all 
protective related duties. i.e. are multi-skilled as opposed to single specialist (Higgins, 
2003). 
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4. Another respondent expressed the opinion that in order for a CPO to be competent 
he/she must be able to draw and fire his/her weapon at a target in less than one-and-a-
half seconds (Jones, 2003). The majority of other respondents felt that this was not 
necessary and that more time should be spent on developing applicable force options 
like alternative weaponry and unarmed combat (Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; 
Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 
2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004).  
 
By correlating information collected from the applicable literature as well as from the in-
depth interviews several key focus areas were identified. Overall it is not possible to say 
that one aspect is more important than another. Rather the approach should be that all 
aspects are interdependent and that each is vital for the effective performance of close 
protection duties. In other words an integrated and interlinked training programme would 
be the ideal, where multiple skills support and supplement each other to develop a ‘well 
rounded’ (holistic) multi-skilled CPO. 
 
Some of the key focus points that were identified in this research as being vital to ensure 
a well-rounded training programme can be outlined as follows: 
 
• Practical application of close protection theory including knowledge of all legalities 
involved in the provision of close protection 
 
• Ensuring the trainee has the ability to cope with fatigue, stress, boredom and adverse 
working conditions through reality based training scenarios and an intense training 
regime 
 
• Ensuring that a trainee is taught all physical skills (fitness, unarmed combat, use of 
alternative weaponry, firearms and driving skills) 
 
• Basic first aid skills 
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• Ability to work as an individual or member of a team 
 
• Development of trainee attributes such as commitment, aggression and determination 
 
• Soft skills such as protocol, people skills and liaison ability  
 
• Determination of the trainee’s integrity and trustworthiness through scenario-based 
training.  
 
Training should ideally, therefore, focus on the development of the above mentioned 
skills and attributes in a practical, work environment related manner. It would be fair to 
state that if a CPO was found particularly lacking in one of the above aspects, he/she 
would probably not be performing the relevant duties as effectively as they should be. 
Moreover, another problem is that the only time a client actually gets to see whether a 
CPO is capable of performing the necessary life saving and protection skills is when 
things have gone completely wrong (lack of planning, poor protocol or even an attack 
situation). At this stage, a CPOs lack of rounded competencies could potentially cost a 
Principal and members of the close protection team their lives, or at best the CPO 
company would lose the contract (i.e. not get more business from that specific client). 
ONGOING TRAINING AND RE-TRAINING 
 
Re-training can be explained as an ongoing process of repetition, re-study, rehearsal and 
performance of skills that a trained CPO has already been exposed to. Ongoing training 
can be explained as the process of gaining new knowledge and/or skills covering as many 
factors and aspects that are applicable to the performance of CPO and related duties. In 
the in-depth interviews respondents were first asked whether they felt retraining and 
ongoing training were necessary. If they answered yes, they were than asked what format 
such retraining and ongoing training should take, as well as how often it should take 
place.  
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The analysis of responses showed that all of the respondents were of the opinion that 
retraining was vital and that ongoing training should be done. Furthermore, the focus of 
such training should be on the long term career development of a CPO and not just on 
skills maintenance. The main reasons mentioned for the importance of re-training were 
two-fold. Firstly, many of the physical skills are ‘perishable’, meaning that if they are not 
practiced regularly the ability to perform them effectively diminishes. Moreover, many of 
these skills may have to be performed under extreme stress and duress i.e. pressure 
situations. This means that in order for a CPO to be able to perform under such 
conditions, there must be regular exposure to similar type situations. The safest way to do 
this is through reality-based retraining. 
 
The second reason identified was simply that CPOs would usually over a period of time 
forget what they had learned during their initial training. This is especially true for those 
aspects of protection that may not be applied in the everyday working environment. This 
could also be attributed to the wide subject base that should be covered during initial 
training. 
 
Frequency of re-training 
Several of the interview respondents had differing opinions about how often retraining 
should be run. The feedback ranged from respondents saying that re-training should take 
place as often as possible and that a CPO should do some sort of physical training daily 
(Hendricks, 2003; Jacobs, 2003). Other feedback suggested different approaches such as, 
allocating two weeks a year for a relatively thorough close protection re-training course 
(refresher). In this case it was mentioned that it was the individual CPO’s responsibility 
to maintain fundamental physical skills and fitness levels (Hugo, 2003). A realistic 
approach would most probably be a combination of the above two opinions.  
 
Ideally the individual CPO should maintain adequate fitness levels on his/her own, with 
group and team training (e.g. repetitive drills) taking place whenever possible but at least 
once a month. Longer training workshops could be run once or twice a year.  
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These longer sessions could last for a few days and cover a wider range of relevant skills 
and topics as well as serving as a forum to update the CPOs on new methods, tactics, etc. 
Such a format would allow for re-training that would keep the necessary skills at an 
effective level of competency as well as provide a platform for ongoing training during 
group and longer bi-annual sessions. An extra bonus to re-training is that it serves as a 
team building mechanism to develop trust, build confidence in each others’ skills and 
competencies as well as create a bond between a team of CPOs. 
 
The focus of re-training 
The focus of the retraining, as previously mentioned, should concentrate on perishable 
skills. These would primarily be those skills that a CPO would not utilise in his/her every 
day work but which are vital if an attack on the Principal were to take place. These skills 
can be divided into one of the following broad categories: 
 
• Every day working skills (driving, communication, protocol, etc.) 
• Management of attack situations (unarmed combat, firearms skills, IADs, etc.) 
• First aid and reactive skills (CPR, Principal evacuations, crisis management, etc.) 
• Physical fitness and related skills (strength, stamina, agility, etc.). 
 
Re-training should focus on maintaining all competencies in each of the above categories. 
A combination of individual and group training is necessary to cover all relevant aspects 
of the above subdivisions. As one of the respondents put it, “re-training should be done as 
often as a protector’s work schedule permits. It is very important for a CPO to stay sharp” 
(Van Rooyen, 2004). 
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INSTRUCTOR RELATED FACTORS 
 
An aspect of concern that was raised by several respondents during the interviews was 
that they felt that close protection training in this country was not always as effective as it 
should be.  
The most common reasoning for this phenomenon was attributed, not so much to the 
training content, but rather to incompetent instructors and ineffective methods of 
instruction. It should be noted that not all respondents felt that South African CPO 
training standards were low.  
 
However, it was universally accepted that the quality and credentials of instructors was 
very important if there are to be high operational standards in the country. Instructor 
credentials and monitoring was mentioned by respondents from both service and civilian 
backgrounds alike. On analysis of the problem, two related aspects were identified as 
probable causes for any close protection instructor related problems. These were either 
the instructor/s possibly not having the necessary operational experience to train 
candidates effectively and/or they were not trained in effective instructor methodology 
(teaching skills).  
 
A solution to this problem was relatively simple to identify, namely to implement a 
regulatory system and standards enforcement approach for instructors in order to ensure 
the quality level of training. The approach would have to be twofold. Firstly, ensuring 
that instructors receive training on how to instruct (train-the-trainer program). Secondly, 
verifying that the potential instructor has actually had experience in the close protection 
field (background checks). Problems with this approach would probably hinge on the 
implementation and enforcement of instructor regulation.28 
 
In order to implement a system of instructor regulation, minimum standards (for an 
instructor’s credentials and qualifications) have to be identified and set levels of 
                                                 
28 Instructor regulation refers to the process that an individual who wishes to operate as a CPO instructor should be made to undergo. This could include training, 
registration and verification of experience and credentials of prospective candidates.  
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competency (teaching skills) implemented, as well as quantifying how much experience 
instructors actually need to have in order to be considered qualified to train. The 
proposed process would have to be implemented at SETA level and can be explained as 
follows: 
 
1. A candidate must complete a generic assessors’ course and then register with the 
relevant SETA. (This would be POSLEC SETA). 
 
2. The registration will include evaluation of the candidates resume and prior 
experience. In order to establish if he/she has the necessary credentials to be 
considered a Subject Matter Expert (SME). 
 
3. In order to qualify as a trainer the candidate would have to undergo a train-the-trainer 
course recognised through the Education, Training and Development Practices Sector 
Education and Training Authority (ETDP SETA). 
 
4. For an instructor to deliver training in the private sector, he/she would have to operate 
through a POSLEC SETA accredited training provider. In order for a company or 
individual to be accredited they would have to undergo quite an extensive 
accreditation process.29 This process would ensure that a provider has the ability to 
offer high quality training and maintain effective records of such training. 
 
Aspects of this process are already being instituted by POSLEC SETA but it will take 
time to implement and enforce the full model as outlined above. Most respondents who 
were interviewed were totally unaware that any process was already in place at all. Those 
that did know about it were positive, yet apprehensive, as to the way that it would be 
implemented. There were also concerns about industry and regulatory bodies being 
biased towards certain service (training) providers and individuals.  
 
                                                 
29 The accreditation process includes a verification of service provider details and infrastructure, an assessment of the providers’ quality management system, 
learning materials, policies and procedures and an evaluation of all training venues available to such a company or individual. To maintain accreditation the POSLEC 
SETA requires updates on all of the aspects just mentioned, as well as the right to inspect training and operations at their sole discretion (www.Poslecseta.org.za). 
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It was mentioned that if certain providers were given preference, it would have serious 
long term effects on the acceptance of South African training standards internationally. 
As mentioned by one respondent the success and professionalism of the specialist CPO is 
dependant on “well trained and experienced instructors [who] are the starting point for all 
high quality close protection training” (Hugo, 2003). 
 
Instructional methodology needed for close protection training  
Instructional methodology refers to the manner in which the relevant information and 
skills are conveyed from trainer to trainee. The focus of this concept is now leaning 
heavily towards outcomes-based education (OBE). The fundamental concepts of OBE are 
based on the learner gaining an understanding of the rationale behind why things are done 
and on actual application of knowledge acquired. This differs from other approaches 
where students may have to learn by memorising facts and concepts.  
 
Some other key concepts of OBE that are applicable to close protection training are 
directly linked to adult-based education and training (ABET), which focuses on the 
practical and measurable outcomes of training. The concepts of ABET would definitely 
be applicable to close protection training since in most cases the recommended minimum 
age for candidates would be 21. One of the focuses of ABET is to relate new concepts to 
already existing knowledge or experiences that the candidates may have had. This is 
effective as candidates will learn faster by relating new concepts to knowledge that they 
may already have. Since there is a section outlining ‘Learning assumed to be in place’ in 
the existing unit standard, it would be important for training methodology to concentrate 
on expanding on a students’ existing knowledge and competency base (Behaviour 
Systems Development, 2003 (a) and Behaviour Systems Development, 2003 (b)). 
 
When considering the need for practical measurable outcomes many of the interview 
respondents felt that it was important for outcomes to be in line with the performance of 
close protection duties in the work environment. Additionally, it was stated that 
“Fundamental [close protection] work competencies should always take precedence over 
a CPO’s ‘nice to have skills’” (Steyn, 2003). This concept is important as a CPO must 
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keep his/her client happy and of course safe. It should be mentioned that even though the 
vast majority of close protection tasks never amount to a CPO actually having to utilise 
his/her combat related skills, it is vital to remember that a CPO is primarily employed to 
protect a Principal’s life and wellbeing. A CPO would not be able to do this without a 
solid base of effective combat related skills. 
 
In addition, respondents indicated that they felt training should be provided in such a way 
as to imitate (simulate) the actual conditions within which CPOs need to operate (Allon, 
2003; Garvey, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; 
Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 
2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). 
This idea would be in contravention of many of the training doctrines applied in training 
other skills. Some of these may emphasise that a trainee should be comfortable, in a well 
organised environment that is free from distractions in order for learning to take place. 
This ‘simulated training’ picks up on the concept of experiential learning i.e. on-the-job-
training. Whilst both theoretical and practical skills are important in order for a CPO to 
provide effective protection, his/her ability to actually ‘do the job’ is what counts the 
most.  
 
It was mentioned several times during interviews that Close Protection work is not for 
everyone and if during training a trainee cannot cope with stress, lack of sleep, 
discomfort and other job-related factors, he/she is actually the wrong person for the job 
(Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; McGuire, 
2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van 
Rooyen, 2004 and Van Jaarsveld, 2004.). Instructional methodology should therefore 
concentrate on training candidates for the job they are going to have to do. This should 
include all the related stress factors and duress related to close protection operations. The 
instructor should also concentrate on an outcomes-based approach that relates prior 
experiences of trainees to what they need to learn. This approach of adult based education 
and training is important to enable students to have the maximum possible understanding 
of close protection methodology. 
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Chart 1: Variables needed for effective close protection training 
 
Content
Duration
Focus
Intensity
Instructor skills
Student profile
Materials & venue
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Training is vital for a CPO to operate and perform effectively in the work environment. 
Various fundamental aspects related to close protection training were identified during 
the research. These include concepts such as the intensity, focus, content and duration of 
training programs. Other key areas of concern identified were aspects pertaining to 
instructor credentials and the instructor’s ability to deliver the training in an effective 
manner. 
 
Furthermore, other relevant aspects that were related to training of CPOs and which were 
consistently mentioned in the in-depth interviews included concepts such as: 
 
• Prospective candidates for CPO training should undergo a pre-selection 
(including a background check, physical and psychological suitability 
assessments, etc.) prior to the commencement of training. This pre-evaluation 
would be used to determine whether the candidate has the correct profile or not 
for being a CPO. 
 
  121
• Ensuring training prepares students for the actual job they must perform and is not 
presented based on the instructor’s preconceived ideas of what he/she believes to 
be the most important aspects of close protection. 
 
• The applied training methodology must shift to focus on outcomes-based 
education and capitalise on the use of adult-based education techniques. 
 
• Training conditions (lack of sleep, induced stress, etc.) should simulate the 
pressure and work environment of an actual close protection operation. 
 
• Re-training should be an integral part of any CPO’s operational life. He/she 
should regularly attend ongoing training sessions and refresher workshops. 
 
• CPOs should attempt to implement as much additional and ongoing training, 
whenever possible, to facilitate career advancement. 
 
There were also instructor-related issues that were identified as having a major influence 
on the effectiveness of training. Some of the key aspects regarding instructors and 
instructional methodology were: 
 
• The fact that instructors should be CPOs with valid and appropriate field 
experience. This is important to ensure that trainees benefit from the instructor’s 
hands-on-experience. 
 
• It is necessary for potential close protection instructors to undergo training in 
instructional methodology. The instructor should have a recognised trainer’s 
(instructor’s) qualification before being allowed to present courses. 
 
• All instructors should only be allowed to instruct on behalf of a POSLEC SETA 
approved training provider. 
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The research has indicated that in order for training to be effective, the above 
considerations need to be addressed. Additionally the regulation of instructors and 
training providers should be enforced in order to maintain standards. It is hoped that 
standards that are both realistic and able to be implemented will be introduced. This 
should enable all South African trained CPOs to gain international recognition from 
regulatory bodies in other countries and be allowed to operate based on their South 
African qualifications. 
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Chapter 6 
 
PERCEPTIONS ABOUT CLOSE PROTECTION 
OPERATIVES AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In terms of this research, a perception could be described as something that a person or 
group of persons may believe to be reality. However, a problem with someone’s 
perceptions is that these may not be founded on fact and experience but rather on what 
seems to be the most convenient, well received or widely disseminated idea. This may 
also be true for persons superimposing their perceptions on reality in order to create a 
platform of concepts that make sense to them.30 This concept was verified by the 
information that was gathered during the in-depth interviews, in which certain 
respondents expressed views such as: 
 
A Protector must be able to function as a fully trained sniper in order to 
implement counter sniping as he has no back up during civilian operations 
(Jones, 2003).  
 
In order to be a qualified CPO, a person must be a fully trained paramedic or 
he/she would not be able to perform the required duties [of a CPO] (Smith, 
2004). 
 
Perception, in close protection terms would not only affect almost all aspects of training 
but also the way in which CPOs actually provide protection. This could be dangerous for 
if a CPO were to react to a perceived threat and not a real threat, the consequences could 
be potentially life threatening. Moreover, throughout the research, a common trend that 
was identified both during the literature review and the in-depth interviews was the fact 
that there are many misconceptions about close protection.  
                                                 
30 This explanation and description of perceptions and how they affect Close Protection have been defined by the researcher.  
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Additionally, there appears to be an overall lack of understanding regarding the core roles 
and responsibilities of CPOs by the general public, the security industry and regulatory 
bodies. Several perceptions-related inaccuracies were identified. These included concepts 
such as: who actually is qualified to be a CPO; what a qualified CPO should be capable 
of doing; and how he/she should actually perform close protection.  
 
This concept has much bearing in determining the necessary operational skills 
requirements needed to provide effective close protection. This is especially relevant 
when considering the perceptions of clients, other security providers, trainers and the 
general public. The need to identify the realities of close protection as opposed to 
perceptions is vital in order to ascertain the correct profile, skills requirements and steps 
required to implement an effective client education program about close protection. 
 
Furthermore, if the realities of the above aspects are not identified and the realities 
determined, it would be almost impossible to develop an outcomes-based training 
program that would be orientated to the actual job description of a CPO. A recurring 
theme that was identified in the interview research was that CPOs should be trained 
according to the actual tasks that are to be performed while operating. This should 
supersede those aspects that may have been defined as ‘nice to have’ skills. 
 
A major contributing factor to inaccurate perceptions mentioned by approximately 80% 
of the respondents was the influence of the media’s portrayal of CPOs (Hendricks, 2003; 
Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 
2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van 
Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004). Movies such as ‘The Bodyguard’ and ‘In the line of 
fire’ have created a distorted image of CPOs and what they do. At first glance the 
portrayal of CPOs and their work may appear to be real but when looking closer it can be 
easily discerned that these films are focusing on the entertainment value of close 
protection as opposed to an accurate portrayal of the CPO and his/her duties. 
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In this chapter, aspects such as the profiling, the preferred characteristics of CPOs in 
terms of physical appearance and personality will be examined. The identified core skills 
requirements will also be discussed, as well as an international comparison between 
South African CPOs and their international counterparts. 
 
CPO PROFILES 
 
The Profile of a CPO would include, but not be limited to those physical and personality 
characteristics and the learnt skills that contribute to his/her ability to effectively perform 
all the necessary duties of close protection provision. It is vital to differentiate between 
what the perceived realities are and what is actually relevant to clients and operatives in 
the industry. 
 
On analysis, the physical characteristics of CPOs could be unpacked into the following 
broad subdivisions:  
 
• appearance  
• build  
• attributes  
 
Personality characteristics would refer to those behavioural and subconscious tendencies 
that dictate a CPO’s behaviour in different circumstances. Lastly, learnt skills would go 
hand-in-hand with a potential CPO’s natural ability to absorb and perform the skills, both 
physical and mental, necessary to perform the different aspects of close protection. 
 
The focus in this chapter will be on the common themes that were identified during the 
in-depth research. Although no one view would be entirely representative of the close 
protection industry, there seemed to be consensus when analysing the information 
collected during the interviews with regard to the above-mentioned factors. These aspects 
will be discussed below.  
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It should be noted that the distinction between what could be considered physical, 
personality or learnt skills is not clear. Several of the aspects that will be described could 
be classified into more than one of the above stated subdivisions. In terms of this 
research, the subdivision is perhaps not as important as the actual concepts being 
discussed. 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CPOS 
 
Physical appearance 
When analysing what a CPO should look like, it is best to refer back to the initial job 
description of a CPO discussed in the literature review (Chapter 4). This would infer that 
a CPO who is responsible for the safety, peace of mind and physical comfort of his/her 
Principal should be physically capable of carrying out all activities necessary to achieve 
these goals. This, however, goes a step further as we need to take into consideration the 
Principal’s profile as well as the applicable risk and threat. It is vital to consider these 
variables prior to determining what the CPO should look like in a given situation. This is 
important as the CPO must be physically suited to the task at hand.  
 
There are several factors which come into play when analysing the correct physical 
appearance of a CPO. These include the Principal’s profile, his/her personal preferences, 
and the environment in which the job is to take place. The identified threat and risks need 
always to be taken into account. The most common theme identified when this topic was 
discussed during the interviews, echoed the following statements: 
 
A CPO is not a bouncer, he/she should be of normal appearance [not have 
distinguishing (i.e. stand-out) physical characteristics] and be capable of 
blending into almost any environment (Sharp, 2003). 
 
A Protector should look like everyone else - the average man on the street. 
The less attention he attracts and the more he can blend in the better he can 
do his job (Steyn, 2003). 
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The concept of a CPO being able to blend into his/her environment was also mentioned 
in most of the relevant literature that was analysed. It seems that universally, it is 
accepted by the close protection industries both locally and abroad, that a CPO should 
conform to certain physical characteristics. Some of these will be outlined below. 
 
1. A CPO should not be too heavily built and should be able to blend into many 
different environments within which he/she might have to operate, i.e. be 
inconspicuous and not stand out in a crowd. 
 
2. A CPO must be able to apply the correct protocol and dress according to any situation 
to assist them in blending in. 
 
3. A CPO should be in such physical condition so as to have a professional appearance 
yet be capable of performing all related protection duties i.e. not overweight, unfit, 
too young or old. 
 
Furthermore, it should also be noted that the profile of the operation, as well as the 
environment wherein the operation occurred, would determine what the physical 
appearance of a CPO should be. The common theme identified during interviews was that 
protection should remain as low profile as possible (i.e. low-key and not attract unwanted 
attention). In other words the CPO must not draw attention to him/herself either by dress, 
behaviour or mannerisms. The reasoning behind this is that it is possible to go from a low 
profile operation to a visible and obvious high profile, but the converse is not always 
possible. Therefore, utilising a close protection team that would attract attention purely 
because of their physical appearance would not be considered the preferred option.  
 
However, it should be mentioned that it may be advantageous to utilise CPOs with 
different physical characteristics based on the environmental factors and operational 
demands of a task.  
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Should the protection detail be operating extensively in crowds providing protection for a 
high profile Principal, it may be wise to utilise physically large ‘bouncer type’ CPOs. 
This would not only assist in the intimidation of the crowd but would also make the 
evacuation of a Principal easier should it be required.  
 
It would therefore be fair to state that in the vast majority of close protection related 
situations, CPOs that blend into the environment would be utilised far more than 
‘bouncer-type’ protectors. However, in certain situations the use of ‘bouncer-type’ 
protectors would definitely have certain advantages. The use of female CPOs is also 
important, as in many situations the Principal may be female. If a female CPO was not 
part of the protection detail, it would be really difficult to provide effective protection. 
All in all the specific operational situation would influence and determine what attributes 
a CPO for that specific operation should possess. 
 
Physical attributes 
The physical attributes necessary for a CPO refer to the natural responses and physical 
capabilities that a CPO should possess. Many of these attributes can and should be 
developed through effective ongoing training. However, if a potential CPO does not have 
the natural tendencies or inherent physical attributes, it would than probably be fair to say 
that this person would probably not be a very proficient CPO.  
 
The focus of physical attributes refers not only to the ability to deal physically with 
potential violent attacks but also with the physical stress and duress that may be placed 
on a CPO during operations. These may include the ability to handle long periods of 
inactivity interspersed with very intense periods of activity, coping for extended periods 
on little sleep and irregular eating patterns. 
 
“There is definitely a need for well trained female CPOs in South Africa today” (Van 
Eck, 2003). Whilst the majority of CPOs that are operating in South Africa today are 
males, there is a definite need for qualified female operatives in the industry.  
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A female CPO may not have the necessary physical strength to deal with threats using 
strictly unarmed combat but would be invaluable to a protection team should they be 
protecting a female Principal. By having a female CPO on the team the Principal could be 
accompanied into female toilets without attracting any undue attention. 
 
Despite the disadvantage of not being as physically strong as men, the use of alternative 
weaponry and comprehensive training would enable a female CPO to operate at the same 
level as her male counterparts. A common measure of physical capability is what is 
known as ‘drag or carry’ competency. This involves a CPO having to carry or drag a 
dummy (between 50kg and 75kg) for approximately 25 metres, simulating the evacuation 
of a wounded Principal. If a CPO is competent to perform this activity, gender would not 
be a factor in determining operational competency. 
PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Personality-related characteristics can be described as those psychological attributes that 
dictate a person’s ability to effectively manage both different people and situations. There 
are many aspects that could be identified and considered relevant under this heading. By 
using the information collected in the in-depth interviews as the primary source, the 
following personality characteristics were highlighted as being most relevant to close 
protection work:  
 
• patience 
• self motivation 
• ability to operate alone or in a team 
• a positive mindset  
• a sense of humour 
 
Each of these factors are inherent aspects of a person’s psychological make up. Even of 
these factors are not prevalent, they can be developed through training and experience.  
  130
However, if there is not a strong natural leaning towards these aspects, a potential CPO 
would, in all likelihood not be able to manage the rigours of the job. This may result in 
more than just the CPO losing his/her job but may mean loss of life for the Principal 
and/or members of the protection team. As emphasised by one respondent: “a CPO must 
be able to operate under stressful situations and cope with boredom while maintaining a 
positive attitude” (Steyn, 2003).  
LEARNT SKILLS 
 
Learnt skills refer to the profile characteristics that must be taught and developed through 
training. It also includes aspects that everyone may possess but may need to be more 
highly developed for CPO duties. Once again the aspects listed below were extracted 
from the information that was obtained during the in-depth interviews. The concepts that 
seemed to be most relevant will be explained below. 
 
People and communication skills 
These refer, primarily, to the tools needed to communicate effectively in all close 
protection-related situations. This concept would include the application of correct 
protocol and etiquette. In many operational situations, the CPO would need to secure the 
co-operation of persons, who although not part of the protection detail, could contribute 
to the success of an operation. These skills can be developed through basic training, 
including role-play and scenario staging, as well as on-the-ground experience. 
 
Observation and awareness 
One of a CPO’s primary tasks is the early identification of threats. This would enable 
him/her to then implement the necessary measures needed to avoid these threats. The 
concept of proactivity and avoidance is partly reliant on a CPO having excellent 
observation and awareness skills. These skills can be developed by training CPOs in the 
necessary techniques and principles that apply. It would then be vitally important for the 
trainee CPO to practice and develop these skills in realistic situations. 
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Quick thinking and adaptability 
The ability of a CPO to be able to think laterally and problem solve under pressure is 
vital to the protection initiative. The capability to blend into different environments and 
operate under vastly different circumstances is part and parcel of a high level CPO’s 
regular operational life.  
 
While this is an inherent personality characteristic, it can most definitely be developed 
through effective training. The training should focus on presenting task-related problems 
in a manner as close as possible to what happens in reality. This should occur with an 
instructor guiding the trainee CPO through the problem until the trainee develops 
confidence to handle these problems alone. 
 
Hard skills 
Hard skills encompass all the necessary physical skills that a CPO needs to develop in 
order to provide effective close protection. The key hard skill areas are unarmed combat, 
driving skills, firearms’ skills, protection-related skills (IADs), and first aid skills (these 
are explained in more detail in the literature review, Chapter 4). These skills should be 
developed through ongoing training. 
GENERAL PERCEPTIONS 
 
The realities of what occurs while providing close protection is something that is often 
not discussed. It seems as if the vast majority of persons involved would rather believe 
the ‘glamorous side’ of the close protection industry instead of looking at the harsh 
realities of what actually happens. During the interview process, this was something that 
almost all respondents mentioned as a point of concern. 
 
In many cases information security was cited as a reason as to why close protection is 
misunderstood. It is obvious that in an industry where operational methodology is 
designed to keep people alive, it would be important that such methodology was not 
available for public access.  
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Whilst maintaining a certain level of discretion when reffering to the sensitive aspects of 
close protection provision is a valid issue, the persons and organisations involved in the 
industry should at the very least be able to differentiate between fact and fiction. 
 
It has also been noted that in many cases the perceptions that people in various positions 
related to close protection may hold directly affect the way that a protection operation is 
performed. There were three sub-groups of persons that were identified whose 
perceptions were relevant to this research namely: the general public, clients utilising the 
services of CPOs and lastly other security providers. Each of these will be briefly 
discussed below. 
 
Public perception 
In general the public perception of close protection can only be based on hearsay or ‘what 
is seen in the movies’. This for the most part would be an unrealistic picture of what 
actually happens, focusing on those aspects that are most entertaining. It is not exciting to 
watch somebody sit in a car outside a client’s house for five hours not knowing when 
they are to depart.  
 
Most respondents felt that even though the public perception is important, it is not 
necessary or viable to attempt to educate the general public on the realities of close 
protection. The following reasons have been identified as to why it is not necessary to 
educate the general public on the realities of close protection: 
 
1. As a direct result of the information security that is a fundamental part of any 
close protection operation, much of what the CPO does and how it is done should 
not be made available to the general public. 
 
2. In any event the public in general would not be interested in the fundamental 
details, as for the most part they are unexciting and quite monotonous. 
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3. Almost all members of the general public would never have a need for personal 
protection therefore there would be no point in educating them (making them 
more aware). 
. 
4. In certain cases the current public perception may actually aid in the smooth 
facilitation of a protection operation. This may be so, in that people might be 
more willing to help or co-operate if they believe that close protection operations 
are ‘like the movies’ as this would make them feel important. 
 
Client perception 
When interviewing respondents, a common point that was mentioned by both CPOs and 
representatives of the regulatory bodies was the importance of clarifying the clients’31 
perceptions about close protection. This is a vital component if South Africa is to have an 
effectively regulated industry.  
 
If clients are not aware of what a CPO should be able to do, as well has how close 
protection should be provided, the effective provision of protection is difficult. It may 
result in the misuse of protection staff or the client utilising under-qualified personnel 
who may charge less and undercut the qualified protection providers. 
 
Further common themes that were identified relating to client misconceptions include, 
but are not limited to, some of the following: 
  
• The belief that any ex-policeman or service person is qualified to work as a close 
protection operative  
• That close protection duties include those of acting as a butler to the client 
• The concept that CPOs do not need ongoing training and re-training 
• The idea that it does not really matter what qualifications a trained CPO possesses 
since it is better to have a less competent person who perhaps is less expensive, 
than to have nobody at all.  
                                                 
31 For the difference between the Principal and the client see Annexure 1: Definitions 
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The research done in this study has indicated that unless there is some sort of client 
education process that deals with some of the concerns mentioned above, effective 
regulation will be difficult or impossible to achieve. The lack of client education may 
result in clients either paying too much for unqualified personnel and/or competing 
providers may actually engage in ‘price wars’ in order to secure business. This could 
have disastrous results with either under-qualified personnel being employed or the 
operative on the ground not getting the correct remuneration for his/her services. 
 
The fact that in many situations the client is actually not the Principal often has a direct 
influence on the quality of protection that the Principal receives. It was mentioned in 
several of the interviews, that in many cases the clients requesting the services did not 
have the correct understanding of what comprehensive protection duties entail. As a 
direct result of this, on many occasions, clients would select service providers purely on 
price-related factors. This, in certain cases, has led to unqualified service providers being 
awarded contracts for the provision of close protection services. 
 
Moreover, another point of concern mentioned by many respondents about close 
protection in South Africa was the risk of incorrect application of affirmative action 
policies. The worry as described by several of the respondents was that to simply 
implement affirmative action, unqualified persons would be employed to provide close 
protection services. This, in itself, could have potentially lethal results since the 
fundamental purpose of close protection is ensuring the safety of the Principal’s life and 
an unqualified person tasked with that responsibility may not be able to adequately 
perform such close protection services (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; McGuire, 2003; 
Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and 
Van Rooyen, 2004.).  
 
Perceptions by general security companies (guarding, alarm monitoring and 
installation and investigation companies) 
Information obtained in the in-depth interviews revealed that within the security industry 
itself, close protection is a misunderstood and misrepresented specialisation.  
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This was mentioned as a point of relevance because in many cases, other security 
companies are requested to provide close protection services by their clients and may not 
utilise qualified and specialised CPO personnel (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; 
Rootman, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003.). Additionally, in many cases 
during protection operations, CPOs must liaise and work with providers of other security 
and related services. 
 
Several of the interview respondents were of the opinion that any company offering close 
protection services should be regulated separately from other security providers, i.e. 
become a recognised service sector on its own (Higgins, 2003; Rootman, 2004; and 
Steyn, 2004). While this may not be a realistic idea in terms of implementation, the 
concept of separating the regulation of close protection providers from other security 
providers may have merit.  
 
The benefits of this approach include establishing the protection market for providers that 
only utilise trained personnel and that the client will probably receive a more effective 
close protection service. A general education package that outlined to security providers 
what the benefits of close protection are and what a qualified CPO’s job description 
should be, would be very useful. This was a possible answer to the problem of how to 
educate ‘other’ security providers on close protection. This was deemed important by the 
researcher as in many cases these other security providers offer sub-standard/not 
comprehensive close protection using poorly trained or unqualified CPOs to many of 
their clients.  
 
Moreover, it would make the working relationship between CPOs and other security 
providers far more efficient. This is relevant since, although a CPO is not a specialist in 
all fields of security, he/she should have a generic understanding of almost all aspects 
relevant to the security of the Principal. This means that a CPO would know what the 
functions of other security providers entail but in most cases other security providers do 
not know enough about close protection to understand clearly how it works.  
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INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CPOS 
 
In all likelihood a Principal requiring close protection would travel extensively outside 
his/her country of origin. In many situations this involves either the Principal being 
accompanied by his/her close protection operative or team. If this does not happen the 
CPO will, at the very least, be responsible for providing advice on travel, 
accommodation, provision of close protection in the country being visited and other 
related arrangements.  
 
As a direct result of this, it is vital that CPO training and operations not only be 
standardised in this country, but in the long term, will need to be linked to international 
operational practices. A CPO may have to work with a local team, resident in the country 
that the Principal is visiting. If operational procedures and approaches are totally 
different, it will make the provision of effective protection in other countries very 
difficult. The direct result is an increase in the risk and threat to which the Principal will 
be exposed.  
 
There are also situations where the Principal travels abroad and does not take his personal 
protectors with but opts instead to use local CPOs at his/her destination. It would be 
important to know that the local team of CPOs meets some sort of minimum competency 
requirements and can do the job effectively, i.e. benchmarked against international 
standards and best practices. 
 
In addition, another aspect to consider is the facilitation of close protection for visitors to 
South Africa. In many cases these visiting Principals have been exposed to close 
protection before and may even have teams in their own countries. If the standard of 
protection that they receive in South Africa is not at least equivalent to that of their 
international counterparts, it will be noticed and could be embarrassing or even life 
threatening to the Principal. As a whole, this could have long term negative effects for the 
close protection industry in South Africa. 
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It is clear that a CPO may work with a variety of Principals with differing religious, 
political, social beliefs or practices. Globalisation means that a CPO can no longer look at 
the world from only one perspective but has to be able to put aside personal beliefs and 
prejudices in order to perform his/her duties effectively regardless of he/she they like the 
Principal or agree with his/her political, religious or ideological beliefs. Providing 
protection internationally means that a CPO must be able to adapt and operate in any 
environment. It is vital that a CPO is able to meet the customary requirements of the 
country being visited in order to avoid offending the locals and inadvertently creating an 
incident 
 
There are also different protocol procedures that apply when working in different 
countries or providing protection to different Principals in South Africa. It is vital that 
CPOs are aware of, and taught, the way that things are done in different countries. This 
must include not only pre-identified protocol procedures, i.e. like how to go about 
obtaining police or government assistance, but also what is customarily correct in that 
country. This is important as undue embarrassment to the client may inadvertently take 
place and the client may take offence to the fact that his/her customs and beliefs are not 
being respected or adhered to. 
SHARING OF KNOWLEDGE ACROSS INTERNATIONAL 
BORDERS 
 
Many South African trained CPOs are operating in the world’s [security] 
hotspots like Iraq. Students are now coming from abroad to get trained in 
South Africa (Smith, 2003).  
 
International crosstraining is not a new concept and several of the respondents 
interviewed have, in fact, been trained by various international instructors both in South 
Africa and abroad. However, what is changing is the fact that international travel has 
never been easier and with the proliferation of the internet, it is possible to find out about, 
and even organise bookings for, training in other countries.  
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There are also many governmental initiatives that involve sending trainers abroad to work 
with operatives in other countries and/or present training. This has happened on several 
occasions in South Africa and is an ongoing initiative. International crosstraining also 
happens the other way around with guest trainers and training teams coming to provide 
training in South Africa. 
 
There has also, over time, been the exchange of ideas and operating practices taking place 
on ground level when CPOs from different countries and agencies land up operating on 
the same tasks. This has led to an unofficial standardising and establishment of what 
skills should be expected of a trained CPO. Furthermore, it should be noted that in certain 
scenarios, it is impractical to standardise all approaches as differing environments and 
situations require differing operational practices. 
 
All-in-all, the process of sharing knowledge across borders has already initiated an 
informal form of benchmarking. In the long term this will make the creation of 
international standards smoother and more readily accepted. 
 
BENCHMARKING OF STANDARDS AND MINIMUM 
COMPETENCIES 
 
There are a few South African CPOs that are professional enough to work 
anywhere in the world, the problem is that South Africa does not have a set 
internationally recognised standard for CPOs (Sharp, 2003). 
 
Due to the nature of close protection work and the fact that many top level South African 
CPOs receive much international exposure, it is only logical that they may be offered 
jobs in other countries. There is also exposure for South African CPOs when they have to 
perform their duties abroad. This has been mentioned simply to reinforce the necessity 
for international benchmarking of minimum competencies and eventually full reciprocal 
recognition of qualifications internationally. 
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In certain cases there are already existing international standards that have been 
established by various organisations having offices or representatives in different 
countries. There are many examples of such international organisations such as the 
International Bodyguard Association (IBA) based in Paris and the Professional 
Bodyguard Association (PBA) based in London. Additionally many companies and 
training institutions have links with associates or offices in other countries. This, to a 
limited degree, does allow for the validation of qualifications or persons. The key 
problem is that no single organisation or company has total international recognition. 
 
During the research it was difficult to obtain objective information since most 
respondents felt that their organisation, agency or company was the only one that actually 
adhered to high standards of close protection training or had received international 
recognition. In several interviews, respondents made related comments about the general 
functioning and effectiveness of many of the existing organisations and their standards. 
Although the respondents explained it in different ways, the general consensus was that 
when taken at face value, these organisations appear to maintain a level of competency 
standards and implement effective validation and enforcement of their policies for all 
their members.  
 
However, in reality this may not be so since many memberships involve simply paying 
regular fees and very little, if any, effort goes into ensuring that members are qualified or 
that people that these representatives may train are competent i.e. no monitoring and 
regular evaluation occurs. Determining the validity of this is not within the scope of this 
research, but it should be noted that unless an organisation’s standards are accepted by 
the entire industry (South African and internationally), they are not really valid or have 
much professional credibility. 
 
In South Africa there are also several CPO associations as well as local representation of 
the international organisations. Among the larger and more progressive organisations is 
the VIP Protectors Association of South Africa (VIPPASA).  
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Furthermore, it is the opinion of the researcher that effective standard setting and industry 
regulation by POSLEC SETA and PSIRA is far more important than the setting of 
internal standards by individual associations and organisations. 
  
The reality is that there is a definite need to establish an international benchmarked 
standard although this might in the immediate future not be realistic. What will, however, 
be viable is to ensure that the minimum standards put in place by the relevant South 
African regulatory bodies are of a high enough standard to be recognised by the 
equivalent bodies in other countries. In the future, reciprocal validation of qualifications 
will be vital in order to ensure that Recognition of Prior Learning can be conducted in an 
effective manner. 
HOW DO SOUTH AFRICAN CPOS COMPARE WITH THEIR 
INTERNATIONAL COUNTERPARTS? 
 
“South African CPOs that are good enough to work internationally are among the best 
operatives in the world” (Jacobs, 2003). 
 
During the interviews certain interesting opinions were presented by the respondents. In 
many cases, these opinions were repeated by unrelated respondents with different 
operational backgrounds and histories. The fact that interviewees with totally unrelated 
experience and backgrounds believe the same things is in its own way a basic form of 
validation. Some of these opinions regarding the standard of South African CPOs will be 
discussed below. 
 
It was stated by several respondents that although the overall standard of CPOs in South 
Africa is low, there are some very well trained and highly competent CPOs who have 
been trained locally. The respondents mentioned that this group of CPOs is as competent 
and compare favourably with any of their international counterparts.  
 
It was also stated that because of the crime situation in South Africa (comparatively 
higher than many other countries especially the more developed), South African CPOs 
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operate at what is considered a medium threat level all the time. Whereas in many other 
countries where crime levels are lower, and violent crime more isolated, the level of close 
protection operations does not need to be conducted at the same level of intensity. This 
translates directly into the South African CPO being more prepared to deal with a 
threatening situation than many CPOs from other countries having lower threat levels, 
would be (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Smith, 2004; 
Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; and Van Eck, 2003).  
.  
In addition, another trend was that South African CPOs seem to operate with fewer 
resources and less logistical back up than their international counterparts. This is 
particularly relevant in the private sector where operations are usually conducted with 
very little or no assistance from the authorities. This differs from many ‘regulated 
countries’ where, on request, a protection detail may receive a good deal of assistance 
from the authorities such as police escorts or access to intelligence and classified 
information.  
 
The research has shown that when all factors are taken into account, the overall opinion 
of respondents was that qualified South African CPOs are just as competent as their 
international counterparts. In fact in many cases respondents stated that they thought that 
South African CPOs are more capable of working effectively in adverse conditions with 
limited resources than their international counterparts. 
 
Another point consistently mentioned was the differences in operational approach when 
referring to high or low profile methods of operation used in different countries. This 
refers to the visibility of the close protection operation. In a high profile operation no 
attempt is made to blend into the environment, the belief is that high visibility acts as a 
deterrent. In the case of a low profile operation the aim of the protection operation would 
be to draw as little attention to who they are and what they are doing as possible.  
Examples given were primarily those comparing the operational approaches of agencies 
from the United Kingdom and the USA. Whereas agencies from USA tend to focus on a 
high profile approach by using lots of manpower and resources, the British agencies 
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attempt to utilise only the resources necessary to get the job done without attracting 
undue attention (Jacobs, 2003; Sharp, 2003; and Smith, 2004). 
 
Throughout the interviews a good deal of time was spent discussing high and low profile 
approaches to protection. The debate as to which is the better approach for the South 
African environment was not totally clear but the general consensus is that it is possible 
to go from low profile to high profile but not the other way around and unless there are a 
huge amount of resources available an effective high profile operation is very difficult to 
run. Therefore the focus should be on low profile as the standard operational 
methodology that is applied in South Africa. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The focus of this chapter was to identify and explain the relevant misconceptions related 
to close protection. The correct profile of a CPO in terms of physical, psychological and 
learnt skills was also discussed. There were three critical subgroups that were identified 
when the topic of perception was mentioned, namely; the public, the clients who use 
close protection and other providers of security and related services. 
 
Some of the key concepts that were mentioned with regard to the close protection 
operatives’ profile were aspects such as his/her physical appearance and the relevant 
personality characteristics that are needed to be an effective operative. The general 
consensus was that a CPO should look like the ‘average person on the street’ in order to 
facilitate low profile protection. This was outlined as far more important then the physical 
size of the CPO. Some of the key psychological attributes that were mentioned included 
attributes such as patience, self motivation, ability to operate alone or in a team, a 
positive mindset and a good sense of humour. 
 
When the concept of public perceptions was analysed, the general conclusion reached 
was that it is impractical to attempt to educate the general public on the realities of close 
protection. Several reasons were cited that clarified this opinion that public perceptions 
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would have very little effect on the actual improvement of a CPO’s operational skills and 
the general regulation of the industry as a whole. 
 
It was, however, identified that an educating process (awareness programme) for clients 
and other security providers would be beneficial. This concept, particularly as it applies 
to the client, may be a vital link in the regulation and professionalisation of the close 
protection industry in South Africa. 
 
Moreover, when comparing the standard at which top level South African CPOs operate, 
compared to their international counterparts, it was stated by several interview 
respondents (Jacobs, 2003; Sharp, 2003; and Smith, 2004) that local CPOs are as good, if 
not better than their international counterparts.  
 
This opinion could be attributed to the fact that because of relatively high levels of 
violent crime in South Africa, local CPOs have become accustomed to operating in 
higher risk and threat operations than are their international counterparts. Furthermore, 
another factor contributing to this opinion is that in many cases South African CPOs 
operate with limited resources and logistical backup as compared to international 
operatives. This translates directly into the South African CPOs ability to perform 
effectively in adverse conditions with limited resources and backup. 
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Chapter 7 
 
TERRORISM, THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
AND CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the September 11 attacks people all over the world look at security 
differently, the importance of specialised security and Close Protection as a 
vital component to effective protection cannot be overestimated (Steynberg, 
2003). 
 
One of the primary identified methods of reducing the likelihood of a direct terrorist 
attack on a designated person or of being an unwitting victim of such an attack, would be 
to utilise the services of trained CPOs. Not only will the presence of security act as a 
deterrent in itself but it will also minimise the risk of exposure through applied avoidance 
and proactive planning. During many of the interviews the concept of terrorism and its 
effect on close protection was mentioned by several of the respondents (Allon, 2003; 
Garvey, 2004; Jacobs, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; 
and Van Eck, 2003). It was then identified as a factor that should be assessed in the terms 
of its relevance to close protection. It was determined that while some of the existing 
literature includes aspects on terrorism very few have actually assessed it within the 
context of close protection. 
 
The concept of a global world economy has influenced international trends in many 
ways. One of these is the way in which terrorism could be perpetrated against targets on 
foreign soil and still achieve the desired effect on the terrorist’s targeted audience. 
Terrorist activity and attack on innocent civilians, in an attempt to achieve a desired 
political or religious outcome, is not a new threat to world security and safety. 
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Terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Red Army Faction in 
Japan (RAF), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the United Kingdom as 
well as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Al-Fatah in Israel to name but 
a few, have long been carrying out acts of terror. This has led to each country tackling 
terrorism in their own way. Examples of this are the establishment of counter-terrorist 
teams (the British SAS, the Yamam in Israel, Delta Force in the USA, etc.) or taking such 
Counter-terrorist action such as Israel placing undercover air marshals on all El-Al flights 
and recent (post 9/11) proposals to arm pilots on American flights. However, the events 
of 11 September 2001 have forever changed the public perception and international 
awareness of the terrorist threat. 
 
Generally terrorist attacks take one of the following forms:  
 
• hostage taking 
• hijacking 
• assassination 
• armed attack 
• bomb attack 
• propaganda and intimidation campaigns 
 
The fact that in the vast majority of cases the targets of terrorist attacks are non-
combatants/civilians (see definition below) means that everyone can be a potential victim 
of a terrorist attack. With this concern in mind the governments of most security 
conscious nations have put considerable time and effort into the concepts of anti- and 
counter-terrorism. The need to deal with the terrorist phenomenon is understood by most 
security specialists and it is common place for security assessments to include an analysis 
of the likelihood of terrorist attack on a given target or person. In terms of proactive 
avoidance and prevention the use of trained CPOs becomes a viable addition to any anti-
terror campaign. 
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The most intimidating aspect of terrorism is the largely random nature of attacks, 
particularly those aimed at spreading fear among the general population. However, there 
are those kinds of terrorist attacks where specific individuals are the target (for whatever 
reason). This is even potentially more relevant for a Principal requiring the services of a 
close protection detail.  
 
More often than not clients utilising close protection services are high profile or 
influential persons. This means that if such persons were targeted by terrorist groups the 
potential media exposure (of the terrorist attack) and ramifications of such action would 
be greater, i.e. the terrorist group involved would get better exposure of its views and 
aims, particularly if politically motivated. From a terrorist perspective this is often 
exactly what they are looking for as in many cases what they desire is exposure and 
publicity for their given cause. 
DEFINITIONS 
 
There are many different definitions of terrorism. The breadth and scope of what is 
considered terrorism and what is not is constantly being changed and adjusted. When 
reviewing terrorism as a specialist field it is staggering to see the sub-divisions of 
terrorism. There are many specialist sub-categories ranging from aspects such as bio-
terrorism to complex issues like state terrorism. In order to answer the stated research 
problem, a detailed assessment of terrorism in its entirety would not be relevant. For the 
purpose of this report the definitions of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United 
States Codes, Section 2656 (d) will be used. The term is the best defined therein and 
reads as follows: 32  
The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence and audience.  
                                                 
32 It should be noted that there are many existing definitions of terrorism and terrorist activities, this definition has been chosen merely 
because it is a well-referenced example. The selection of this definition by no means validates its accuracy above that of other 
definitions. 
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The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens or the 
territory of more than one country.  
 
The term ‘terrorist group’ means any group practising or that has significant 
subgroups that practice international terrorism 
(http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/). 
 
What differentiates a terrorist attack from a criminal offence? 
In many cases a terrorist attack would involve criminal offences, i.e. murder, assault, etc. 
This is not, however, true for the converse. According to the above definition, for an act 
to be considered an act of terror the following key aspects need to be apparent:33 
 
• It needs to be a premeditated act, in other words it must have been planned in 
advance. No terrorist act is a spur of the moment act. While the victims and location 
may not have been pre-selected, the act itself would have involved a certain amount 
of preplanning. The motivation for the attack could be based on political, cultural, 
religious or social beliefs. However, when looking at the majority of terrorist attacks, 
the motivation seems to trace back to a politically-focused reasoning. 
 
• The attack or act is usually an act of violence perpetrated against non-combatants. For 
purposes of the above definition, the term non-combatant is interpreted to include, in 
addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed 
and/or not on duty. Civilian security personnel, such as Executive Protection 
Personnel, unless openly armed, would also be seen as non-combatants. 
 
• The last key aspect relevant to defining a terrorist act is usually the attempt to gain 
exposure for the terrorist group’s cause by means of the ensuing media coverage of 
their terrorist action. In his book, Inside Terrorism, Hoffman devotes an entire 
chapter to this issue. Some of the key points that are mentioned by Hoffman are as 
follows: 
                                                 
33 The information below has been extracted and compiled from: Terrorism inside a world phenomenon (Davies, 2003: 14-15); and Inside Terrorism (Hoffman, 
1998: 13-43). 
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- The fact that many terrorist acts are planned in such a manner as to get maximum 
press and media coverage 
 
- The concept that the knowledge that many people will be informed about whom 
the terrorist group perpetrating the act are and why they are doing it, is sometimes 
motivation for terrorist action in itself 
 
- The constant battle of television networks and other media forms to gain ratings 
and push up circulation means that the more extravagant the terrorist act the more 
media exposure each will get (Hoffman, 1998: 131-157). 
 
Therefore, a terrorist attack by definition will usually include some sort of criminal 
offence (murder, attempted murder, arson, assault, etc.), whereas a criminal attack may 
not demonstrate any of the factors that define a terrorist action. It is often the intention 
behind the action that will determine whether it is an act of terror or simply a criminal 
act.  
TERRORISM AND CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
By definition almost all close protection activities attempt to minimise the Principal’s 
exposure to every relevant threat. The Principals’ exposure would be primarily dependant 
on their profile in terms of aspects such as public exposure. If the Principal is a high 
profile figure (featured regularly in the media, well-known, i.e. a celebrity, or holds a 
position of influence, for instance in business, politics or entertainment) any of the 
aspects listed below34 can increase the likelihood of terrorist groups targeting him/her:  
 
• His/her political beliefs  
• His/her religious beliefs  
• His /her nationality 
• His/her business dealings 
                                                 
34 The aspects that are listed have been drawn from various sources as listed in the Reference List and collated by the researcher, specifically in context of a 
Principal’s likelihood to be a victim through terrorist attack.  
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• His/her personal likes and dislikes 
• The people that the Principal socialises with or is affiliated with. 
 
The more the CPO knows about the above mentioned factors the easier it will be to 
determine what level of exposure the Principal may have to a terrorist attack. This would 
then enable the CPO to plan and hopefully implement such strategies to minimise any 
attack from occurring. Contingencies would also be developed covering all relevant 
aspects of how to deal with attacks if they were to occur.  
 
Finally, in terms of a terrorist attack, the last aspect to consider is ‘wrong place, wrong 
time’. This means that simply by being at a certain geographical location and/or at the 
wrong moment in time the Principal may be exposed to acts of terror. Nonetheless, even 
this random, unforeseen exposure can be minimised. A CPO would minimise the chances 
of ‘wrong place, wrong time’ by being up to date with terrorist groups’ modus operandi 
and then planning the principal’s movements in such a way as to limit the time the 
Principal will be in such situations or locations. 
 
Random acts of terror are exceptionally difficult to predict and avoid. However, effective 
prediction and avoidance could be achieved by employing Close Protection Operatives 
and risk management professionals. It is well noted and considered a ‘must learn’ topic 
for all professional CPOs to at least have a basic knowledge of terrorist groups and 
modus operandi. This is important as otherwise it is impossible to carry out a 
comprehensive risk and threat analysis and thereby inhibiting effective planning and 
contingency planning. 
 
Avoidance of any threatening situation could be considered the primary goal of close 
protection. A well trained CPO tasked with the protection of a Principal that could 
potentially be a victim of terrorist attack should consider it a primary aspect of his/her 
duties to liaise regularly with relevant authorities, conduct ongoing research and 
fieldwork and than constantly plan according to the identified changing trends. 
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In their book, You’re the target: Coping with terror and crime, Shackley, Oatman and 
Finney outline their belief that effective close protection in certain cases could be 
considered enough of a deterrent for would be assassins, stalkers, and terrorist attackers 
to select easier or less protected victims (Shackley, et al. 1989: 111-122).  
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TERRORISM 
 
The significance of the 9/1135 act of terrorism in the USA has been extensive. It was not 
only the number of people that died in this particular incident that had such far reaching 
after effects (such as the United States actions against Afghanistan and Iraq). If a 
comparison is drawn between this specific act (9/11) and other continuous terrorist 
activity there have, in fact, been many more civilians killed over a period of time in 
places like Latin America, the Middle-east and certain Pacific-based countries than in 
9/11. The resulting widespread fear and insecurity in American citizens post-9/11 could 
perhaps be linked to the widespread media exposure at the time of the 9/11 attack and the 
fact that the attacks were conducted on such a large scale, for the first time on American 
soil, i.e. unprecedented, and that America appeared defenceless against the onslaught. In 
other words, was unable to defend itself and protect American citizens. American public 
fears and insecurities have subsequently been compounded by the ongoing media focus 
and attention given to the ‘Global War Against Terrorism’. 
 
It could be said that the 9/11 attack made people all over the world reassess their security 
personal and otherwise. Furthermore, people may have also started to analyse what they 
could possibly do to enhance there safety when travelling abroad. A practical example of 
this is the huge drop in air travel by tourists for a while after 9/11. One of the obvious 
answers, for those that could afford it, was to employ the services of security specialists 
(CPOs).  
 
It is a widely known fact in security circles that something often referred to as the 
‘international terrorist network’ is in operation and was at its prime in the 1980s and 
                                                 
35 See Chapter 4, section on international and local demand for Close Protection Operatives for more information. 
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1990s. This network had been established where terrorists from unrelated groups received 
training and established informal networks and in certain cases co-operated in planning 
operations and drawing support from each other. This means that knowledge and 
information was shared across borders. The implication of this network is that there could 
well be a continuous threat to certain high-profile individuals regardless of where a VIP 
might be travelling in the world. An example of this is the attack at Ben Gurion airport in 
the late 1970s by members of a terrorist group known as the Red Army Faction. This 
attack was apparently perpetrated on behalf of Middle Eastern terrorists and carried out 
by German and Japanese terrorists.  
 
Therefore, with both the internationalisation of the media and international operations of 
terrorist groups being well established, it is easy to recognise that terrorists could achieve 
their objectives by selecting targets that may be far removed from their home country. So 
too with business now being run on a global scale and international deals becoming the 
mainstay of large business operations, a VIP business executive may travel abroad often. 
It would therefore be vital for a CPO to be up-to-date and congruent with all threats in 
any specific set travel destination including potential terrorist or related activity. 
 
The Al-Qaeda36 terrorist network is said to be active in over 60 countries. Furthermore, 
their modus operandi is so varied that some governments are devoting entire units to try 
and track down traces of the network in their own countries. For individuals without such 
resources, employing CPOs that can liaise with such units and work to minimise the 
associated risks to the Principal would be a practical measure to employ. Without 
effective specialist security professionals conducting ongoing liaison and research it 
would be almost impossible to determine when, where, why and how an attack may take 
place.  
                                                 
36 The Al-Qaeda network terrorist network is considered one the world’s foremost terrorist organisations, it is estimated to be active in over sixty countries and is 
alleged to be responsible for the 9/11 attacks and the Bali bombings in Indonesia. Its leader Osama Bin Ladin is one of the world’s most wanted terror suspects. 
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FUNDAMENTALIST ATTACKS 
 
We issue the following Fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the 
Americans and their allies… Civilians and Military… Is an individual duty 
for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do 
it… (Quote from a video taped interview with Osama Bin Laden on 7 
October 2001).37 
 
In security and safety terms the concept of fundamentalist attacks is a very disturbing 
idea. The fact that a person would be willing to trade their life in order to achieve a given 
objective is in itself a worrying concept for any security personnel. When that objective 
may involve perpetrating violent acts on a CPOs principal, it is vital for CPOs to not only 
be aware of fundamentalist behaviour but also how to manage and deal with it. This is 
obviously no small task but the modern methods of terrorist necessitate the need for 
counter skills to fundamentalist attack. 
 
Fundamentalism is not a new concept. However, it takes on a different perspective when 
assessing its impact on Close Protection and close protection strategies (the need to 
protect a designated person from any threatening situation). An attack by a 
fundamentalist terrorist is a major problem since regardless of the form of attack (suicide 
bombing, firearms attack, etc) if an individual is willing to lay down their life in order to 
achieve their objective, they will make a very difficult adversary to defend against and 
protect a Principal’s life.  
 
There are many misconceptions about fundamentalist attackers. Information on the 
profile of fundamentalist terrorists is mentioned in the publications of Lacquer (1999: 79-
105) and Hoffman (1998; 157-185). Some of the predominant misconceptions are that: 
terrorists are uneducated, badly trained and easy to spot.  
                                                 
37 The excerpt was extracted from material utilised by Mr C. McGuire (see references for details on Mr McGuire) in a lecture on terrorism to Japanese embassy staff, 
presented in Johannesburg on the 12 November 2001. The original quote was taken from a CNN news update that screened the above-mentioned video interview. 
  153
However, from the vast majority of case studies in the various literature reviewed, these 
aspects seem to be untrue. This may mean that the fundamentalist attacker may be a well 
educated, highly motivated attacker and even a professional soldier who will be able to 
pre-empt and avoid many security and close protection initiatives, plans or measures  
 
It is vital that a CPO’s training and operational practices prepare him/her with the skills 
and knowledge of how to avoid, manage or deal with a terrorist attack should it occur. In 
order to achieve this all aspects of a CPO’s training need to be integrated into a focused 
protective strategy. When analysing the applicable factors that need to be focused on in 
order for Close Protection Operatives to receive the training necessary to deal with this 
sort of threat, the following aspects have been identified: 
 
1. Effective risk and threat assessment skills should be included in all close protection 
training, in order to know recent modus operandi of current fundamentalist terrorist 
groups. This would also give the CPO the ability to identify any threats that are 
inherent as a result of geographical location and Principal characteristics/ lifestyle. 
 
2. A CPO should be well trained to utilise effective planning skills in order to pre-empt 
potential attacks and threatening situations. The aim would then be to avoid such 
situations and to plan for identified contingencies that may arise should a situation 
occur. 
 
3. Effective delegation, manpower and logistical appreciation skills are vital in order to 
correctly forecast and then deploy the necessary close protection structure. This is 
done in order to create layers of defence around the Principal and limit his/her 
exposure identified threats. 
 
4. Effective awareness and observational skills training should be a core part of close 
protection training, in order to enable CPOs to identify the subtle indicators that may 
precede an attack situation. 
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5. Mental acuity and lateral thinking ability should be part of CPOs characteristics. This 
should enable a CPO to be prepared for different contingencies and unexpected 
attacks that may occur. 
 
6. Effective Immediate Action Drill (IAD) reflex training should be a mainstay of close 
protection team training. This would hopefully ensure that under the pressure of an 
attack situation the close protection detail will respond in the correct way.  
 
While a fundamentalist terrorist attack is a most daunting reality, effective training 
covering the factors discussed above should prepare the CPO to deal with and manage 
any attack should it actually occur. 
TERRORISM AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION 
 
The South African policy on terrorism can best be explained in the following excerpt 
from Martin Schönteich of the Institute for Security Studies, in an article titled ‘South 
Africa's arsenal of terrorism legislation’ in the journal African Security Review.  
 
“SOUTH AFRICA’S ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY 
 
In 1998, the South African government approved a new official policy on terrorism. In 
terms of the policy, terrorism is defined as: 
 
‘An incident of violence, or the threat thereof, against a person, a group of 
persons or property not necessarily related to the aim of the incident, to 
coerce a government or civil population to act or not to act according to 
certain principles.’ 
 
According to its terrorism policy, the South African government is committed: 
 
• To uphold the rule of law;  
• Never to resort to any form of general and indiscriminate repression;  
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• To defend and uphold the freedom and security of all its citizens; and  
• To acknowledge and respect its obligations to the international community.’  
 
Moreover, according to the terrorism policy, the South African government shall: 
 
• condemn all acts of terror 
•  take all lawful measures to prevent acts of terror and to bring to justice those who 
are involved in acts of terror; undertake to protect foreign citizens from acts of 
terror in South Africa 
• in the event of an act of terror in a foreign country and involving a South African 
citizen, co-operate with the host government to resolve the matter 
• not make concessions that could encourage extortion by terrorists; not allow its 
territory to be used as a haven to plan, direct or support acts of terror 
• support and co-operate with the international community in their efforts to 
prevent and combat acts of terror 
•  use all appropriate measures to combat terrorism; and support its citizens who are 
victims of terrorism” (Schonteich, 2000: 39-40). 
 
To date there are two South African organisations that are listed as terrorist organisations 
by the United States, State Department, namely; People Against Gangsterism and Drugs 
(PAGAD) and Qibla (the name is taken from the term used to describe the direction in 
which Muslims face when praying).38 These two organisations are thought to have links 
to the international Al-Qaeda network. It is stated on the above website that the two 
organisations ‘Probably have ties to Islamic extremists in the Middle East’. There have 
been criminal court cases against PAGAD for urban terror attacks in Cape Town during 
1998 and 1999.  
 
 
                                                 
38 This information is available on the United States, State Department website: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/appb.html. Accessed 26 
November 2004. 
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The reality of a terrorist attack occurring in South Africa is something that cannot be 
ignored and the South African government has recently released an update draft bill on 
anti terrorism (B12-2003, 1/11/2002). The government’s aim seems to be to take a much 
harder stance to terrorism activities.  
EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL TERRORISM ON 
CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
During this research several critical factors were identified that influence the way 
terrorism effects Close Protection. These aspects pertain to both local and international 
trends. These factors will be outlined and discussed below: 
 
1. Foreign travel of VIPs 
Almost all people that warrant the services of a CPO or CPO team will travel abroad 
relatively often. Even if the CPO or team does not accompany the VIP it falls within the 
scope and duties of the CPO to conduct a thorough risk and threat assessment of the 
situation at the intended destination of travel. The CPO would than brief the Principal 
accordingly.  
 
It is therefore vital that a CPO is up-to-date with international trends and occurrences. 
Furthermore the CPO must have the ability to access the correct logistical and situational 
threat related information as well as make contact with key personnel on the ground at 
the Principal’s intended destination. This is important since the threat of terrorist attack 
may vary from country to country and region to region.  
 
2. International terrorist networks 
The fact that most established terrorist groups have contact with each other and assist 
each other where possible poses a unique problem to the CPO. The problem is that due to 
a Principal’s status, nationality, religious persuasions and/or political beliefs there may be 
at risk from foreign groups targeting them in countries where such a group is not believed 
to be active. 
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3. Media leveraging 
Many VIPs utilising close protection services can be classified as high profile (easily 
recognizable by the public and regularly featured in the media). This means that a 
terrorist organisation wanting media exposure for their cause would attract a lot of 
attention by perpetrating an attack (murder, kidnap, destruction of assets, embarrassment, 
etc.) on a high profile VIP. It is well documented that media coverage and exposure to a 
larger audience base is a common motive for terrorist attacks. 
 
4. Principal’s background, religious and/or political beliefs and affiliations 
A Principal may be targeted solely because of his/her background, religious and /or 
political beliefs and affiliations. Reasons for this, in addition to possible media coverage 
may be strictly personal as fanatical followers belonging to a fundamentalist terrorist 
group may take personal offence to a public figure who extols different beliefs and ideals 
to them (for example, the Fatwa pronounced on the author Salman Rushdie for his novels 
on aspects of the Muslim religion which upset certain sections of this religion’s 
adherents). 
RAMIFICATIONS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FOR THE 
TRAINING OF CLOSE PROTECTION OPERATIVES 
 
A basic knowledge of terrorist training, methodology and activities, should 
form part of any close protection training program. It is important for a CPO 
to know how his opposition trains and prepares (Sharp, 2003). 
 
Within the context of international terrorism and fundamentalist attacks (i.e. the usually 
suicidal nature of these attacks and the attacker’s absolute disdain for their own lives in 
accomplishing an attack on their selected target) the key question to be clarified is: 
 
How does terrorism and its modern applications impact on the required 
training of Close Protection Operatives? 
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Information gathered from the literature review and from the interviews undertaken, all 
seem to indicate that a more comprehensive and holistic approach needs to be adopted for 
the training of CPOs. This is not specifically because of the increase in the threat level of 
terrorist attacks, but the worldwide proliferation of terrorist activities remains a major 
contributing factor to the need for highly trained CPOs. 
 
Terrorism is not a new threat but the combination of modern technology and improved 
weaponry as well as the easy access to information (internet) has made the potential for 
terrorist attacks an even greater concern. When assessing additions or adjustments needed 
for CPO training the following areas appear to be most relevant: 
 
• The CPOs ability to use of technology (Internet) to gain information 
 
• The CPOs ability to effectively conduct accurate threat assessment and risk analysis. 
 
• Effective liaison skills is a must have attribute for CPOs, in order to keep as informed 
as possible by gaining relevant information from authorities 
 
• A combination of the abilities needed to plan thoroughly, while also being able to 
adjust and adapt based on the sudden changes in a given situation  
 
• The CPO must also obviously maintain adequate competency levels of all the relevant 
hard skills (unarmed combat, firearms skills etc) as relevant to the function of Close 
Protection. 
 
The above mentioned aspects were mentioned in almost all close protection training texts 
that were examined. The majority of respondents mentioned the importance of well-
trained CPOs as a vital aspect to protect a Principal from terrorist threats. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Whilst acts of terror are not a new threat to the safety of civilians, recent acts of terror 
such as the 9/11 attacks and the Bali bombings have changed the relevance of the threat 
to many people. In terms of close protection activities it is vital for CPOs to know what 
the existing threats to their Principal may be, as well as when, where and how these 
threats may manifest. 
 
The link between the effective application of close protection and minimising the levels 
of exposure to potential terrorist activity are well noted. However, factors such as the fact 
that many Principals are high profile figures who may travel internationally often mean 
that a CPO needs to stay abreast of changing terrorist trends. This needs to be done in 
order for the CPO to minimise the Principal’s exposure to such threats.  
 
There is existing proof that international terrorist organisations exist and have widespread 
networks operating in many countries. It is suggested that the South African 
organisations, PAGAD and Qibla probably have ties to Islamic extremists in the Middle 
East. This combined with the fact that there have been several bomb attacks in the last 
few years in South Africa means that terrorism is a real threat in South Africa. 
 
In order to minimise the risks of terror attacks, there are certain aspects of close 
protection training that need to be emphasised. These include aspects such as 
comprehensive networking and information gathering skills that would be needed to gain 
information on terrorist activities from the relevant agencies and official organisations. 
This would than enable the CPO to effectively plan to limit the exposure of a Principal to 
identified threats. Effective planning would also enable the CPO to consider 
contingencies and make the necessary preparations to manage such contingencies should 
they occur. It would also obviously be vital for a CPO to be competent in all necessary 
hard skills (firearms, unarmed combat, etc.) should an attack actually occur. 
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Close Protection Operatives need to have, at the very least, a basic understanding of 
terrorism, including motivation and general modus operandi of terrorist attackers. This is 
validated by the need for a CPO to be able to provide a comprehensive service which 
must focus on the relevant threats facing a Principal. 
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Chapter 8 
 
TECHNOLOGY, COMMUNICATION AND CLOSE 
PROTECTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The ability for a CPO to effectively liaise and communicate with all parties 
involved in a Close Protection task is one of the most important attributes. It 
is a fundamental skill necessary to do the job in a professional manner 
(Sharp, 2003). 
 
In its most basic definition close protection involves the safeguarding of a designated 
person’s life. With such high stakes involved it is obvious that any miscommunication 
could have very serious consequences. During the interviews a common theme that was 
identified as a vital operational skills requirement for a CPO was for the CPO to be able 
to effectively communicate and liaise with all relevant parties (Hendricks 2003: Higgins, 
2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 
2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 
2004). This was also mentioned in several training manuals and literary sources to the 
point that Consterdine (1995: 327) states that “A CP team will stand or fall in 
effectiveness by its ability to communicate”.. 
  
While the topic of communication was mentioned in many of the instructional manuals, it 
was noted that a detailed working analysis of the communication aspects of close 
protection was missing. This topic was discussed in detail, in those interviews where the 
respondent raised communication as a key component of the CPOs arsenal of skills. The 
researcher has also gained extensive experience with this subject while operating as a 
CPO, team leader and close protection trainer.  
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The applicable aspects of communication as applied in the context of close protection 
will be expanded on in this chapter. The aim of this chapter is not to serve as an 
instructional framework but rather as a detailed breakdown for the application of 
communication and related concepts during close protection operations. Furthermore, it 
can be mentioned that a thorough understanding of the aspects covered in this chapter 
should not only be well known to all close protection trainers but to field operatives as 
well. 
 
A further theme that was identified in almost every interview was the importance of 
applying technological improvements to all aspects of close protection operations and 
training (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; 
Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Smith, 2004; Steynberg, 2003; 
Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). This 
concept goes hand-in-hand with communication as improved technology enables more 
effective means for CPOs to gather information and communicate.  
 
Technological improvements have not only enabled more effective communication but 
have had effects on almost all close protection equipment, ranging from better firearms to 
GPS tracking systems. Several of these modifications and new operational equipment 
will be discussed in this chapter. It should also be noted that while improvements in 
technology have huge benefits for the close protection industry, there is the reality that 
potential attackers could utilise these tools as well. This would obviously make it far 
more difficult to provide comprehensive protection for a high risk Principal. 
OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL JARGON UTILISED IN CLOSE 
PROTECTION 
 
Much the same as almost any other specialist field, there always seems to be a language 
in itself when analysing the close protection industry. The use of specific technical jargon 
is an aspect that became apparent during the preliminary interview process. It became 
quite clear during the in-depth interviews that the vast majority of CPOs, almost take for 
granted that all people understand what they are talking about and referring to.  
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This was reinforced by certain of the interviewees, who actually mentioned, that persons 
not involved in the protection industry seem to have a limited understanding of close 
protection terminology (Higgins, 2003; Jones, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Sharp, 2003; and Van 
Eck, 2003). This can obviously lead to potential miscommunication between persons 
exposed to the close protection industry and those who are not. 
 
Another trend that was identified during the in-depth interviews with CPOs was the use 
of different terminology to describe the same thing. The different interviewees seemed to 
base their specific terminologies on their own personal training and operational 
backgrounds. An example of this is where certain outdated terminology was used. For 
instance instead referring to the designated person receiving the Close Protection as the 
Principal he/she is referred to as a ‘F1’.  
 
When assessing the international close protection environment the same seems to be true, 
where different terminology is used to describe the same thing. A typical example to 
illustrate the point is the way that the specialist field of close protection is generally 
referred to in different countries. Below is a breakdown to illustrate this point: 
 
Britain, South Africa – ‘Close Protection’ or ‘VIP Protection’ 
Israel – ‘Body guarding’ 
USA – ‘VIP’, ‘Executive’ or ‘Dignitary Protection’ and ‘Close Protection’ 
Australia – ‘Close Personal Protection’. 
COMMUNICATION IN CLOSE PROTECTION  
 
There is much information available on the principles that are applicable to general 
communication. Some of these will be briefly outlined below and than these principles 
will be related to Close Protection. As outlined in the Behaviour Systems Development’s 
Train-the-trainer manual, effective communication should follow the sequence below: 
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Diagram 1: Process of communication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Behaviour Systems Development A, 2003: 71) 
 
Regardless of the medium for communication CPOs should utilise the key steps as 
outlined in the above diagram. These aspects which are applicable to communication in 
all situations should be implemented by CPOs to avoid miscommunication. An example 
relating to the above diagram to a close protection situation could be a Principal briefing 
(see, Annexure 1: Definitions). If the close protection team leader (sender) does not 
effectively put the information across in an understandable format (encoding and 
sending) and if the Principal (receiver) does not understand (decode) and confirm 
(provide feedback) that he/she understands what is required the resulting consequences 
could be severe. 
 
If we were to take the above example and assume that the protection team leader would 
be briefing a Principal on the ‘dos and ‘do nots' of reaction to a hand grenade attack and 
if the message, for whatever reason is not effectively communicated the consequences 
could cost lives of the Principal and protection team. This is simply one example but the 
concepts could be applied to almost all aspects of close protection. 
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BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNICATION IN CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
The topic of communication as applied to close protection is very broad; therefore it is 
necessary to subdivide it into more easily explained subcategories. When referring to 
communication as related specifically to close protection we are able to subdivide it into 
the following categories: 
 
• Communication between team members of a close protection detail 
• Communication between team members of a close protection detail and the 
Principal or client 
• Communication between CPOs and relevant persons in the external environment.  
 
The importance of each of these areas cannot be understated. They are each vital 
components that are essential for a close protection operation to not only be successful 
but also efficient. Each of these three areas will be outlined in more detail below. 
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CLOSE PROTECTION TEAM 
MEMBERS 
 
The subdivision of internal communications within a close protection team can be broken 
down into two subsections, namely: everyday communication and communication under 
attack. These will be discussed below. 
 
Everyday communication  
In order to understand ‘everyday communication’ with in a close protection team this 
aspect needs to be further subdivided. It can be broken down into three primary 
subdivisions namely; communication before an operation, communication during the 
operation and lastly communication after an operation. Each of these aspects will be 
briefly discussed below. 
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Communication aspects before a close protection operation 
In terms of verbal and written communication, pre-operation communication would 
include an operation’s warning, comprehensive advance work and planning, an 
operations order (for more information, see Chapter 4, section on close protection 
documentation) and a full face-to-face team briefing. This process would usually first 
involve telephonic communication and than face-to-face verbal communication in order 
to pass on all relevant information. 
 
Communication aspects during a close protection operation 
Communication during a close protection operations would be either through hand radios, 
cellular phones and/or face-to-face verbal communication. In addition, certain close 
protection operatives advocate the use of hand signals to communicate concepts during 
an operation. The identified benefits of using hand signals are as follows:  
 
• it is simple and quick to communicate short messages, 
• it provides minimal interruption for the Principal  
• it enhances team work through the implementation of forced visual contact at 
regular intervals between team members. 
 
Communication aspects after a close protection operation 
This phase of an operation would usually involve a debriefing for all team members as 
well as the application of feedback systems either written or verbal (for more information 
on report and record keeping see Chapter 4, close protection documentation). 
Communication after an operation is often not given the necessary attention in close 
protection manuals but is vitally important. If CPOs and other relevant parties involved in 
a close protection operation are not able to learn from mistakes that may have been made 
during the operation, it would be difficult to ensure that the same mistakes do not happen 
again. 
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Communication during an attack 
Whilst the primary objective of close protection may be centred on the avoidance of any 
potentially dangerous situation, the realities of violent attack is most definitely something 
with which a CPO should be prepared to deal. Information obtained during several of the 
in-depth interviews indicated that there was a concern of how many CPOs currently 
operating in the industry would respond when actually faced with a life threatening 
situation. Furthermore it was mentioned that a major reason why CPO teams may not 
react effectively could be as a result of inefficient communication whilst under the stress 
of an attack (Higgins, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Jaarsveld, 2004; and 
Van Rooyen, 2004). 
 
The key aspects of the way that communication takes place during an attack on the 
principal (Attack On Principal/AOP, utilising American terminology) were discussed 
with the interview respondents mentioned above. The common theme seemed to be that 
communication during an attack should be trained to be an instinctive response. It should 
be a fundamental aspect of the IAD training that forms the basis for CPO response to 
threatening situations. 
 
There are several definitions of IADs but the definition selected for this research is taken from the 
Dynamic Alternatives’ Close Protection Training Manual: “These are planned, trained responses 
to an attack or threatening situation in any given environment” (Dynamic Alternatives, 2003: 34). 
The levels of communication that should take place during an IAD are illustrated in the 
flow chart below: 
 
Flow chart 1: Communication during IADs 
 
Step 1: 
A CPO identifies an attack and should then, if possible, communicate the following key 
pieces of information to the rest of his/her team members: 
• Direction of attack (clock or directional method see below) 
• The form or type of attack 
• A description of the attacker/attackers  
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• Inform the rest of the team that the he/she will engage the attack 
 
Step 2: 
(it should be noted that the aspects below should all happen simultaneously) 
• The CPO identifying the attack should, if it is possible to do so, 
communicate a warning to the attacker (e.g. ‘drop the gun’) 
• The designated Bodyguard should tell the Principal what is happening 
based on pre-rehearsed reaction the Bodyguard will simultaneously 
provide body cover and evacuate the Principal 
• The rest of the team members will either provide back-up for the CPO 
who is engaging the attacker, and /or assist in providing additional 
bodycover for the BG and Principal as they evacuate 
 
 
 
Step 3: 
• A detailed evaluation and assessment of the situation after evacuation 
should be done by the team leader. The Team leader would then make 
a decision on what should happen next. 
 
The steps outlined above are simply a generic example but the format could be applied to 
most attack-related IADs that a close protection team would face. 
 
Why it is difficult to communicate effectively during attacks and IADs 
Probably the key reason making it difficult to communicate under attack is as a direct 
result of the ‘flight or fight’ survival instincts. Under the extreme duress of an attack on a 
Principal a CPOs survival instincts will trigger a huge amount of adrenal release, known 
as adrenal dump. There are many signs and symptoms of adrenal dump that effect a 
CPO’s reactions, not all of these are helpful to a CPO while executing an IAD. 
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Geoff Thompson in his book, Dead or Alive, describes many of the symptoms that are 
triggered during adrenal release. The adrenal release symptoms that effect 
communication are as follows: 
 
1. Auditory exclusion or distortion - which makes it difficult to clearly hear or 
distorts what, is actually heard.  
 
2. Verbal inability - the inability to communicate complex material verbally. This 
occurs as a direct result of the part of the brain which runs the formation of 
complex speech patterns shutting down as a direct result of adrenaline causing 
flight or fight instinct’ 
 
3. Memory distortion - this basically refers to the fact that under extreme duress a 
person will only respond reflexively (apply innate survival instincts). Therefore 
for an IAD reaction to be effective it needs to be practiced repetitively until it 
becomes reflexive.  
 
4. Freeze or panic - if a CPO has not trained to make the correct reactions reflexive, 
he/she may freeze or panic under the stress of a real attack. In order to avoid 
freezing or panicking skills need to be developed in a manner that is as close to 
what will occur in reality as possible (Thompson, 1999: 85-101).  
 
Another barrier to effective communication under attack is known as the ‘flinch response. 
The flinch response is the human body’s instinctive reaction when faced with an 
occurrence that it was not prepared for. The flinch response involves three key actions 
namely: 
 
1. A sharp inhalation 
2. Physically moving away from the threat 
3. Hands and arms being drawn into the chest or face area for protection 
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The relevance of these three responses in terms of communication difficulties for a CPO 
under attack is primarily focused on the first action of the flinch response, a sharp 
inhalation. This is a reflex action and can make regulated breathing difficult, this in turn 
would make verbal communication and clear thinking difficult for a CPO experiencing a 
flinch response.  
HOW TO OVERCOME THE IDENTIFIED BARRIERS TO 
COMMUNICATION 
 
Realistic training and scenarios 
“Realistic, repetitive scenario-based training is the most effective way to ensure that a 
CPO functions effectively in a life-or-death situation” (McGuire, 2003). 
 
The statement above refers to the fact that repetitive rehearsal and practice under realistic 
conditions assists in acclimatising CPOs to attack situations. This should enable them to 
function and communicate more effectively under the pressure of an actual attack on 
Principal situation. 
 
Use of key words to shorten and simplify communication 
“Communication under attack should be short, direct and pass on as much relevant 
information as quickly as possible” (Van Eck, 2003). 
  
The use of shortened key words to represent more complex concepts enables more 
knowledge to be communicated and understood. This could be achieved by applying 
aspects such as: implementing a directional approach as opposed to a clock system 
approach (see Annexure 1: Definitions). Through repetitive practice during training, 
protection team members develop trust and an intimate understanding of procedures that 
should be followed under attack. This generally means that if an attack was to take place 
within a CPOs given area of responsibility (see Annexure 1: Definitions) then he/she 
would verbally communicate it to the rest of the team. 
 
  171
The communication from the CPO who identified the attack to the rest of the team would 
be based on a key identifying aspect such as; the colour of the attacker’s shirt, or one of 
the attackers prominent physical characteristics. These would assist the other team 
members in quickly identifying the attacker. The weapon or method of attack should also 
be communicated in as succinct a manner as possible, e.g. gun or knife attack. To 
illustrate that he/she was unhurt and capable of engaging the attacker, a CPO might use 
the word ‘mine’ or ‘engaging’ to inform the rest of the team members and let them know 
that he/she is dealing with the attack. A fellow team member could than utilise words like 
‘cover’ or ‘back-up’ to let the rest of the team know that he/she is assisting the CPO who 
is engaging the attack. 
 
At this stage, the rest of the team would then concentrate on the evacuation of the 
Principal whilst taking into account the potential for secondary attacks or ambushes. The 
CPO or CPOs dealing with the attack would then evacuate when the attackers were 
neutralised or the Principal was removed from the threat. 
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TEAM MEMBERS AND THE 
PRINCIPAL 
 
The amount of direct communication between the protection team and the Principal 
would vary based on the following aspects: 
 
• the size of the close protection team 
• the relevant protocol based on the Principal’s status or office 
• the Principal’s wishes  
• the identified threat level 
 
The Principal may or may not communicate directly with regular close protection team 
members. The Principal may chose to talk only to the bodyguard or team leader. It would 
then be the responsibility of the bodyguard or team leader to communicate with the rest 
of the team. It is also commonplace for the majority of communication to take place via 
the Principals personal assistant or if an official via the Aid-de-Camp.  
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Whilst taking these various differences in channels of communication into consideration 
there should at the very least be a Principal briefing (see Annexure 1: Definitions) and 
regular security update sessions. 
 
Probably the key influencing factors determining the frequency and format of everyday 
communication would be the Principal’s personality and the professionalism of the 
protection team. In certain of the interviews it was mentioned that sometimes the CPOs 
relationship becomes almost one of a good friend or close associate (Higgins, 2003; 
Rootman, 2004; and Steyn, 2003). This occurs as a direct result of the amount of time 
that the Principal and CPO spend together. If this was to occur, the CPOs ability to 
operate professionally may be impaired. It is noted that a CPO should always maintain a 
professional emotional distance from his/her Principal. 
 
Furthermore, another aspect to be considered is the communication between the team and 
the Principal under attack situations. Once again all the ‘difficulty factors’ mentioned in 
the section on ‘team communication under attack’ are applicable here. The concept 
should be to inform the Principal of what is going on and the necessary actions that need 
to be taken in as short and simple a manner as possible. A common practice among CPOs 
is to only refer to the Principal by his/her surname and only address him/her formally, 
except when under attack. The change in form of address would act as an indicator to the 
Principal that the situation was serious.  
 
It has also been found that the Principal may listen more effectively when this ‘first 
name’ system in an emergency is implemented as opposed to if it is not. An example of 
the communication that might take place during an attack could be as follows: ‘John we 
are being shot at, get down and move to the cars’.  
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COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CPOS AND THE EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT (LIAISON SKILLS) 
 
A CPO’s ability to organise logistics and ensure the assistance of any 
external party who could make an operation run more smoothly is vital. This 
skill is probably the most common way a client will assess and measure the 
value for money of their Protectors (Higgins, 2003). 
 
CPOs would need to liaise with many different people to run an effective protection 
operation. This liaison could take on many forms and the CPO needs to be an expert at 
interpersonal communication whilst maintaining operational security. There is no way 
that a CPO can operate in an information or communication vacuum. In fact one of the 
key reasons why former law enforcement personnel often excel as private sector CPOs is 
because of their old networks and connections. Their knowledge of military or police 
aspects such as their understanding of chain of command and the applicable protocols 
become very valuables tools. 
 
During a close protection operation one of the first external liaisons would take place 
whilst conducting advance work. Advance work can be defined as the process of 
gathering and sorting all necessary information in order to effectively plan and then 
actually run the specific operation. It is at this stage that communications may be 
necessary with some of the following external parties: 
 
• Police or related agencies 
• Hotels or other accommodation venues 
• Airlines and relevant handling agents 
• Venue organisers and staff 
• Security managers or other officials who may be engaged in an operation 
• Hospitals and medical centres 
• Any tourist officials who may provide assistance or advice 
• Any other party who may be able to contribute to the success of an operation. 
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Whilst performing protective duties, the protection detail will constantly liaise with 
civilians in the immediate environment. This is vital in order for the operation to run 
smoothly. Communicating with external parties may take many forms. An example here 
could simply be liaising with the hotel concierge to organise extra rooms. A more 
detailed external liaison may be liaising with the relevant police contact person in order 
to get a police escort for a protection motorcade. The key fundamental is that if the CPO 
cannot communicate effectively and organise assistance from the relevant people, it 
would be almost impossible to run an efficient and secure close protection operation. 
 
Some additional communication related aspects that are relevant when assessing how to 
train and prepare CPOs for operational duties are outlined below: 
 
• Teaching CPO trainees liaison protocols and communication skills are vital in 
close protection but they are very seldom covered in enough detail during CPO 
training courses. When these skills are taught that focus seems to be on a 
superficial overview with very little assessment or evaluations being conducted 
(Hendricks, 2003; McGuire, 2003; and Sharp, 2003). It is important that a 
prospective CPO can effectively communicate. The ability to convince relevant 
external parties into assisting or providing information on a close protection 
operation becomes necessary for civilian CPOs. This is primarily because they 
operate without government backing and authority and therefore cannot instruct 
people to assist them. 
 
• In addition CPOs need to be trained in the correct procedure to follow in order to 
get relevant information, assistance and co-operation from both official and 
unofficial external parties. This is important, since if a CPO lands up offending 
any persons that are involved, this can make the smooth running of an operation 
very difficult. This may even result in the Principal being under additional threat 
because of inefficient organisation. 
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HOW TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS AFFECT CPOS  
 
This area basically refers to technological improvements within the field of personal 
communication equipment that is utilised by CPOs. Not only have there been vast 
modifications with hand-held radios and hands-free voice activated microphones but the 
wide distribution of cell phones and satellite phones have enabled easy international 
communication for protection details to be brought to a new level. 
 
One CPO interviewed simply stated that “I don’t know how we ever provided effective 
close protection without cell phones” (Higgins, 2003). 
 
How technology is affecting the training of CPOs 
The development of technological training aids and tools has without a doubt enhanced 
the way that CPOs are trained. The list of training aids is extensive and enables training 
to more closely mimic reality. One of the major benefits of some of this technology (use 
of video projectors and realistic firearm models) is that close protection trainees can 
practice dealing with potentially dangerous situations in a safe environment. This limits 
the exposure of trainees to unnecessary dangerous risks while still training them 
effectively. 
 
Equipment and technology have made huge advancements in realistic 
simulations, enhancing the way that CPOs are trained, unfortunately this 
happens primarily overseas (Van Jaarsveld, 2004). 
 
An example of this in the South African training environment is the low cost and ease of 
use of modern paintball guns that bring a low level of risk to the student but adds to the 
reality of IAD training. The use of a multimedia approach to training is also becoming a 
core part of close protection training. Use of computer projectors, videos and CDs in 
training has provided the trainer with a large variety of mediums and techniques that can 
be used to communicate information to students.  
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THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNET ON CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
The internet and the proliferation of the worldwide web have had an enormous influence 
over all sectors of trade and industry. This holds true for the close protection industry as 
well. The internet has created huge benefits, as well as additional threats and risks for 
CPOs. Probably the major benefits would revolve around the ease of access to 
information and the efficiency and speed of email communication. The associated risks 
stem from the ease of communication and access to information for attackers. 
 
The proliferation of the internet has several points which have to be taken into 
consideration since they have a direct effect on the close protection industry (these will 
be discussed below). 
 
Ease of long distance networking 
The internet has made both the benchmarking of standards and the creation of 
national/international networks relatively easy. These networks could assist in sharing 
relevant information. Having established contacts with direct email access makes the 
accessing of necessary operational information relatively easy and quick to verify or 
query. 
 
Easy access to close protection operational methodology 
This refers to the fact that any interested parties can download or access close protection 
training methodology and operational principles on the internet. The impact of this is that 
it is now easy for potential attackers to find out how CPOs train, as well as how they 
would probably operate and react to different attack scenarios. This gives the potential 
attacker an opportunity to spot the weaknesses of a CPO team when planning an attack. 
This obviously poses a serious problem for CPOs.  
 
Alternatively on the positive side this also provides CPOs anywhere in the world the 
opportunity to obtain the most up-to-date methods and best practices which can be built 
into their training. 
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Access to Principal’s personal and company information 
“I found out things that I did not even know about my CEO on the internet” was a 
statement made by one of the interview respondents.39 
 
The impact of important confidential information being accessed via the internet means 
that a potential attacker or merely someone out to discredit a Principal may be able to 
gain that information if he/she knows how to access it. Conversely the same ease of 
access to information also makes the conducting of risk analysis and Principal Profiling 
easier for CPOs. This is especially relevant when planning international travel, where 
information on the current political situation in foreign countries needs to be obtained and 
assessed with planning foreign operations. 
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS ON CLOSE PROTECTION 
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS 
 
While it is important for a CPO not to become dependant on tools and 
equipment, a professional CPO will [and can] carry a wide array of 
weaponry and related equipment (Sharp, 2003). 
 
Tools and equipment utilised by CPOs is quite a broad topic. It can be broken down into 
subcategories. These will make it easier for the reader to follow. These subdivisions are 
as follows: 
 
1. Weaponry 
2. Technology 
3. Accessories 
 
(Each of these aspects will be discussed below). 
 
                                                 
39 Respondent requested to remain anonymous for this information reference. 
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Technological improvements of close protection weaponry  
The ongoing research and development by forward thinking companies (such as Glock 
and ASP international), as well as the application of technological improvements in 
almost all the weaponry used by CPOs obviously has huge benefits for them. Some of 
these benefits and advantages of specific weaponry are outlined below: 
 
• The advent of smaller, lighter, high capacity (able to carry a sizeable amount of 
ammunition) pistols has meant that it is easier for a CPO to carry around more fire-
power that is easily concealable and reliable. 
 
• Improvements in ballistic body armour (bullet-proof vests) and protective accessories 
(e.g. bullet proof briefcases40) are readily available to CPOs. When such equipment is 
used effectively it can assist as an effective risk reduction tool.  
 
• The proliferation of combat torches and mini hi-power handheld torches makes the 
carrying and use of necessary equipment far easier than outdated bulky less powerful 
torches. This makes them easier for CPOs to carry and are more effective (brighter 
and last longer) to use than older models. 
 
• Improvements in communications equipment (see above section on communication). 
Smaller lighter radios and cell phones that last longer are obviously useful to CPOs 
when on long term contracts. 
 
• Folding tactical batons such as the Armament Systems & Procedures (ASP) 
extendable baton provide an easy to carry alternative force option for CPOs. This 
means that the CPO could have the advantage of being able to carry a baton 
concealed and utilise it as a full length baton if necessary to implement a force option 
lower than a firearm.  
                                                 
40 Carrying ballistic protection in any form could have huge benefits if an attack were to take place. Having everyday objects such as briefcases that are actually 
bullet-proof could be very useful for CPOs since they serve the dual purpose of a carry-case and protection device. 
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• Improvements in pepper sprays and mace mean that the potential for permanent 
damage to an assailant is minimised while the capacity to stop him from attacking is 
increased. This is also an excellent minimum force option as compared to the firearm.  
 
• The improvements in combat folder knives (these are knives where the blade folds in 
and out of the handle), which are available in many sizes and weights making 
personal choice possible for CPOs when selecting a bladed weapon. These 
improvements make it easy for a CPO to carry a combat effective knife in comfort. It 
also provides the CPO with an additional force option other then the firearm. 
 
• Flexi-cuffs such as the Armament Systems & Procedures (ASP) Trifold are light and 
easy to use and eliminate the necessity for CPOs to carry heavier steel and more 
cumbersome handcuffs. 
 
Trends regarding other close protection related equipment 
There are many tools that are utilised by CPOs whilst operational that are not necessarily 
weapons. These tools could assist in various aspects such as planning or monitoring the 
protection team during an operation. Several of these are outlined below: 
 
• Approximately 70 % of the interview respondents considered basic computer skills 
(internet, e-mail and report writing) to be a vital operational skills requirement for 
CPOs in this day and age (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 
2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; 
Steynberg, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004).  
 
• Use of electronic security measures (cameras, alarms, infrared beams and access 
control measures) have improved greatly in terms of sophistication and technological 
advancement over the last few years. It is therefore important for any CPO to have, at 
the very least a basic understanding of these tools since they form an important part 
of ensuring a VIP’s safety at work or residences. 
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• It is necessary for a CPO to have a basic understanding of the way that electronic 
surveillance takes place and the complexities involved. In most cases a CPO will 
make use of professionals in the field of Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) in order 
to negate or minimise the risks associated with information security or breaches 
thereof. 
 
• Improvements in vehicle tracking systems now means that a team leader or operation 
room controller can simultaneously keep track of all vehicular movements during a 
close protection operation. This makes the overall coordination of the close protection 
operation far easier. It would also enable better logistical support for field operatives 
since it would be simpler (than in the past) for the coordinator to know where the 
CPO team are. 
 
• The proliferation and widespread availability Global Positioning Systems (GPS) has 
made navigation and orientation (during route planning and operations) infinitely 
simpler and can dramatically cut down the time spent on the planning of VIP venue 
transfers and route reconnaissance phases of an operation. It can save both time and 
money since it minimises the risks of getting lost. 
 
Accessories 
There are several other pieces of equipment that are relevant to the close protection 
industry as a whole (both training and operations). Several of these are outlined below. 
 
• The use of digital and video cameras makes training and student feedback infinitely 
more effective (the student can have an opportunity to actually see and rate their own 
performances in training).  
 
• It also can vastly improve the quality and usability of information gathered in security 
audits41 (by having visual references to include in reports) or the need to clarify 
                                                 
41 A security audit is a comprehensive evaluation and analysis of all security aspects both physical and other. The security audit is used to determine security 
weaknesses. Recommendations would then be made on how to minimise the identified weaknesses. A site survey is the physical inspection and assessment of a 
building or physical structure in order to identify any physical hazards or security risks. 
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certain points during team briefings (by having visual references to illustrate key 
points). 
 
• Availability of fire-retardant material (such as Proban and Nomex) as well as small 
but highly effective fire extinguishers has made the task of reducing the risks of fire 
far easier and therefore enhancing the safety of the principal. 
 
• Improvements in first-aid equipment (e.g. portable defibrillators) mean that the 
protection team has less to carry (compact and lighter kits and equipment) and can 
achieve better results if first-aid has to be administered, then may have been possible 
in the past when such equipment was not readily available. The size and weight of 
modern equipment means that it can actually be carried with the CPO team. This 
obviously is very beneficial since if the equipment is needed is on hand and the 
Principal may not have to be evacuated to a hospital.  
CONCLUSION 
 
The importance of CPOs to be able to apply effective inter-personal communication 
whilst taking protocol into account cannot be overstated. It is vital that a CPO can 
communicate effectively using the relevant communication tools such as cellphones and 
handheld radios. He/she needs these skills in order to elicit the assistance of relevant 
parties. This is especially so if these parties are able to smooth the running of a protection 
operation or enhance the safety of the Principal during such an operation. 
 
It is also important to assess how communication is affected during an attack on principal 
(AOP) situation. Much training needs to be done in order to ensure that a CPO team can 
function effectively as a unit under the duress of an attack situation. This involves much 
repetitive practice and rehearsal as well as ensuring that all communications are as short 
and simple as possible. This would enable the effective communication of the close 
protection team member’s actions in as short a time frame as possible.  
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Technology, such as the ease of access to the internet, has had a tremendous impact on 
the way that close protection operations are conducted. Improved (in terms of size, 
weight, portability, technological features and reliability) communications equipment has 
positively influenced close protection operations. This can be seen all the way through 
the operation, from the information gathering stages right up to the debriefing stage and 
termination stage. Improvements in close protection equipment and weaponry now mean 
that a CPO has the capacity to carry equipment having better performance than in the past 
(e.g. carrying of high capacity small frame semi-automatic pistols like the Glock 19 or 
26). This means that a CPO can in fact carry more ammunition while having less overall 
equipment weight and therefore be better able to conceal his/her weaponry i.e. less bulky 
than previous equipment/firearms. 
 
It is every CPO’s and trainer’s responsibility to keep as up-to-date as possible with 
changing trends and technological enhancements related to the close protection industry. 
This is important in order to make the provision of protection services more effective, as 
well as improving their existing skills and competencies. In many cases better equipment 
translates directly to being able to provide the Principal with better protection. 
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Chapter 9 
 
USE OF FORCE OPTIONS AND CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“In many situations CPOs cannot legally utilise their weapons [firearms] therefore they 
need to have other options, such as unarmed combat or batons” (Jacobs, 2003). 
 
Throughout the interview process most of the respondents expressed concern regarding 
the use of force options available to CPOs (Allon, 2003; Bodhoo, 2004; Garvey, 2004; 
Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 
2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 
2004). The focus of this concept centres on the fact that most CPOs in South Africa tend 
to be still firearm dependant (reliant on the firearm as the primary force option) and do 
not have sufficient training in other force options. Force options other than a firearm 
would primarily be unarmed combat, improvised and alternative weaponry. The problem 
of firearm dependency, whilst definitely an international one, is, however, more 
pronounced in South Africa.42 In many other countries only service personnel CPOs (e.g. 
police and military) may operate with firearms, with the result that most civilian CPOs 
operating in such an environment would focus their training on additional force options.  
 
South Africa has seen a different evolution for CPO use of force options. Firearms laws 
in South Africa been updated,43 in the past firearm regulation has been relatively lenient 
when compared to many other countries.  
 
                                                 
42 This could be as a result of the past inefficient firearms control in South Africa (as compared to other developed countries), as well as the fact that South Africans 
have what could be called a ‘gun culture’ whereby from a young age many South Africans are exposed to firearms usage. This is particularly true of white South 
African males over the age of thirty who as a result of conscription, had to serve time in either the military or police.  
43 For more information see the Firearms Control Act 60/2000. It should be noted that the regulations stated in this Act were only finalised and implemented on 1 
July 2004. 
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The ease of obtaining and carrying a firearm, as well as its effectiveness as a self defence 
tool meant that use of firearms has been the primary choice as a use of force option for 
South African CPOs.  
 
It was also only after 1994 that the civilian/private sector of close protection began 
expanding exponentially in South Africa. It would make sense that CPOs moving from 
the military or police into the private sector would have been trained in one of the 
services’ close protection units. A CPO with this training would therefore apply the same 
use of force strategies that they were trained on in their previous units. In other words 
since most service personnel were and still are trained in a firearms reliant manner, a 
CPO with this background would probably be limited in the use of force options that 
he/she could effectively apply. 
 
Moreover, the vast majority of close protection trainers who became civilian instructors 
utilised the training methodology with which they were familiar. This methodology was 
also based primarily on what was taught in the various government associated agencies 
that were running close protection details. The doctrine for almost all of these was to be 
reliant on the use of firearms during attack situations. This doctrine still holds true for 
protection of high risk personnel, as in all likelihood if a protection detail must respond to 
attack in such a situation, it is probably a maximum force situation (Hendricks, 2003; 
Higgins, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; 2004; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; and Van 
Eck, 2003).  
 
The problem with a CPO being ‘firearms reliant’ becomes most apparent when we 
consider that the majority of operational close protectors working in South Africa today 
are not operating in extreme high risk situations. Another identified hindering factor that 
accompanies firearm reliance is that the situations in which a CPO could safely utilise 
their firearm are few and far between, taking into account situational and safety factors 
are considered.  
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In addition a further question that arises is whether the majority of CPOs operating today, 
actually have sufficient training to competently handle their firearms under the pressures 
of an attack situation, in which innocent civilians may be hurt by misplaced shots or over 
penetration.44 
 
Whilst the concept of applying unarmed combat or alternative weaponry as minimum 
force options seems straightforward, the wider issue seems to be whether individual 
CPOs actually know when to use the available different force options. Other research has 
indicated this as a universal problem being faced by service and civilian security 
personnel. The controversy over applied force in self defence becomes more obvious as 
the concept of ‘use of minimum force’ is a key aspect needing to not only be understood 
but also applied in all violent situations (Mistry et al, 2001).45 
 
This chapter aims to look at the reasons why training in force options other than the use 
of firearms is needed. Steps necessary to implement unarmed combat and alternative 
weaponry into the core training of close protection personnel will be examined. This is 
vital so that a CPO can respond with the correct level of force in any given violent 
encounter. Responding with the correct force option needs to be an instinctive process 
since under the intensity of attack there is usually not time to decide on what the best 
course of action should be or what level of force the response should be. 
DEFINITIONS 
 
Relevant background and understanding on what unarmed combat is, as well as the 
concept of alternative weaponry was discussed in Chapter 4. A brief breakdown of each 
was also given explaining further the inter-related principles that apply to this field. Some 
of these concepts will, once again, be clarified below: 
 
                                                 
44 Over penetration is the term used to describe a projectile that not only enters its designated target but passes straight through it. Over penetration could be 
dangerous to innocent bystanders behind the target as the bullet may still be travelling at a high enough speed to cause death or injury. 
45 For more information see: Mistry et al, 2001The use of force by members of the South African Police Service: case studies form seven policing areas in Gauteng. 
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• Unarmed combat refers to the use of force by a CPO to restrain or incapacitate an 
attacker without the use of a firearm or alternative weapon. 
 
• Alternative weaponry refers to the use of any tool or implement other than a 
firearm or unarmed combat that can be used to incapacitate or restrain an attacker. 
 
• Improvised weaponry will refer to the use of everyday objects in a CPOs 
surroundings that could be used as a weapon or for distraction. 
BACKGROUND TO THE USE OF MINIMUM FORCE CONCEPT 
 
‘Use of force’ is a topic currently surrounded by a good deal of controversy in South 
Africa. This seems to be true for all parties affected by the ‘use of force’ legislation. The 
debate on use of force impact in various ways on all parties involved in the close 
protection industry, whether it is a CPO claiming that he/she has the right to utilise any 
means necessary to protect their client or the client claiming that they do not want 
firearms and violence around them.  
 
A detailed list of examples illustrating the misconceptions regarding ‘use of force' could 
be provided but for the purposes of this report, use of force will concentrate on the 
concept outlined as:  
 
In order for a response to be considered one of minimum force the 
defender (CPO) must respond with only that amount of force necessary to 
stop the threat (McGuire, 2003). 
 
When assessing minimum force from the point-of-view of CPO training and operations it 
is important that a comprehensive understanding of the overall close protection initiative 
is in place. Thorough understanding of the law regarding use of force is something that 
cannot be ignored since a CPO who merely stops an attacker from harming their Principal 
is not enough. It must be done in accordance with the law. This may seem simple enough 
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but the reality is the CPO must decide and execute an effective and legal response to an 
attack situation under immense pressure. 
 
The time that a CPO has to decide on the correct reaction in any situation can probably be 
counted in split seconds (i.e. the need for split-second decision-making). It would 
therefore be justified to state that a CPO’s reactions must be planned in advance and 
trained to be as instinctive as possible under the duress and confusion of an attack. The 
wrong decision may be made, especially if responses are not drilled into a CPOs 
subconscious and become a learnt and instinctive (spontaneous but correct) response at 
the same time.  
  
It is an accepted fact that the use of a firearm in response to an attack is usually 
considered a maximum force reaction. However, in the past most close protection 
operations were run by the police or similar agencies and if use of force was warranted it 
would probably be because a definite attack on a high profile person was taking place. 
This would necessitate the use of maximum force in retaliation (i.e. application of 
firearms). It is clear now today that the majority of close protection operations in South 
Africa are for primarily medium and low risk clients. The protection provided for these 
type of clients are usually all performed by persons in the private sector and the risk level 
would usually not involve maximum force responses.  
 
Moreover, even in the case of government close protection units, the altering of the ‘use 
of force’ during arrest46 has meant that police officers are as limited in response to violent 
attack as civilians (i.e. can only be utilised if a life threatening situation arises) (see 
Mistry et al, 2001 for more detail on s49). Accordingly if a maximum force response is 
utilised by police, there may be serious consequences (if the officer/s involved is found to 
have used excessive force, he/she may be prosecuted for their actions) after the situation 
has occurred. The bottom line is that the concept of minimum force has gained more 
                                                 
46 This is found in Section 49 of The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 but has recently been changed in the Judicial Matters Amendment Bill introduced on 1 
February 2004 (B2-2005). 
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acceptance and become a guiding principle with regard to the use of force, specifically 
deadly force.  
 
As a consequence minimum force is applicable to all CPOs whether service personnel or 
civilians. Probably one of the most effective ways to deal with the legal aspects and 
associated new limitations on the use of force is to train the close protection operative to 
have rounded skills (the ability to apply various force options to deal with a violent 
situation).  
THE NEED FOR CPOS TO POSSESS ROUNDED SKILLS 
 
Rounded skills means that a CPO is sufficiently trained to posses the relevant range of 
force options. He/she needs to be able to apply the correct level of force in an attack 
situation, while taking into consideration not only the law but the safety of the CPO and 
Principal as well.  
 
When assessing the operational skills needed by CPO’s, 80% of the South African 
respondents (Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; 
Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; 
Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004.) interviewed were of the 
opinion that the use of a firearm, while providing close protection in South Africa, is an 
unlikely occurrence. This could be due to the fact that most criminal attacks can be 
avoided by effective planning and high levels of awareness during protection operations 
as well as the fact that the majority of South African clients that employ CPOs are not of 
a high risk nature.  
 
Whilst taking this into account, it is clear that even though the CPO should be highly 
trained in the tactical use of firearms he/she is far more likely to utilise unarmed combat 
or alternative weaponry in an altercation. This would allow for minimising the risks of 
using maximum force in a situation where a high level force option may not be 
warranted. The lack of rounded skills was illustrated, during a presentation on use of 
force options and alternative weaponry conducted by Dynamic Alternatives Pty Ltd in 
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March 2001, to over 80 active members of the Presidential Protection Unit and VIP 
Protection Services of the SAPS. Staff of Dynamic Alternatives asked the officers 
attending the presentation the following to two questions: 
 
1. Have you ever utilised your firearm to defend a Principal against attack while 
providing close protection services? 
 
2. Have you ever pushed, restrained or had to strike [unarmed] someone while 
protecting a Principal as part of a close protection detail? 
 
The response was clear (far more officers having had to use unarmed combat than 
firearms). Approximately 70 officers stated that they have had to use some sort of 
unarmed combat techniques while working as a member of a close protection detail, with 
only one officer claiming to have utilised his firearm whilst performing protection related 
duties. These responses were certainly interesting since after further questioning the vast 
majority of officers had received little if any unarmed combat and alternative weaponry 
training for their jobs as CPOs. It was also clear that the focus of all training that they had 
previously received concentrated on the use of firearms as the primary response to almost 
all attack situations.  
 
Furthermore, almost all of the interviewees echoed the sentiments expressed above by 
these police members of close protection units. While most felt that it was necessary for 
CPOs to be well trained in the tactical usage of firearms, the vast majority were of the 
belief that unarmed combat and related skills training receives far less attention in 
training and retraining programs when compared to firearms skills. 
 
The direct meaning of this, is that the way that most CPOs are trained does not correlate 
with the way that they are going to have to work and respond in real life situations. There 
appears to be a major imbalance in training methodology when assessing use of force. 
This will have to be adjusted in the future if a focus on practical outcomes-based training 
is to be achieved. A probable reason for CPOs and other security personnel not being able 
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to effectively apply the concepts of minimum force may be attributed to the fact that 
these operatives have not been sufficiently trained in the use of force options other than 
firearms nor do they appear to fully comprehend the implications of the use of force in 
particular deadly force utilising firearms (Mistry et al, 2001: 58). 
SITUATIONAL FACTORS EFFECTING USE OF FORCE 
 
There are several factors that will affect what weaponry and level of force a CPO would 
choose in a given situation. These are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Firearms usage at various ranges 
After assessing various relevant literature sources including assassination case studies 
and training manuals, certain consistencies become apparent. Aspects noted included the 
fact that the majority of close protection handgun shooting incidents take place at a range 
of less than eight metres, with many of them at less than five metres. This indicates a 
disturbing trend, regarding the way that CPOs are trained in comparison to what happens 
in reality. In several cases what happened does not correlate with the way in which CPOs 
are trained to utilise their firearms and tactical defensive options during an AOP (Attack 
on Principal). An example of this is the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin where he was 
shot and killed from only a couple of metres away. 
 
A training video titled, “Surviving Edged Weapons”, that was made as an instructional 
tape for police officers in the USA, contains examples of knife attacks on police officers, 
demonstrated and verified at an approximate range of seven metres or less. It was noted 
by police officers in the video that a committed attacker will be able to rush and stab an 
officer before the officer can draw and accurately fire his weapon. The implications are 
that at a range of seven metres47 or less it would probably be more beneficial for the CPO 
to utilise unarmed combat or alternative weaponry as a first option and only after that to 
then possibly draw the firearm if the situational variables allowed this action (Calibre 
Press video production, 1987). 
                                                 
47 In the publication The Modern Bodyguard, the following information is given: “FBI summary of officers killed, together with police gunfight data has remained 
consistent - 92% of all fire-fights occur within 20 feet” (Consterdine, 1995: 230). 
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In order for a CPO to be able to do this, an integrated approach to tactics and response to 
attack needs to be applied. Due to the complexities of responding to an attack situation, it 
is clear that if a CPO is not trained to integrate relevant unarmed combat and associated 
techniques with drawing and firing a firearm, then in many cases the response would be 
too late or ineffective. The end result may be injury or death to the CPO and/or Principal 
 
It is also a well-known fact that under the intensity of attack, the human flight or fight 
instinct triggers adrenal dump (a huge injection of adrenalin into the body). This adrenal 
dump will cause, among other side effects, disorientation and inhibited judgement of 
space/distance perception. This means that during training, realistic situations need to be 
simulated in order for the trainee to be able to learn to assess and utilise the right tools 
based on the distance of attack whilst under the induced pressure of the simulation. 
 
Crowds and working environment effects on use of force 
A clear trend was identified during the interviews whereby the majority of interviewed 
respondents were of the opinion that the situations where CPOs could safely utilise their 
firearms effectively are few and far between. When analysing the reasoning behind this 
trend, the following factors could be identified: 
 
1. In many close protection related situations that might warrant the use of force, the 
most common identified environment was that of working in a crowd. Any armed 
response in a crowded situation has the inherent risk of the CPO shooting non-
combatants (e.g. bystanders). This is an obvious example of the risks of utilising a 
firearm in terms of safety and efficiency. 
 
2. The next problem is the fact that in an attack situation it is not always possible to see 
what is behind your attacker. This means that over-penetration of shots fired could 
kill or injure innocent civilians. 
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In order to counter this concern many CPOs carry hollow-point48 type ammunition. 
However, this still leaves the problems of accurate shooting and ricochets that could 
injure or kill civilians. 
 
3. There is also the problem of weapon retention. While working in a crowded area it 
may be difficult for a CPO to both draw and fire his weapon as the crowd may 
overwhelm him and take his/her weapon. It is a common rule for CPOs that when 
working in a crowd, they may loose jewellery and other objects on their person. Many 
CPOs carry retention holsters (holsters with a retention clip or similar mechanism) for 
such situations. These holsters may slow the drawing of a firearm slightly but makes 
retention of the un-drawn weapon much easier. 
IDENTIFIED TRAINING INADEQUACIES IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
When all of the aspects outlined above are considered, the problems posed by use of 
firearms in crowds and the resultant risks of over penetration or missing cannot be 
ignored. However, these problems can be rectified through ongoing and intensive training 
(see Chapter 11: Recommendations, for more detail). In assessments on CPOs conducted 
by Dynamic Alternatives Pty Ltd, certain disturbing trends were identified. By evaluating 
these assessments,49 the following findings were noted. 
 
1. Most of the assessed CPOs were of the opinion that they could utilise their firearms 
effectively under pressure. However over 50% could not pass the evaluations50 on the 
first attempt. 
 
                                                 
48 Hollow point ammunition (for example the Winchester SXT) is designed to expand and adjust shape when entering a human attacker, thereby slowing down and 
lodging in the assailant and causing maximum physiological damage. This is referred to as the bullet’s ability for ‘one shot stop’, in other words the bullet is quite 
likely to stop an attacker with one accurate well placed shot.  
49 These assessments were conducted on over 50 CPOs who underwent close protection and related tactical firearms assessments during the period November 2003 
to May 2004. 
50 These evaluations comprised of basic firearm handling skills i.e. draw and fire, rapid fire, turning and firing, hand and magazine changes, etc. as well as two CPO-
related shooting drills - one providing cover for a Principal and the other simulating the evacuation of a Principal whilst providing covering fire. 
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2. Much ongoing training, retraining and practice is necessary to maintain required 
operational standards. The vast majority close protection respondents that interviewed 
were of the opinion that their peers neither had the time nor the inclination to put in 
the necessary “range time” in order to maintain the level of competency necessary to 
utilise their firearms in close protection related attack situations. 
 
Two apparent problems were identified by the assessors with regards to the poor 
performance of the CPOs that were evaluated during this process. Firstly the CPOs were 
either not initially trained effectively with regard to the necessary competencies of close 
protection related firearms usage; or secondly the candidates assessed may have been 
trained effectively but did not retrain often enough to maintain the required level of 
competency. Both of these problems can be addressed through the establishment of a 
compulsory industry minimum standard with regularly implemented competency 
evaluations. Moreover, another identified problem related to the assessments mentioned 
above was the fact that very little unarmed combat training was undertaken by most 
CPOs evaluated.  
 
There was also a cause for further concern, in that many of the assessed candidates 
claimed to have undergone some sort of martial arts training. This prior training was 
meant for them to achieve competency in unarmed combat tactics as applied to close 
protection. The vast majority of candidates assessed, that claimed such backgrounds did 
not outperform their competitors, who in some cases had very little or no unarmed 
combat or martial arts experience. Whether or not martial arts prepare CPOs for the 
demands of close protection work will be discussed below: 
MARTIAL ARTS AND CLOSE PROTECTION 
 
 The link between Close Protection and martial arts is frequently exaggerated. The 
effectiveness of many martial arts in the specialist security world is often questioned. In 
their book Bodyguarding: A complete manual, Rapp and Lesce explain this concept as 
follows:  
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Karate schools tend to train students for competition, not defence against 
deadly threat. They also concentrate on developing style, rather than quick 
economical and disabling blows and holds (Rapp & Lesce, 1999: 23). 
 
By definition the term ‘martial art’ means that some of the system is ‘martial’ and some 
is ‘art’.51 When it comes to defending the life of a Principal against violent attack a CPO 
must not only have the capability to effectively defend him/herself but also the Principal 
that he/she is protecting. In order to have the skills necessary to provide effective 
protection the need for competency in unarmed and alternative weapon defence is vital.52 
As a direct result of the fact that a CPO may have limited time available for training and 
retraining the focus of such training should be on practical easy to learn and apply skills. 
Any system or technique employed by a CPO must meet certain criteria in order to be 
considered effective.53 These criteria are as follows: 
 
1. The techniques must be based on the realities of attack and in line with the modus 
operandi of the way in which attackers actually engage their victims. All too often, 
techniques taught in martial arts systems are based on what the instructor perceives to 
be real as opposed to what actually happens in a violent attack. Moreover, these 
techniques are usually practised in such a controlled and unrealistic environment that 
they do not resemble the actual ‘real life’ situations the CPO needs to be training for. 
 
2. The techniques that are taught to CPOs need to be simple and forgiving (not 
compromise the CPO if the technique does not work). If the techniques are too 
complicated to learn the likelihood of them being applied in pressure situations is 
                                                 
51 The initial aim of all combative systems was to train its proponents to deal with the harsh realities of life and death combat. However, in this day and age many of 
these combat systems adapted from their initial functions to become methods of self development for their proponents or sports, with the combative concepts 
becoming secondary. This can be clearly seen in the names of such arts as Jujitsu which means ‘gentle art’ being adapted by Jigaro Kano in the 1920s to become 
Judo or ‘gentle way’. While the change may seem small the focus was on transforming a combat system into a platform for self development and sport. 
52 To emphasise the importance for a CPO to have good unarmed combat skills in the United Kingdom, Peter Consterdine states “When it comes to the bottom line, 
you have to be able to fight and remember, you are seldom if ever going to be armed, certainly never if you work in this country [United Kingdom] and seldom, even 
if abroad. You are dependent on your physical unarmed skills, aggression training and fitness.” (Consterdine, 1995: 271)  
53 These criteria have been identified by the researcher after over twenty years of martial arts experience and nearly ten years of training CPOs in unarmed combat 
and related tactics. The researcher has the following martial arts related experience and qualifications: 5th Dan Dennis Survival Jujitsu; 4th Dan Koga Ryu Ninjitsu; 
3rd Dan Gendai Ryu Ninjitsu; 2nd Dan Taekwondo; 2000 middle weight Black Belt full contact Survival Jujitsu champion, Israel; 1997 South African Taekwondo 
team member 1997, World Cup, Egypt; 1998 coach to South African Muay Thai team, 3rd Kings Cup, Thailand; and an inducted member of the first South African 
Martial Arts Hall of Fame in 2004. 
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very slim. The concept of applying forgiving techniques is designed in order not to 
leave the CPO off balance and open to counter attack if something is goes wrong 
while performing the aforesaid technique. 
 
3. Self defence techniques need to be integrated into the close protection related use of 
firearms and easily applied with relevant CPO operational methodology (i.e. walking 
formations and IADs). 
 
4. The fact that the CPO may be carrying a lot of equipment, may be tired and have 
several attackers to deal with at the same time, must be taken into account when 
assessing the applicability of self defence techniques or tactics. 
 
5. The CPO must have the capability to fight off attackers under any circumstance, at 
any distance and in any environment since the attacker is likely to engage when the 
CPO is least prepared to deal with the situation (i.e. attackers exploit opportunities). 
APPLICABLE LEGISLATION 
 
It would be impossible for a CPO to effectively apply minimum force concepts in line 
with the applicable legislation, if the relevant laws and procedures are not well known to 
him/her. Changes in South Africa legislation regarding the security industry and use of 
force need to be outlined. Before the South African 1994 elections, the vast majority of 
close protection work was carried out by designated government related units (police, 
military and related agencies).  
 
When training curricula were compiled prior to 1994, the use of force guidelines and 
legislation were far more lenient than they are now. Past laws enabled officials to utilise 
firearms to apprehend suspects of any serious criminal offence (termed as a Schedule 1 
offence). It was thus obviously viewed that any attack on a Principal would probably 
warrant a maximum force response i.e. the use of firearms. 
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Changes with regards to use of force  
There are several fundamental changes in the way that use of force is now applied. All 
close protection operatives, whether part of a government organisation or not must abide 
by the laws of South Africa. This means that regardless of whether a CPO feels that it is 
correct or not to utilise a higher force level in an attack situation, he/she will be held 
accountable according to the law of the country.  
 
A recurring theme mentioned during interviews was the need for CPOs to not only 
understand the law, but to also be able to apply it in practical situations. It seems that the 
majority of misunderstandings stem from the way that trainees are taught the law during 
their initial training. In addition, the fact that the subject knowledge is not updated in 
retraining sessions means that many CPOs are not informed of new changes to 
legislation. In order to effectively train close protection personnel, there needs to be a 
shift from current training methodologies to outcomes focused training. This would entail 
the use of practical work-related scenarios to explain how the law would apply to CPO 
duties and functions. 
 
The law requirements as stated in the Close Protection Unit Standard 
The SAQA Unit Standard for Close Protection lists the applicable legislative material for 
CPOs. The unit standard contains the relevant government Acts and information a CPO 
must understand, as well as be able to apply in the workplace.  
 
These are as follows (no section numbers are mentioned in the unit standard so it would 
be fair to assume that the exact sections were not identified when this unit standard was 
compiled): 
 
1. Applicable sections of the Firearms Control Act 60/2000.  
2. Applicable section of the Criminal Procedures Act, 1977.  
3. Applicable section of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993.  
4. Applicable sections of the Dangerous Weapons Act.  
5. Applicable sections of the Road Traffic Act  
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6. Applicable sections of the PSIRA act 56/2001.  
7. Private defence  
8. Moral and humanitarian considerations (proportionality)  
9. Continuum of force  
10. Vicarious liability  
11. M.I.S.S (Minimum Information Security Standards) 
12. Civil liability  
  
For the purposes of this research it is not practical to further analyse the relevance of each 
of the above stated sections. However, it would be advised that all persons wanting a 
thorough and comprehensive understanding of the close protection industry in terms of 
the South African environment should understand the contents of the above Acts and 
regulations. 
 
International laws and the relevant limitations to Close Protection 
The concept of international legal limitations refers primarily to the manner in which 
South African CPOs may be limited when performing their duties internationally. An 
example of this may be that a CPO may be firearm reliant while working in South Africa. 
However, internationally he/she may not even be able to carry any weaponry at all. The 
vast majority of the CPOs that were interviewed had, at some stage in their careers, 
operated in various foreign countries. Some of the common themes that were identified 
during the interviews with these respondents with regards to the law and operation 
internationally can be summarised as follows: 
 
In most parts of Europe and many other countries a CPO cannot carry any weapons at all. 
However, in certain other countries even if carrying a firearm was permitted, a CPO 
would very often struggle to obtain the correct permits and permission to carry a weapon 
particularly if the protection detail was deployed in a hurry. It is therefore vital that South 
African CPOs move away from being reactive and firearms reliant. The focus needs to 
shift to implementing effective preventative planning as well as towards being able to 
manage and deal with threatening and violent situations without the use of a firearm. 
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Several ideas on how CPOs could work around the difficulties of gaining access to 
firearms were presented during the interviews but almost all of the respondents who had 
operated internationally were in agreement that the ability to fight unarmed and/or utilise 
improvised weapons was vital for CPOs in order for them to effectively operate 
internationally. 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is a clear need for a shift in the way that South African CPOs train and operate. 
The focus needs to shift from being firearms reliant to CPOs having rounded combat 
skills that include unarmed combat, use of alternative weaponry and improvised 
weaponry. Currently most training programs cover firearms responses to attack in much 
detail but pay very little attention to other force options. 
 
It is important to note that even though there are certain links between martial arts and 
close protection, they are not always congruent. Several key issues were identified that 
outlined what would make a self defence technique applicable in terms of close 
protection requirements. Some of these concepts focused on aspects such as forgiving 
techniques that are simple and easy to learn. This is vital if these techniques are to be 
applied under the duress of an attack situation. It is also important that unarmed combat 
and alternative weaponry skills are integrated with tactical firearms skills and close 
protection practices. 
  
Changes in use of force legislation as well as the improbability of being able to carry 
weapons internationally, means that a CPO needs to have various reactional capabilities 
in order to comply with legal guidelines. This implies that a CPO needs to be up-to-date 
with any relevant changes in applicable legislation. A CPO needs to not only have a 
thorough understanding of relevant law but also be able to apply the law in practical work 
related situations. 
 
In order for CPO trainees to actually have a workable understanding of the legislation, 
training needs to focus on an outcomes-based approach. This needs to include scenario 
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and example related training for students so that they can learn to apply their knowledge 
in actual working situations. There is also a definite need for the CPO to concentrate on 
preventative planning and to implement a proactive approach in order to avoid 
threatening situations. This approach should be outlined and included in all training 
programs. This is vital if South Africans CPOs are to be able to hold their own in the 
international market. 
 
 
 
 
  200
Chapter 10 
  
FORWARD THINKING, ADAPTABILITY AND THE NEED 
FOR A PROACTIVE APPROACH TO CLOSE 
PROTECTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Proactive planning and the ability to perform advance reconnaissance are 
the most important attributes that a CPO should possess. The future of close 
protection will be based on these attributes (Hendricks, 2003). 
 
The problem is action is always faster than reaction. Therefore, we prefer to 
take a proactive rather than a reactive approach to bodyguarding (King, 
2001: 29)  
 
The concept of being proactive and avoiding potentially threatening situations is a theme 
that was constantly mentioned during the in-depth interviews (Garvey, 2004; Hendricks, 
2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; 
Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 
2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). The importance of 
acting proactively in close protection was also mentioned in several of the related 
literature sources (see reference list for details).  
 
There is a need to not only be able to predict the likelihood (the when and how) of a 
threat occurring but to also implement the necessary measures to either avoid or limit the 
level of exposure of the Principal to such threats. Proactive planning is no longer a task 
that can be solely delegated to other parties (such as a designated planning officer). The 
CPO must have the skills to implement effective risk management practices both prior to 
and during a close protection operation.  
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The importance for a CPO to be able to think on his/her feet is vital. This is because 
during an operation the Principal’s itinerary may constantly change and it will be the job 
of the CPOs on the ground to implement the adjusted advance planning. 
 
The specialist sub-field of risk management, threat identification, threat avoidance as 
well as comprehensive planning skills need to go hand in hand with a flexible and 
adaptable approach. What this means, is that it is not enough to predict what is likely to 
happen in a given circumstance and then plan around for that. It is possible that situations 
or occurrences may occur that, regardless of how comprehensive the planning was, were 
not factored into the operation/situation. In these scenarios it comes down to the CPO on 
the ground having the correct mindset, skill and experience to manage the situation.  
 
The nature of close protection work combined with the huge number of variables that 
may unexpectedly occur, reinforce the need for all CPOs to have proactivity and planning 
skills. Today’s CPO must not only have the skills needed to plan ahead but must also 
possess the lateral and quick-thinking ability to effectively manage almost any situation 
under extreme stress. This concept was constantly mentioned throughout the research but 
was seldom explained in enough detail to validate the relevance of this point. A 
breakdown and more detailed explanation will be covered in this chapter that will 
hopefully assist in bridging the identified gap. 
FORWARD THINKING CPOS 
 
In close protection the attacker has almost all the advantages. One of the 
only things that can help to deal with this problem is to be proactive and 
take measures to prevent an attack from happening (Sharp, 2003).  
 
The concept of forward thinking can be explained as ‘the ability to process available 
information and then predict the likelihood of different variables occurring in a given 
scenario’.54  
                                                 
54 This explanation was personally formulated and used by the researcher whilst providing Close Protection training to various groups including presidential and 
royalty CPOs. 
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An example of applied forward thinking could be a CPO who must take his/her Principal 
to the airport. It is not enough to simply know the relevant routes and pick-up and drop-
off times. The CPO must attempt to predict as many aspects as possible that may form a 
barrier to the successful completion of the task (such as traffic jams, flat tyres, possible 
car accidents, etc.). 
 
When looking at the definition of close protection the three primary objectives need 
constantly to be taken into account, namely: to ensure the Principal’s safety, peace of 
mind and physical comfort. The CPO must effectively predict the applicable variables 
relevant to each of these aspects as thoroughly as possible. Moreover, proactive measures 
should then be taken to hopefully avoid any of these problems, or at the very least, limit 
the potential of these problems occurring.  
 
It is an exceptionally difficult task to attempt to predict many of the contingencies that 
may occur. To be able to do this a CPO needs to have had a wide range of close 
protection related experience, in which he/she was exposed to many variables and 
situations. The fact that it is difficult to gain such a level of experience means that there 
are not many CPOs capable of functioning as a specialist planning officer.  
 
However, in many operations there is not an allocated budget for a specialist planning 
officer’s services to be utilised. Therefore the CPO on the ground would have to perform 
all the necessary planning him/herself. This would mean that regardless of whether a 
CPO is an experienced planning officer or not he/she should at the very least be 
competent to conduct basic planning. 
 
Perhaps the most effective way to deal with not having a set planning officer is to ensure 
that during training a practical, comprehensive and realistic approach to planning is not 
just taught but ingrained in potential CPOs. This would mean that as a basic competency 
a CPO would need to be able to conduct rudimentary planning which should include the 
following: 
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• Advance work and liaison 
• Principal Profiling 
• Threat assessment and risk analysis 
• Determining of IADs and escape routes. 
 
Effective, applicable planning is both time and resource consuming. However, the 
benefits of this exercise cannot be over emphasized. There is a wide selection of planning 
and risk management documents available in various manuals and applicable literature. 
However, the concept of simply taking a proforma planning document and applying it 
would not be a very effective approach. There are many reasons why the use of someone 
else’s proforma documents is not suggested (i.e. there may be either too much or not 
enough detail on the proforma). This becomes especially relevant in the private sector 
where time, manpower and budget constraints are applicable.  
 
A more recommended approach to planning would be to utilise a proforma in conjunction 
with a well-trained planning team that has the ability to predict any potentially 
threatening occurrences. These predictions would be based on collection of all relevant 
information, followed by detailed analysis of this information. This information would 
then be superimposed on the Principal’s profile and linked to his itinerary. The process 
would then involve a prioritisation of the identified threats and determination of ways to 
either avoid these threats or minimise the likelihood of them occurring (in many cases 
experienced CPOs have proforma documents for the above that would be adjusted and 
tailored as necessary for each task). 
 
This planning process would run in a continuous looping system. It is a fundamental error 
to conduct planning prior to an operation and then consider the process complete. This is 
important since even if changes to the Principal’s itinerary both in times and locations are 
factored into the security planning for the venues, routes and resulting time frame 
changes would in all probability have been impossible to consider.  
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Therefore, a planning or advance team may have to be quickly dispatched to gather the 
necessary information. Once the information has been analysed, a quick assessment and 
threat minimisation plan has to be developed. 
THE NEED FOR THINKING ADAPTABLE PROTECTORS 
 
The ability for an operative to think on his feet and do the correct thing in all 
situations is vital (Sharp, 2003). 
 
The term ‘adaptability’ refers to a CPO’s ability to adjust and effectively react to quickly 
changing variables in their environment. This means not only being able to fit into the 
environment in which they must operate but be able to effectively protect a person whilst 
adapting to a changing situation. Furthermore, it is not simply the capability to cope with 
adverse conditions but to process complicated, potentially life threatening occurrences 
and then quickly implement the correct counter-action. 
 
During the in-depth interviews respondents were asked to list the necessary skills that a 
CPO must posses to be able to operate effectively. The concept of a CPO being 
adaptable, as well as being able to think on his/her feet is something that approximately 
60% of interview respondents listed in the top three close protection operational 
requirements (Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; McGuire, 2003; Sharp, 2003; 
Steyn, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Jaarsveld, 2004; and Van Rooyen, 2004). When 
interviewees were asked why they feel this was an aspect that is so important for a CPO 
to possess, the answer was almost universally a ‘yes’. 
 
Most of the respondents answered something along the lines of “because people’s lives 
may depend on it” (Jacobs, 2003). This reinforces the concept that a CPO’s operational 
skills requirements, although broad, are vital in order to perform the necessary activities 
needed to protect someone’s life or more specifically to keep the Principal safe and out of 
harms way. 
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As a direct result of the nature of close protection work, as well as the diversity of 
Principals that a CPO may have to protect, he/she may very well find themselves at an 
embassy party or political rally on one day and in the bushveld the next. An effective 
CPO should be able to blend into all relevant environments. To achieve this takes not 
only effective training but the CPO trainee must also have the correct physical and mental 
attributes for this specialised field. 
 
According to the previously mentioned job description of a CPO, he/she must protect the 
integrity of a Principal not just his/her physical well being. To achieve this may mean 
something as simple as preventing a waiter form spilling a drink on the Principal or 
something as complicated as creating layers of security and access control measures to 
minimise the chances of attackers being able to get physically close to the Principal. 
 
CPO’s leaving the police often have trouble adapting to the private sector as 
there are far less guidelines to follow and almost all close protection tasks [al 
the different skills] need to be performed (Steyn, 2003). 
 
Another interesting trend that was identified during the interview process was that CPOs 
with a military or police background sometimes appear to have trouble adjusting to the 
demands and operational skills requirements of the private sector. The reasoning behind 
this observation focused on two primary concepts. Firstly the difficulty in accessing 
additional resources; and secondly, the fact that in some cases these CPOs only 
performed specialised functions of close protection whilst in the police or military. These 
two aspects will be explained in more detail below. 
 
Limited access to resources refers to the fact that in the majority of cases service 
personnel would have had access to resources such as CAT teams, intelligence 
information or even counter-snipers while operating in the police or military.  
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This differs substantially from how things are usually conducted in the private sector 
where a protection detail may be given a set budget (usually quite small) to utilise for the 
entire operation irrespective of the fact that the operational team may feel that more 
resources are required in order to provide effective protection. The bottom line in private 
sector close protection is that services are rendered with a close-eye cast on making 
money for the service provider company or with a limited expenditure because the client 
does not want to pay more. Whereas often in State close protection services ‘no costs are 
spared’ especially when protecting high profile politically sensitive VIPs. 
 
The concept of job specialisation goes hand-in-hand with the fact that service personnel 
usually have access to more state resources than their civilian counterparts. In many of 
the close protection operations that are run by the police or military, there may be enough 
operatives on the detail to allow for set (static) placement of CPOs. This means that 
military or police operatives may work in only one designated position of a protection 
detail for the majority of their service career. What often happens when such CPOs begin 
to work in the private sector they struggle to adapt to working with limited resources and 
the fulfilling of multiple functions on a close protection detail themselves. It may take 
such a CPO some time to gain the experience and go through retraining to effectively 
adapt to this different working environment. 
HOW TO IMPLEMENT A PROACTIVE APPROACH  
 
The ability to minimise risk by being able to predict what may go wrong and 
implementing contingency plans or remove the source of the problem is a vital 
skill for all planning officers [to possess] (McGuire, 2003). 
 
Adopting a proactive approach through planning and fieldwork is definitely not a new 
concept in the fields of specialist security and close protection. The concept of detailed 
planning and gathering of information is usually referred to as advance work (see Chapter 
4: Secure advance party). 
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By definition advance work entails gathering information before an operation, analysing 
this information and then utilising the results to pre-emptively plan to avoid the identified 
potentially threatening situations. Probably the key aspect of this proactive cycle would 
be the determination of what can actually be done in order to directly avoid or minimise 
the exposure of the protection detail to these identified threatening situations. 
 
It is not necessary for a CPO or designated planning officer to be an expert in human 
behaviour and psychology in order to plan effectively. However, it is vital that a CPO has 
at least a fundamental understanding of these subjects. The CPO’s ability to forecast 
human behaviour (the potential attacker’s actions) in different contexts and situations is a 
vital component to being proactive. This is necessary in order to be able to plan ahead as 
well as forecast what variables may affect the running of a close protection operation and 
then plan accordingly to manage these variables.  
 
The last aspect identified as a key factor in having a proactive approach is to understand 
what the level of training and necessary reactions a protection team should have. A CPO 
or planning officer must have the ability to be able, in advance, to predict the positions, 
mental state and reactionary capabilities of a close protection team. This is vital since 
when planning for contingencies, if these factors are not taken into account, it may mean 
that the actual application of the plan may not be realistic.  
 
In close protection where people’s lives may depend on planning, it is important for this 
approach to be consistently applied towards the manner in which all planning is 
conducted. When taking the above into account, it can be understood that the better the 
CPO is at applying ‘forward thinking’, the less he/she exposes his/her Principal to 
potentially dangerous, uncomfortable or threatening situations. CPOs would severely 
limit their chances of a successful and incident free operation if they do not apply 
forward thinking and proactive planning. 
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REACTIVE ASPECTS 
 
The concept of reflexive reaction to different situations is something that was discussed 
in almost every in-depth interview (Garvey, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; 
Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Jones, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 2003; Rootman, 2004; 
Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 
2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van Jaarsveld, 2004). Research showed that the 
respondents were in general agreement of what threats and attack situations a CPO 
should be trained to deal with. There was, however, quite a lot of differentiation with 
regards to what was and what was not perceived as a priority skill by the different 
respondents. It was also found that even though almost all the reviewed literature 
mentions reactionary skills, the detail did not correlate to the importance placed on this 
by the interview respondents. The concept of reactionary aspects will be broken down 
and analysed in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
The term ‘reactive’ refers to the idea that there has been or there is about to be some sort 
of occurrence which may require an action from an individual CPO or close protection 
team. CPOs reactions can be subdivided into the following subcategories: 
 
• The trained reflexes a CPO must have to be able to respond immediately to attack 
situations 
• What instinctive reflex a CPO needs to posses 
• A CPO’s adaptability to diverse conditions.  
 
The concept that one objective can be achieved through different means is also relevant 
to CPO reactions and will also be included in the discussions below. 
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Trained and instinctive reflexes of CPOs 
Trained reflexes refer primarily to the pre-determined Immediate Action Drills (IADs) in 
which all CPOs should be competent. There should be IADs in place for the majority of 
contingencies that would have been identified during the advance work and planning 
stages of an operation.  
 
The close protection operative and/or team should be able to respond fluently and 
reflexively in order to provide the best possible protection for a Principal should a 
potentially dangerous situation actually occur. Below is a summarised list of situations 
for which a CPO should have trained IADs in place. It was compiled from information 
that was obtained in the various in-depth interviews that were conducted as well as from 
the personal experience of the researcher.55 It is by no means a complete list but should 
provide the reader with an overview of what should be required of a competent CPO. The 
list of situational IADs is as follows: 
 
• Firearm attack close range (handgun or assault rifle) 
• Firearm attack long range 
• Knife attack 
• Unarmed attack (striking, grabbing or tackling) 
• Hand grenade 
• Various vehicle ambushes (roadblock, rolling box attack, etc.) 
• Friendly crowds (Swarming and mobbing the Principal) 
• Unfriendly crowds (Rioting, throwing objects, etc.) 
• Potential injury to the principal from environmental factors (such as tripping or 
falling)  
• Medical emergency (heart attack, choking, etc.) 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Several of these situations are outlined in the various literary sources as well. An example of this is The Modern Bodyguard (Consterdine, 1995: 203-206).  
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The ideal for the close protection industry and for a CPO to be considered competent, 
he/she should at least have the ability and skills to react in the correct manner during any 
of the above situations. Whilst there may be several possible reactions to any one of the 
above situations, the correct reaction would be that reaction which provides the 
maximum safety to the Principal, the other members of the team and the individual CPO.  
 
The reactions should protect the parties in that order with the protection of the Principal 
being the primary objective and the safety of the CPO being the last. All of these 
reactions should be performed while simultaneously considering all the legal 
ramifications pertaining to an action. 
  
Instinctive reflex would usually refer to the human ‘flight or fight’ instincts, as well as to 
physiological and psychological factors that affect the human body during survival based 
situations. Through effective and ongoing training most of the associated negative side-
effects of adrenal release (see Chapter 8) can be minimised enabling the CPO to respond 
effectively according to the correct trained response. In other words, through ongoing, 
effective scenario and reality-based training, the correct IAD (trained response) will 
actually become instinctive. Experience would also contribute to making IADs reflexive 
and instinctual. 
 
Adaptability to diverse situations 
“The one thing that you do not plan for will most probably be the thing that does 
[happen]” (Jacobs, 2003).  
 
An attacker is most likely to study the movements of a Principal and attack in as 
unexpected manner as possible, usually when the protection team is least prepared to 
respond. It is for this reason that a CPO needs to have the capability to react according to 
instructions and/or trained cues. Moreover, he/she should be able to very quickly 
assimilate all relevant information, weigh up the relevant options and implement the 
option that will provide the best possible outcome in terms of close protection objectives. 
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This is perhaps not a skill that can be taught, but more of an inherent personality 
characteristic.  
 
If a person’s ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstance is more of a personality 
characteristic than a learnt skill, effective selection and screening of potential CPOs 
becomes vital.56 It would make sense to evaluate a potential CPO prior to conducting full 
training to assess whether he/she has the correct attributes to operate as a CPO. 
(Candidate selection and CPO profiling are discussed in Chapter 5 and 11) 
 
It is obviously also possible to enhance this attribute through realistic training that 
simulates diverse situations. The more this is done under reality based conditions, the 
more beneficial this training will be. It goes without saying that experience will condition 
a CPO more effectively than almost any alternative training method. There is in fact, no 
substitute for on-the-job experience. 
 
Achieving the desired outcome by different means 
 
We are in the business of finding solutions [to client problems], the client 
does not have to know how you get things done, the point is that things 
[must] get done (Higgins, 2003).  
 
Due to the diversity of situations with which a CPO may have to deal with, it is vital for 
him/her to have the ability to implement lateral thinking (think out off the box). In other 
words there may be several ways to deal with a problem and the most effective way may 
not seem to be the most obvious. This may not necessarily relate to an attack situation but 
how these are dealt with will affect the safety and smooth running of close protection 
operations.  
 
                                                 
56 This pre-evaluation/selection should assess a candidate’s personality type, physical fitness and ensure that he/she has no phobias or hindrances which could be a 
barrier to performing as a CPO. (for more information see Chapter 5: Close Protection training and related issues). 
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An example of this could be as follows: ‘A client arrives at the airport at nine in the 
evening and has an early television interview. The client’s luggage does not arrive and 
the airline says it will only get there tomorrow evening’.  
 
There may be several options available to a CPO in order to deal with this situation and 
avoid inconvenience or embarrassment for the client. The CPO would probably first have 
to gather as much information as quickly as possible. He/she would than have to identify 
various courses of action and select the option that is the most effective from a safety and 
client preference point of view. The key concept is that CPOs may have to find solutions 
to many of the problems that a client may face. 
 
The need to solve problems is something a CPO encounters every day but the problem is 
usually made more difficult to manage because of the limited time frames in which CPOs 
usually have to solve these problems and implement the solutions. There are several 
methods of developing the necessary skills but for the most part, problem-solving and 
lateral thinking capability is something that a potential CPO should posses before 
entering the close protection industry. 
CONCLUSION 
 
After collecting and analysing all the relevant information a CPO must have the ability to 
forecast potentially threatening situations. However, just being able to do this is not 
enough on its own. It is then necessary for the CPO to determine and implement the most 
effective manner to avoid or minimise the Principal’s and the protection team’s exposure 
to these threats. In order to do this, a CPO must be able to apply the skills of forward 
thinking and advance planning. He/she must have the ability to quickly adapt to changes 
in the immediate environment. These skills need to extend into not only being able to 
determine what the correct reaction should be but what actually is possible in a given 
situation. A CPO’s ability to do all of this would be based on his/her training and 
experience. A proactive approach should be adopted by all CPOs with the focus being on 
threat avoidance. 
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Moreover, the CPO should be able to reflexively respond to a threatening situation 
whether it was planned for or not. The reaction needs to be effected in such a manner as 
to maximise the safety of the Principal first and then that of the protection team members. 
The CPO should be trained to deal with, at the very least a set of identified universal 
threats that include scenarios such as firearms attacks, medical emergencies and hand 
grenade attacks. All natural instinctive flight or fight responses need to be practised 
constantly and honed to the point where they work hand-in-hand with close protection 
related IADs.  
 
Lastly it should be an operational skills requirement for a CPO to be able to problem-
solve effectively under the intense stress sometimes encountered while providing 
protective services. Whilst this is something that can be developed, if it is not an inherent 
personality characteristic, he/she probably has the wrong profile for close protection 
work.  
 
The consensus of opinion emanating from the interviews undertaken for this research 
indicated that proactivity, effective planning ability, the CPO’s ability to adapt and 
problem solve are definitely key operational skills requirements. Whilst a CPO may be 
able to work in the industry without all of the above competencies, he/she may not be 
operating at the level needed to ensure the complete safety of a Principal. Not all of the 
previously mentioned attributes can be considered learnt skills therefore effective trainee 
selection (including evaluations on physical fitness, psychological profile and emotional 
suitability) is a vital component in order to ensure that the right people are being trained 
to perform close protection duties. 
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Chapter 11 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON STANDARDS FOR CLOSE 
PROTECTION TRAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA TODAY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this research was to determine the skills requirements necessary in order to 
formulate recommended standards for the further professionalisation of the close 
protection industry in South Africa. Extensive information was gathered during the 
research that enabled the provision of answers to the research problem posed. Throughout 
this study, recommendations have been given both from a researcher’s point of view and 
from the statements made by the interview respondents. However, it is necessary to 
provide a skill-by-skill breakdown highlighting what recommended minimum 
competency standards should be implemented in order to reach the goal of full 
professionalisation of this specialized sector of the Private Security Industry in South 
Africa. 
 
During the interviews, respondents were asked to give their opinions on what the 
minimum acceptable levels of competency should be for each of the identified skills that 
are needed to provide professional close protection services. In this chapter these 
recommendations have been consolidated into a point-by-point overview. It should be 
noted that in many cases there are several options for implementation of standards and 
the recommendations given in this research are intended to serve only as guidelines.  
 
What the industry wants 
Almost every South African respondent who was interviewed indicated that even if the 
set standard was low, it would not initially matter since at least there would be a standard 
(Hendricks, 2003; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; McGuire, 
2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; Steynberg, 2003; 
Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; and Van Rooyen, 2004).  
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The general consensus was that the implementation of even rudimentary regulations run 
by a body that understands the nature of close protection work and which (the regulatory 
body) would not be easily corrupted, would on its own, eliminate from the Close 
Protection industry many of the dubious close protection training and provider 
companies. This, in itself, would greatly assist in professionalising the industry as a 
whole. Furthermore, career pathing needs to be set. Career pathing should enable 
candidates to qualify for different qualifications based on their level of competency. 
Based on feedback and suggestions from the interview respondents, the following 
different levels of close protection qualifications were identified: 
 
• Entry level (Certificate) 
• Experienced operator (Diploma) 
• Team leader or management level (Degree), 
 
During the in-depth interviews the respondents were asked the following question and 
requested to comment on each subject:  
“What kind of minimum standards would you set for the following criteria”: 
• Prior educational qualifications 
• Physical abilities 
• CPO skills 
• Prior experience in guarding 
• Firearm skills 
• Unarmed combat 
• Protective skills 
• First aid skills 
• Security knowledge  
• Advanced driver training 
• Protocol and etiquette 
• Management and business skills 
• Related skills” 
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The feedback and information gathered during the interviews was then correlated and 
grouped into relevant themes. The key aspects for each of the abovementioned criteria is 
discussed below. 
PRIOR EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
 
The key concept being analyzed here is what level of education the prospective candidate 
should possess in order to be considered suitable for close protection training. The 
majority of respondents felt that the minimum should be Grade 12 (Matric). The 
remaining respondents felt that a Grade 10 (Standard Eight) would be sufficient. The 
point raised here was not so much the candidate’s actual capability with literacy and 
numeracy even though these are vital for a prospective CPO but more importantly the 
candidate’s level of ‘life experience’.  
 
The overall consensus seemed to be that a candidate should be around 21 years old with a 
valid matric certificate before entry into a basic training program could be considered. 
However, it was also universally expressed by the respondents that if the candidate was 
younger but showed the necessary commitment and maturity he/she should be accepted 
for training.  
 
Additionally it was mentioned that a candidate should have some sort of military, police 
or related security experience before being accepted into a close protection training 
program. Candidates without any previous experience could, as a form of bridging, 
obtain the Security Guard Grade Level C (a Grade C Guard is competent to function as 
an armed guard). This would be an acceptable base to begin close protection training. 
Prior experience was a point of concern in several interviews and is mentioned here 
simply as a point of consideration and not as a vital point of implementation. 
PHYSICAL ABILITIES 
 
A point of controversy that was identified by most of the respondents was the physical 
fitness and the physical competencies needed by a CPO in order to operate effectively. 
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The fact that actual fitness standards are not clearly defined in the existing unit standard 
has also led to confusion as to what the excepted minimum standards for physical 
competency are. When analysing the information obtained via the literature review and 
through the interviews primarily conducted with the internationally experienced 
respondents, the consensus seemed to follow the statement below: 
 
“A rounded level of fitness that is regularly assessed is a vital aspect of a CPOs 
operational readiness” (Sharp, 2003).  
 
It was identified that not only is it necessary for the CPO to be fit enough to handle all 
operational situations (like an attack on the Principal) but it is most important for a CPO 
to look fit i.e. have a fit appearance and to be in the necessary physical condition needed 
to deal with a violent attack. The reason for this is that in many cases appearance is one 
of the primary criteria that the Principal has to assess the CPO on. This concept is 
mentioned in several literary sources but explained by Peter Consterdine as: 
 
Being a BG [bodyguard] is a specialist, demanding job if everything is done 
correctly and well and a correct attitude to fitness and training is integral to 
being able to ‘switch on’ and dig in when things get tough (Consterdine, 
1995: 290). 
 
A point often mentioned during the interviews was that the fitness assessments done on 
CPOs need to be duty-related and not necessarily based on generic military or police 
assessments. The concept is that CPOs are best assessed based on skills they may have to 
perform. The example given was that it may be relevant for a CPO to carry a wounded 
client but not necessarily have to run five kilometres within a specified time. Therefore 
perhaps the fitness assessments should entail not only the generic push ups, pull ups, sit 
ups and endurance runs but also a dummy carry and agility course.  
An example of a close protection related fitness assessment that could serve as a standard 
for a minimum level of competency could be as follows: 
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(Note: the evaluation should be done in a battery format with a two minute allocated rest 
period between each exercise.) 
 
• 45 push ups in one minute 
• 40 sit ups in one minute 
• 8 pull ups in one minute 
• 6 x 50 metre shuttle runs57 (each alternate run should have the CPO carrying a 50 
kg dummy) 
• 2,4 kilometer run in under 15 mins 
 
The above assessment is merely an example of activities that could be utilized in an 
assessment and should not be considered the only valid method of assessing a CPO’s 
physical competency. An obstacle course or similar agility assessment course could also 
be used to effectively measure a CPO’s physical competency. 
CPO SKILLS 
 
This subdivision relates to the specific skills needed to perform close protection duties 
effectively. The current SAQA unit standard for close protection mentions all of the 
relevant skills.58 However, there is no definition in the unit standard for what could be 
considered a minimum level of competency (see Annexure 5: SAQA Unit Standard, for 
details). An example illustrating this is if a CPO is being assessed on his/her planning 
skills, at what level should he/she actually be assessed (e.g. planning for a five-day 
operation with a ten-man protection detail or planning for a pick-up from the airport and 
drop-off at a hotel. There is an obvious distance between the planning/organisational 
levels needed for these different operations.) 
 
The subdivision of CPO skills is so broad that in order to simplify the relevant concepts, 
the four specific outcomes as identified in the unit standard have been chosen as a 
                                                 
57 Shuttle runs refers to running back and forth between two points that are twenty five metres apart. 
58 The relevant skills include all aspects that are needed for a CPO to provide effective protection for a Principal on foot, in transit or static at venues. This would 
include aspects such as firearms, skills, unarmed combat, first aid, advanced driving, etc. see Chapter 4: Literature review, for a detailed breakdown of all the 
necessary skills. 
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framework from which to expand. These serve only as examples based on indicators 
obtained from the research of what may be considered acceptable minimum competency 
standards. It would be unrealistic to explain as separate entities each and every individual 
competency relevant to close protection, as they function as a synergistic unit.  
 
It is therefore suggested that in order to try and formulate some form of set evaluation 
standards that a guideline similar to the following be implemented:  
 
• All written documentation should be done on the basis of protecting a medium 
risk level Principal. This could be clarified by outlining that there is definitely a 
threat but one that is not that likely to occur. 
 
• The planning and practical evaluations should consist of a team structure with a 
suggested minimum of three and a maximum of six team members. 
 
• The operation to be planned for should be at least one day long and should 
include protection of at least two different venues. 
 
The first specific outcome as outlined in the unit standard is to ‘ascertain the Principal’s 
brief and risk profile’. In terms of evaluation this leaves a wide scope of options and tools 
available to demonstrate competency in this area. A recommended approach could be to 
highlight the key areas relevant to this competency and put them into a suggested set of 
documents and checklists. As a minimum these documents should include a risk and 
threat assessment, a principal profile and a detailed operational itinerary. To demonstrate 
competency, a CPO should be able to compile each of the above documents in a 
workable format. There should be enough information in each document to compile an 
effective protection plan that would ensure the safety, well-being and comfort of the 
Principal. 
 
The second specific outcome is to ‘Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a 
Principal’. It should be noted that the specific outcomes should be conducted 
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progressively as it would be impossible to plan for an operation without comprehensive 
information on the Principal’s profile and the identified threats. In order to assess 
competency in this area, key concepts relevant to planning need to be demonstrated.  
 
As a minimum these planning documents should include, but not be limited to the 
following: 
 
• the written allocation of relevant resources 
• a clear definition of roles and duties of team members  
• a step-by-step breakdown of the different phases of the defined operation 
• a summary of all necessary logistics required for the whole operation based on 
venues and transport 
• a detailed set of contingencies and reactions to the identified threats that may 
occur, these should be correlated to the identified risk factors at different stages of 
a Principal’s itinerary.  
 
Regardless of the format in which all the above aspects are presented, it is vital that there 
is a structured approach to the planning and that the plan itself is practical and can 
actually be implemented. A written exam could also be used to assess a CPO’s 
knowledge and understanding of all the relevant concepts. 
 
The third specific outcome of the SAQA Unit Standards is to ‘protect a Principal during 
transit/foot/venue movement’. In terms of evaluation this could be done by utilizing a 
combination of practical assessments and scenario evaluations. The practical assessments 
should be based on a realistic scenario where the candidates should be able to 
demonstrate effective protection capabilities both as individuals and as members of a 
team. These scenarios should be performed in ‘live situations’. 
 
An example of this could be a shopping centre where the candidate must demonstrate the 
relevant protective skills in a “live” environment. At this stage, it is recommended that 
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only controlled ‘attacks’59 are applied as the reactions of civilians or officials may 
endanger all parties. Key aspects to be assessed at this stage would include awareness, 
observation skills, positioning according to situation and profile of the Principal and 
operation, team work, application of planning and communication skills. 
 
In terms of the actual physical protection of a Principal, the assessment should take place 
in a controlled environment like a shooting range or private training facility. The 
candidate should, at the very least, be able to demonstrate competency to effectively 
manage the following ‘Attack on Principal’ situations: 
 
• Long range firearm attack (sniper) 
• Close range firearm attack (5 - 25 metres) 
• Attack with a knife or similar weapon 
• Unarmed/ grabbing attack 
• Hand grenade attack 
• Throwing of objects at the Principal (e.g. eggs) 
• Dealing with ‘autograph seekers’ and over friendly persons 
 
The candidate should be able to demonstrate the above in simulated scenarios where 
safety of all participants is the foremost concern. The assessments should include 
demonstration of effective embus and debus60 methodology, effective demonstration of 
protective formations based on the scenario and the ability to react effectively to anything 
that may unexpectedly occur. 
 
The fourth specific outcome as stated in the SAQA Unit Standard refers to the CPO’s 
ability to ‘Terminate and review a protection operation’. As stated in the unit standard 
this should include ‘Feedback in verbal, written, recorded formats’. In terms of actual 
application, a candidate should be able to submit a detailed operational report explaining 
his/her role in the operation and making recommendations for the future. The candidate 
                                                 
59 A simulated attack or ambush on the close protection detail. 
60 ‘Embus’ and ‘Debus’ refers to the manner in which a protection detail should escort a Principal into and out of a vehicle (i.e. embarking and disembarking). There 
are specific security related procedures that should be implemented during these activities which aim to minimise the exposure of the Principal. 
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should also be able to verbally explain him/herself and justify all actions that were taken 
whilst operational during a post operation debrief session. Assessment could include a 
question-and-answer session and the submission of an operational report should 
sufficiently demonstrate competency in this area. The format and layout is not as 
important as the content and should remain flexible. 
PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN GUARDING 
 
The concept of a candidate having some sort of prior security-related experience before 
commencing with close protection training was mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
However, since it is an aspect that warranted different responses from the interview 
respondents it will be discussed in more detail. The information yielded from respondents 
revealed that almost all of them felt that prior experience was necessary, with the 
remainder indicating that it is nice to have but would not be an absolute necessity if the 
potential trainee had the correct profile. There were basically four types of candidate 
backgrounds that were identified as useful for someone who wanted to be trained as a 
CPO to possess. These four backgrounds were: 
 
• Military or related experience 
• Police or related experience 
• Security or related experience 
• Martial arts and/or firearms experience 
 
It should be stated that simply because a person has had experience in one or more of the 
above sectors, it does not necessarily mean that he/she is qualified to operate as a CPO.  
Prior experience in one of these fields would simply be a good indicator that a person 
may have the potential to become a CPO. Additionally, prior experience in the above 
areas could enable the initial close protection training period to be shorter since it will be 
easier to train a candidate with related experience to achieve the necessary competencies. 
It was further suggested by several respondents that if a candidate has no prior military, 
police or related background than a candidate would be required to do basic security 
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guard training. The suggestion was that a candidate should train up to at least the level of 
Security Officer Grade C. 
FIREARM HANDLING AND RELATED SKILLS 
 
In general, aspects regarding firearm usage by CPOs was a point of dissension among 
some of the interview respondents. Certain respondents felt that the use of firearms was 
the single most important competency that a CPO must possess (Allon, 2003 and Jones, 
2003), while other respondents indicated that the use of firearms as the primary force 
option for CPOs was outdated and that whilst a basic competency in firearms handling is 
required the need for a CPO to be highly trained in firearms usage is not as relevant as it 
used to be (Garvey, 2004; Rootman, 2004; and Steyn, 2003).  
 
The reality is that the use of firearms is a maximum force option. Maximum force may be 
necessary when one correlates the core function of close protection, which is to protect a 
Principal’s life. However, what is important to determine is what scope and depth of 
firearm skills competency does a CPO actually need to posses. Information from both the 
interviews, as well as the literature review yielded several inconsistencies in the way that 
respondents felt that competency for CPOs should be applied. An example of this was 
that one respondent felt that a man size target should be used whereas most of the other 
respondents felt that only the Centre Body Mass (CBM)61 of a man-sized target should be 
allowed.  
 
It would seem logical that when considering what is actually applicable in terms of 
training time and operational limitations that a compromise between the respondents’ 
various points-of-view would be the best approach. In the South African context, it seems 
that a CPO should at the very least, be able to utilise a pistol or revolver in a tactical close 
protection related duty context. The use of a hand carbine, shotgun and assault rifle could 
be seen as ‘add-ons’ or ‘nice to haves’ but not vital competencies for a CPO to posses.  
 
                                                 
61 Centre Body Mass is the term used to describe the centre of an attacker’s body. CBM is demarcated on a target by a rectangle that is in the middle of a human 
silhouette; it is also often referred to as the ‘A’ Block. 
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The basis for establishing competency should focus on a CPO’s ability to handle a pistol. 
Therefore it is necessary to apply the existing unit standards for handguns. There is an 
existing competency assessment in place for use of a handgun (for details see SAQA Unit 
Standard Number 10748: Use of a handgun) that has the following critical outcomes: 
 
• Handle handguns safely 
• Apply knowledge and understanding of the relevant legislation required  
• Operate, use and maintain handguns 
• Shoot handgun competently. 
 
The core competencies outlined under the critical outcome number four: ‘Shoot Handgun 
competently’, are as follows: 
 
• Shooting fundamentals  
• Fault analysis  
• Low light shooting  
• Cover (barricades) and concealment (SAQA, 2002a; 1 and 4)  
 
It should not even be a point of debate that the above aspects should be included in a 
close protection related competency assessment. However, there are several more aspects 
that are relevant to close protection. These fall within the scope of the unit standard for 
tactical use of a firearm (for more details see Unit standard number 10757: Use of 
firearms in tactical duty related situations). 
 
It is specifically stated in this unit standard under the heading of ‘learning assumed to be 
in place’ that it has been written specifically for persons who may need to utilise more 
specialised firearms tactics whilst performing their jobs, it states: “Competent in the 
relevant job related skill(s), i.e. response officer, close protection of persons, specialist 
units in official institutions, etc.” (SAQA, 2004b: 1). 
 
  225
The specific outlines as stated in this unit standard are as follows: 
 
• Prepare relevant personnel, firearms and equipment required 
• Apply knowledge and understanding of the tactical operational procedures and 
techniques 
• Conduct post-operational de-briefings with relevant personnel (SAQA, 2004b: 2-
5). 
 
Based on the above, a relevant close protection shooting assessment should include tests 
and exercises that not only demonstrate basic handgun competency but also the 
candidate’s ability to utilize the firearm in duty-related situations. Some suggestions of 
this could be:  
 
• Demonstration by single operative of drawing and firing while protecting the 
Principal 
• Demonstration of basic close protection team reactions (performed from 
formations and walking drills) to simulated attacks (IADs), live fire62 
• Demonstration of firing from vehicles during embus/debus or close protection 
related situations.  
 
To consolidate the standards for close protection firearm usage, the feedback obtained 
from respondents on this aspect could easily be formatted into the existing unit standards. 
It should be reiterated that the accepted competency evaluation should be the minimum 
standard that the industry roleplayers could agree on. 
  
It is not recommended that a competency assessment be made so difficult that most 
candidates would not qualify, nor should it be so easy that an untrained person could 
qualify easily. There needs to be an effective middle ground that can actually be applied 
in practice within the context of the South African close protection industry. 
                                                 
62 Live fire means that the drill is performed by firing live ammunition at designated targets. The use of live fire makes the assessment more realistic and lifelike. 
This enables the assessor to evaluate how the candidate is likely to perform if a real attack took place.  
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UNARMED COMBAT 
 
This aspect is considered a vital component if we are to aim at rounded CPOs who have 
minimum force options available to them and are able to operate internationally. The 
details are found earlier on in this report (Chapter 9, Use of force options and close 
protection) and include the need for CPOs to have competency in unarmed combat, 
alternative and improvised weaponry. The feedback obtained from the vast majority of 
respondents indicated that it was important that an assessment covering this topic be 
focused on outcomes and not orientated towards a candidate’s choice of fighting style or 
system (Bodhoo, 2004; Higgins, 2003; Hugo, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; Maharaj, 2004; 
McGuire, 2003; Richards, 2003; Rootman, 2004; Sharp, 2003; Smith, 2004; Steyn, 2003; 
Steynberg, 2003; Thobejane, 2003; Van Eck, 2003; Van Rooyen, 2004; and Van 
Jaarsveld, 2004). It was also stated that it is perhaps more important that a candidate is 
able to deal effectively with work-related situations instead of being able to demonstrate 
technical competency in specific techniques. This approach is congruent with that of 
Leroy Thompson who states that: 
 
 No one martial art is better for those in close protection than any other, 
although one that incorporates blocks, strikes, throws, arm bars, kicks, 
disarming techniques, offence and defence with impact weapons and blades 
and situational awareness is most desirable (Thompson, 2003: 172). 
 
Furthermore, it was determined that it is more important that a candidate be able to 
demonstrate effective attributes under stress, than being able to demonstrate sets of 
technique against unrealistic ‘set up’ attacks. Some of the attributes should be:  
 
• Aggression 
• Commitment 
• Ability to utilise the correct force option under pressure 
• Power  
• Focus 
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The above are just examples and the list could obviously be increased and adjusted.  
 
The key concept when analysing how CPOs could be assessed for this competency could 
be summarised as follows: The CPO must be able to effectively manage (neutralize, 
incapacitate or restrain) an assailant within the constraints of the law in a close protection 
related environment (the aim being to protect the Principal) utilising unarmed combat 
and/or alternative weaponry to achieve the best result in the most effective manner. It is 
important that these skills are integrated with IADs and can be performed in a simulated 
environment i.e. simulate real-life situations that the candidate may encounter during a 
CPO operation.  
 
An example of what an assessment should test in candidates could be as follows: 
 
• Demonstrate ability to strike effectively with different natural body weapons  
• Demonstrate the ability to restrain and control an attacker standing or on the 
ground 
• Demonstrate the ability to defend against various weapon attacks (close range 
firearm, knife or baton, etc.) 
• Demonstrate the necessary attributes needed to manage and deal with a violent 
attack within the constraints of the law whilst applying effective close protection 
methodology. 
The above is simply a suggested approach based on information obtained during the 
research. It is suggested that an industry accepted minimum standard competency 
assessment be developed and implemented in order to standardize what can be deemed as 
an ‘operationally competent’ CPO. 
PROTECTIVE SKILLS 
 
Although almost the same as the subdivision on CPO skills described earlier in this 
chapter, protective skills can be defined as any physical skill needed to ensure the safety 
of a Principal other than the use of firearm, alternative weapon or unarmed combat. This 
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aspect was included to allow respondents the opportunity to add any aspects they felt 
were relevant to protective skills that may not have been previously discussed.  
 
Primarily, respondents reiterated the need for a candidate to be competent in the relevant 
application of formations, embus, debus, walking drills and related exercises. Since there 
are no universal textbook right or wrong ways to demonstrate many of these aspects it 
was mentioned that a generic approach to assessment should be adopted. In other words 
the candidate should be assessed on his/her workplace application and choice of 
protection tactic based on the situation as opposed to demonstrating every option in a 
repetitive fashion. A written evaluation could also be implemented to assess the CPOs 
basic understanding of related security concepts. 
 
The primary concept outlined under this topic is for all the relevant subdivisions of a 
close protection operation to function in a holistic manner. It is vital that all sub-
components (see Chapter 4: Literature review) link synergistically in order enable the 
CPO to provide effective protection for his/her principal in any situation. This would best 
be assessed in a scenario based evaluation where candidates should demonstrate their 
ability to provide an integrated protective initiative.  
 
The scenario should encompass all the aspects that would be needed to run an effective 
protection operation,63 i.e. candidates are provided with a ‘Principal’ (possibly one of the 
instructors) who has a fictional background and is faced with an imaginary threat. 
Assessors could be on hand to grade and assess the candidates. The students would also 
be evaluated on all the necessary documentation (Principal Profile, threat and risk 
assessment, operations appreciation, advance work notes, Operations Order, etc.) which 
they should have prepared during the exercise.  
                                                 
63 All aspects of a protection task would involve starting with the planning and advance work and ending with a team debrief. The scenario should ideally run for at 
least forty-eight hours. 
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FIRST AID SKILLS 
 
The desired level of competency with regard to a CPOs first aid and medical assistance 
skills can be analysed from several points of view. Competent international close 
protection operatives who may have to work in third world countries that do not have 
sufficient medical facilities and personnel would obviously need a higher first aid skill 
level than locally based CPOs. The key concern when determining what first aid or 
medical competency qualifications a CPO should possess would be decided in terms of: 
‘what is the minimum qualification that would be acceptable to the South African 
industry as a whole’? 
 
The vast majority of CPOs in South Africa would only be operational in this country 
where high quality medical care is available. Therefore, the CPO would only need 
‘immediate responder’ first aid training as it would not take too long for more qualified 
help to arrive or to evacuate the wounded to a medical facility. This view is endorsed by 
Leroy Thompson who states that:  
 
The US Secret Service and many other protective teams practice what is 
called ‘ten minute medicine’, based on the assumption that the job of the 
protective team is to keep the Principal alive for ten minutes until reaching a 
hospital or until emergency medical technicians can attend (Thompson, 
2003: 172-173).  
 
Another point that was raised by several respondents was that in cases where medical 
concerns were an issue or the Principal was travelling to a country without sufficient 
medical facilities, a designated qualified medic could be included in the close protection 
team. This would negate the need for all CPOs to have a very high level of medical 
training as a designated medic could join the team to fill this gap. 
 
When analysing international trends, the United Kingdom and Australia require only a 
basic first aid and CPR qualification that has to be kept up-to-date (either annual or three 
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yearly refresher training and re-qualification). Based on this and on the information 
obtained from the research it would seem logical that a level one (the entry level first aid 
qualification) would be sufficient as the minimum standard qualification that a CPO 
would need to possess. 
  
It would perhaps be preferable for CPOs to have a level three64 (more comprehensive first 
responder qualification). However, the practicality of implementing this would be 
unrealistic in terms of the entire close protection industry in South Africa because of the 
extra training time that would be required, as well as the fact that this would entail 
additional costs for the prospective CPO. 
 
The standards for first aid qualifications are set by the Health and Welfare SETA. It would be a 
waste of energy and resources to set new standards that are only applicable to the close protection 
industry. Specialised sessions can be held by registered training providers to deal in more detail 
with issues such as gun shot wounds and the like. These sessions would be add-on training for 
experienced CPOs that feel that they may need to operate in an environment in which they will 
personally have to apply these skills. 
SECURITY KNOWLEDGE  
 
The topic of security knowledge as referred to in the interviews does not concern the 
subdivisions of protective concepts and CPO skills that have already been discussed in 
this chapter. The focus of this topic is on related fields of security speciality.  
This was discussed in much detail with most of the respondents who were of the opinion 
that a CPO should have a basic understanding of related speciality fields. It was not 
necessary for the CPO to become an expert in these fields but to simply have a basic 
understanding (i.e. a working knowledge) of what these fields entail.  
 
The fields that were identified as relevant were: Physical security (including alarm 
systems and access control), risk management, electronic countermeasures (ECM), 
information technology (IT) security and investigation. The consensus among the 
                                                 
64 Where a level one concentrates on fundamental first aid skills such as CPR, a level three includes more details on aspects such as anatomy, child birth as well as 
more detailed triage. 
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respondents was that while it was important for the CPO to at least know what these 
speciality fields are about, it is not necessary for any sort of minimum standard 
competency evaluation to be established. The reasoning behind this was that if such 
services are required, it would not be difficult to gain access to the relevant specialist. 
 
A point of interest that was raised during the interviews was that perhaps a more 
specialist qualification (perhaps an Advanced Close Protection Operative qualification) 
be created for CPOs that have gained extensive experience and undergone detailed 
ongoing training in related fields. At present, most CPOs seem to study for security-
related tertiary qualifications since gaining higher level qualifications could expand their 
employment prospects. This would expose them to more opportunities in the security 
field other than only close protection perhaps also including the function of a security 
manager.  
ADVANCED DRIVER TRAINING 
 
The current unit standard for close protection describes that under Specific Outcome 3 
(Protect a Principal during foot, transit or venue movement) the following aspects must 
be in place: 
 
• Protective escort techniques while in transit.  
• Defensive Driving.  
• Offensive Driving.  
• Evasive Driving 
• Convoy and motorcade Driving 
 
In the Unit Standard, no definition or assessment criteria are presented to explain the 
above concepts or provide a guideline for assessment. During the interviews, almost all 
respondents mentioned the above sub-categories of advanced driving as being relevant 
for a CPO to be able to effectively perform his/her duties.  
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However, when the methods of assessment were discussed with interview respondents 
the feedback was quite ambiguous. The practicality of implementing comprehensive 
assessment of the above topics would be almost impossible, especially in private sector 
training. It was mentioned on several occasions that the costs of renting vehicles, 
skidpans and organizing the necessary objects to ram would be exorbitant in comparison 
with what potential training candidates could afford to pay.  
 
It would be more practical to perhaps make the minimum standard a combination of basic 
defensive driving with skidpan drills and convoy procedures. Before a candidate 
performs a physical evaluation, a basic theoretical evaluation should be conducted to 
ensure that the candidate has the necessary theoretical understanding of defensive, 
offensive and convoy driving. This should be done in order to ensure the safety of all 
parties involved since if the candidate does not have a good theoretical base, he/she 
would not be permitted to perform the practical evaluation. It would also serve as a 
vetting process since if the candidate does not demonstrate the necessary theoretical 
understanding the assessment could be postponed until the candidate is ready thus saving 
time and money.  
 
A suggested example of a close protection driving assessment could cover the following 
aspects: 
 
• Pre-trip inspection of the vehicle 
• Observation and awareness of surroundings whilst driving 
• Vehicle control 
• Application of security concepts (e.g. leaving escape routes, positioning the 
vehicle in such a way that threats could be minimised, scanning for threats, etc.) 
while driving 
• Demonstrate knowledge of the Principal positions while in a vehicle  
• Demonstrate understanding of motorcade driving, explaining vehicle positioning, 
roles and duties of each vehicle as well as the application of anti ambush drills (a 
three-car convoy would be sufficient to demonstrate competency) 
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• Be able to demonstrate, on a skidpan or similar surface, the relevant collision 
avoidance and skid control techniques 
• Be able to demonstrate basic offensive and anti-ambush techniques such as 
reverse turns and hand brake turns.65  
 
The above could form the basis for a close protection driving competency assessment and 
has been compiled from information obtained in the literature review, the researcher’s 
personal experience as well as from the in-depth interviews. In order to assist training 
providers in curriculum development that can cater to training personnel according to the 
recognized standard, it is vital that an accepted minimum competency evaluation be 
developed for the South African close protection industry regarding driving skills. 
PROTOCOL AND ETIQUETTE 
 
Protocol was consistently mentioned by respondents as a point of concern when 
discussing areas of importance to professional CPO performance. The difficulty seems to 
become apparent when possible assessment criteria were discussed with the respondents. 
The majority of respondents felt that protocol and etiquette was best evaluated during a 
scenario or similar-type exercise where a candidate would have to demonstrate the 
necessary attributes (see Chapter 6: Perceptions about CPOs and international 
comparisons, for details) in a work-related simulation.  
Protocol related aspects could also be assessed in a theoretical format by using both 
written or oral questioning to determine candidates’ knowledge and understanding, not 
only of the necessary protocol and etiquette but its practical application. 
MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS SKILLS 
 
In terms of a minimum competency assessment for CPOs, the subject of business 
management skills would not be very important. It may be more relevant when assessing 
planning officers or team leaders. The business related skills that would be vital for a 
                                                 
65 Reverse turns and hand brake turns are evasive manoeuvres that would be used if an ambush/roadblock was encountered. These techniques enable the vehicle to 
quickly turn around and evacuate in the opposite direction of an attack. 
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CPO to possess would at the very least include report writing, basic computer literacy 
and rudimentary client liaison and marketing skills.  
 
When determining what should be included in an assessment it would be important to 
remember that in terms of minimum competency it may not be necessary to assess these 
aspects at all. The unit standard states that “learning assumed to be in place” must equal 
“a knowledge, comprehension and application of language and mathematical skills at 
NQF level 04” (SAQA, 2002c: 1). Therefore, a candidate wanting to be assessed should 
at the very least be able to perform the necessary business related skills, needed to 
perform in standard CPO operations. 
RELATED SKILLS 
 
During the in-depth interviews the sub heading of ‘Related skills’ was included to allow 
the respondents to add any information that they felt was applicable but may not have 
been covered under the other headings. It was also utilised to give respondents an 
opportunity to discuss the ‘nice to have’ add-ons to basic CPO skills that have been 
discussed in other sections of this study. Not one of the respondents felt that it was 
necessary to add on to the aspects that had already been discussed. When the topic of 
evaluation for ‘nice to have’ skills was discussed, with respondents it was universally 
agreed that each relevant skill would have its own assessment criteria and that it should 
not be included in a CPO minimum competency assessment. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary this research was done to ‘identify the steps needed to professionalise the 
Close Protection industry in South Africa’. In-depth interviews, literature review and the 
researchers personal experience where used to draw the information, that was needed to 
answer the stated research problem. It was found the ineffective regulation of the Close 
Protection industry, as well as factors such as content of training, instructor credentials, 
training methodology and lack of universal training standards where aspects that needed 
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to be assessed if the South African CPO industry is to be world-class. Key fundamentals 
that were identified for a country to have effective regulation and standards setting were: 
 
• A minimum standard covering each accepted area of close protection training to form 
the basis for a recognised qualification. 
 
• A regular re-evaluation and competency assessment framework to maintain up-to-
date records of qualified CPOs as well as to clarify their operational status (ability to 
perform skills in terms of minimum standard requirements). 
 
• A penalty system, perhaps a disciplinary system with fines and sanctions, that would 
serve as a deterrent to companies or individuals that do not comply with the above. 
 
• A validation database for clients to verify the qualifications of close protection 
providers. 
 
The concept of an accepted minimum standard that encompasses the identified relevant 
aspects of close protection is a vital component towards professionalising the close 
protection industry in South Africa. This accepted standard must divide the competencies 
into the relevant subfields and then provide a guideline to measure and quantify exactly 
what a competent CPO should be able to do. 
 
There were certain key areas that were identified as vital components of any CPO’s skills 
and knowledge base. These areas refer to some of the hard skills of close protection (i.e. 
unarmed combat, driving and firearms) as well as the necessary soft skills (i.e. protocol, 
report writing and communication skills). Assessments should evaluate a CPO’s 
knowledge and skills in terms of both theoretical understanding and practical ability. The 
assessment should attempt to evaluate a CPO’s knowledge and skills in terms of what is 
the minimum accepted standard. If a CPO is complies with these minimum standards 
he/she would be regarded as being competent. 
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Furthermore, use of scenarios and reality-based simulations should be utilised as 
evaluation tools wherever possible. This is important as it is necessary for evaluations to 
assess what a CPO actually needs to be able to do in order to operate effectively. 
Eliminating preconceived ideas and focusing on the application of skills should be 
applied in all aspects of evaluations. These scenarios and assessments should take place 
in both ‘live’ and controlled environments. The safety of all parties involved in the 
assessment process should be the first consideration when designing and implementing 
any practical and scenario assessments. 
 
Interview respondents were given the opportunity to outline what they believed were 
relevant aspects in the establishment of minimum competency standards for the 
subcategories of close protection. These opinions were than consolidated and correlated 
with information from the literature review, as well as the researcher’s personal 
experience.  
 
Where it was possible, suggested competency assessments were linked to existing SAQA 
unit standards. If no unit standards could be found or the information in the existing unit 
standards was not clear, then suggested assessment criteria were outlined. It is important 
to ensure that standards are not set so high that prospective CPOs cannot qualify. 
Additionally, standards should not be so low that incompetent persons could qualify as 
CPOs.  
 
It should also be noted that any assessment and/or minimum standards must, in practical 
terms be able to be implemented especially with reference to cost and available resources. 
The underlying goals of having minimum competency and established assessment criteria 
are to establish a qualifications framework for CPOs that would be internationally 
recognised. This would most definitely assist in professionalizing the South African close 
protection industry.  
 
Finally, it was found that the vast majority of CPOs operational in South Africa may not 
be considered competent if measured against what respondents described as a ‘competent 
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CPO’. However, the few South African CPOs that are operational internationally and do 
maintain high quality standards may be considered among the worlds best. In the section 
in this paper on recommendations, suggestions were given on methods of assessing 
competency that are not outlined in the existing unit standard for Close Protection 
training. It is hoped that the findings and suggestions outlined in this research report will 
be implemented in some way to assist in professionalising the Close Protection industry 
in South Africa. A professional industry with internationally benchmarked qualifications 
is necessary so that qualified CPOs may gain international recognition for their skills and 
compete internationally in this competitive niche market of security services. 
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ANNEXURES 
ANNEXURE 1: DEFINITIONS 
 
The definitions below have been taken directly from the Dynamic Alternatives (Pty) Ltd. 
Basic Close Protection Manual 2003 and in some cases expanded or adapted to fit 
definitions emanating from the research. Permission has been given in writing for these 
definitions to be included in this study. 
 
Areas of Responsibility and Arcs of Fire 
Refers to the predetermined zones or areas in a Close Protection formation that are 
allocated to a team member in advance depending on formation, environment and their 
position to each other and the Principal  
 
Attack  
Any potential, actual or attempted, direct or indirect physical breach and/or threat to the 
security of the Principal or his/her assets, commercial ventures, as well as any other legal 
or personal interests and entities both locally and internationally. 
 
OR 
 
Any potential, actual or attempted direct or indirect breach and threat to the security and 
integrity of all restricted information or of any information system relating to the day-to-
day functioning of the Principal and/or his/her assets, commercial ventures or any other 
legal, as well as personal interests or entities both locally and internationally. 
 
Attempt 
A direct or indirect endeavour to breach the security and or safety of the principal, his 
assets, commercial ventures or restricted information relating to the day-to-day 
functioning of the Principal. 
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Client  
The Client is the organisation, body or person that is actually financing the protection 
operation. In certain cases the Client may also be the Principal i.e. the person receiving 
the protection also pays for it. 
 
Clock system 
A method of communicating between close protection team members. It describes the 
direction of potential threats based on the numbers of a clock. The direction the Principal 
is facing is always considered as twelve o’clock. 
 
Close Protection 
Those measures taken by a trained individual or team, static or mobile, overt or covert, in 
order to continuously ensure the safety and comfort of the Principal in a professional 
manner. 
 
Cover  
There are two types of cover: 
 
Cover from sight = any structure or object that will hide something from view 
 
Cover from fire = any structure or object that will prevent projectiles from firearms from 
penetrating it  
 
Covert visit  
A visit is classified as covert when the visitor and/or the circumstances surrounding the 
visit is of such a sensitive nature that disclosure could lead to severe damage or serious 
embarrassment to the Principal, his country or the country being visited. 
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Directional approach 
This is a simplified version of the clock systems where the numbers of a clock are 
substituted with four directions; front, back, left and right. As with the clock system 
bearing is taken from the direction the Principal is facing. 
 
Divert 
The action of deflecting or drawing off the attention from one thing or person to another 
with the aim of getting rid of the hindrance. 
 
Engage/neutralise 
To enter into conflict with any potential threat and render it ineffective by opposite force 
or effect. 
 
Escorting 
Incorporates the physical accompanying of the Principal in a restricted area in order to 
enhance security. Or the assistance to the Principal with regards to his travelling or 
visiting program. Includes all measures, junctions and instructions not relating to 
safeguarding or protection. 
 
Evacuate 
The removal of a person or persons from a place considered to be dangerous, preferably 
according to a pre-arranged plan.  
 
Immediate action drills 
These are planned, trained responses to an attack or threatening situation in any given 
environment. 
 
Liaise 
Acting as a communication and information link on behalf of the Principal with other 
teams or units and relevant authorities, as well as any external parties that are involved in 
a close protection operation. 
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Overt visit  
A visit is classified as overt when the visitor and the circumstances surrounding the visit 
are of such a nature that disclosure will not lead to damage or embarrassment to the 
Principal, his country or the country being visited. 
 
Principal 
A person who as a result of his/her appointment and considering such person’s stature/the 
position he/she fills or the knowledge he/she possesses, is in the national interest that 
he/she enjoys special handling and protection. The Principal is the person that the 
protection team actually protects.  
 
Principal briefing 
The briefing given to a new Principal outlining the following; close protection Principals 
and objectives, team modus operandi, the Principals’ responsibilities and any other 
information deemed relevant for the smooth performance of operations. 
 
Protection 
Incorporates continuous Close Protection, either static or mobile of the Principal and 
his/her immediate entourage.  
 
Risk  
A condition where loss or losses are possible or a combination of hazards measured 
against probability/likelihood of the said action/ event actually occurring.  
 
Support  
To lend assistance to the Principal, fellow team members or relevant authorities as a 
situation demands or requires.  
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Threat 
This refers to any institution, person, organisation, item or condition that has the ability to 
threaten the physical safety and/or well being of the principal and/or his/her assets, 
commercial ventures or any other legal entity both locally and internationally. 
 
OR 
 
Any institution, person, organisation, item or condition that has the ability to threaten or 
damage the public and professional image, dignity and/or integrity of the principal and/or 
his assets, commercial ventures or any oilier legal or personal interests or entities both 
locally and internationally. 
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ANNEXURE 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS FOR 
CPOS 
 
Questions 
 
1. Please provide a brief summary of your background as related to Close Protection in 
both operations and training? 
 
2. In your own understanding define the job description of a Close Protection Officer 
(CPO)? 
 
3. In order of importance list the necessary operational skills (defined as the functional 
abilities that a CPO must have to operate effectively) requirements of a CPO? 
 
4. In your opinion, please list, for each operational skill, what training is required to 
ensure that a CPO can meet these skills requirements? 
 
5. How long would it take to train an individual, who possessed all the correct physical 
and psychological attributes to achieve the competencies necessary for the provision 
of effective Close Protection? 
 
6. Is retraining necessary for CPOs? If yes, how often and what should the focus of such 
training be? 
 
7. In your professional opinion what percentage of the CPOs operating today have been 
trained effectively and could be considered fully competent to effectively provide 
Close Protection services? 
 
8. What current changing trends with regards to both CPO training and operations are 
you aware of? 
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9. What would you consider to be an effective method of screening for operational 
employment and/or training of CPOs? 
 
10. Should civilian CPOs undergo the same training as service personnel from the 
military or police? If no, what differences in training would you recommend? 
 
11. Is it possible to subdivide the training of CPOs into levels of operational capability? If 
yes, how would the training be subdivided? 
 
12. In your opinion do current methods of training produce the most capable CPOs in the 
shortest possible time frame? If no, how can training programs be adjusted to meet 
the above stated requirement? 
 
13. Please provide a brief description of any overseas training and/or operational 
experience that you might have been exposed to or have undergone? 
 
14. If you have had any interaction with overseas trainers and CPOs, how would you 
evaluate this interaction (In terms of operational and training strong and weak 
points)? 
 
15. If you have had any experience of both (South African and international operations 
and/or training) - what in your opinion are the primary differences in the way that 
South African CPOs operate and train as compared to their international 
counterparts?  
 
16. What kind of minimum standards would you set for the following criteria: 
 
• prior educational qualifications 
• physical abilities 
• CPO skills 
• Prior experience in guarding 
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• Firearm skills 
• Unarmed combat 
• Protective skills 
• First aid skills 
• Security knowledge  
• Advanced driver training 
• Protocol and etiquette 
• Management & business skills 
• Related skills 
 
Thank you for your time and information provided. 
  254
ANNEXURE 3: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS FOR 
CLIENTS USING CLOSE PROTECTION SERVICES  
 
(ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ADDED TO MAIN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE) 
 
Questions 
 
1. What do you, as the client, think are the most important skills and attributes that a 
CPO should posses/ exhibit? 
 
2. How often do you utilize the services of a CPO/ team? 
 
3. How do you determine if a CPO you utilize is qualified and capable of providing you 
with the service you require? 
 
4. Do you feel that South African CPOs are of an international standard in terms of 
training and professionalism? 
 
Thank you for your time and information provided. 
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ANNEXURE 4: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS FOR 
OFFICIALS OF STATUTORY REGULATORY BODIES FOR THE 
PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY 
 
Questions 
 
1. In your opinion what does the future of close protection in South Africa hold in terms 
of both training and operations? 
 
2. What role do you see the relevant regulatory bodies playing in the CPO industry? 
 
3. Will set standards of operational competency for CPOs be developed and 
implemented? If yes, how will the enforcement of such set standards be achieved? 
 
4. In your opinion in what ways can the relevance of standards to the close protection 
industry be measured? 
 
5. How can international reciprocity of qualifications be ensured? 
 
6. What sort of time frame do you envisage until standards for the close protection 
industry are implemented and regulated by the designated bodies? 
 
7. In your opinion would re-qualification tests conducted on an agreed upon time frame 
and set standards be practical to implement and regulate? 
 
Thank you for your time and information provided. 
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ANNEXURE 5: SAQA CLOSE PROTECTION UNIT STANDARD 
 
 
All qualifications and unit standards registered on the National 
Qualifications Framework are public property. Thus the only payment that 
can be made for them is for service and reproduction. It is illegal to sell this 
material for profit. If the material is reproduced or quoted, the South 
African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) should be acknowledged as the 
source.  
SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY  
 
SAQA US ID: 
 
UNIT STANDARD TITLE 
11510 Provide close protection of designated persons  
SGB NAME ABET BAND PROVIDER 
NAME 
 
SGB Security  Undefined    
    
FIELD 
DESCRIPTION 
SUBFIELD 
DESCRIPTION 
  
Law, Military 
Science and 
Security 
Safety in Society    
UNIT 
STANDARD 
CODE 
UNIT 
STANDARD 
TYPE 
NQF LEVEL CREDITS 
LMS-SIS-0-SGB 
SEC  
Regular Level 5 40 
REGISTRATION 
START DATE 
REGISTRATION 
END DATE 
REGISTRATION 
NUMBER 
SAQA 
DECISION 
NUMBER 
2002-10-09 2005-10-09 11510  SAQA 
0144/02  
 
 
PURPOSE OF THE UNIT STANDARD  
The purpose of this unit standard is to enable relevant personnel who are tasked 
with the protection of designated person(s) (principal), to provide protection to 
such person(s) (principal) against harmful threats whilst in transit, on foot or at a 
venue.  
 
Benefit for society of this unit standard is that the person who completes this 
will contribute to safety in society.  
 
Person credited with this unit will be able to:  
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 Ascertain the principals brief and risk profile.  
 Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a principal.  
 Protect a principal during transit/foot/venue movement.  
 Terminate and review the protection operation.  
 
LEARNING ASSUMED TO BE IN PLACE  
The following knowledge, skills, attitude and/or equivalent:  
 
 A knowledge, comprehension and application of language and mathematical 
skills at NQF level 04.  
 Competently drive a vehicle according to the k53 standards  
 Understand the relevant legislation required for the lawful possession and use 
of relevant firearms  
 Handle relevant firearm safely  
 Operate, use and maintain relevant firearm  
 Shoot relevant firearm competently  
 Use of firearms in tactical duty related situations  
 
UNIT STANDARD RANGE  
The unit standard applies to the protection of designated persons against harmful 
threats, whether physical or electronic, direct and indirect.  
 
Specific Outcomes and Assessment Criteria:  
 
SPECIFIC OUTCOME 1  
Ascertain the principal`s brief and risk profile.  
OUTCOME RANGE  
Principal must include:  
 Designated person or persons to be protected.  
 
Brief must include:  
 Principals instruction in preparation of protection assignment.  
 
Ascertain must include:  
 Determine/confirm factual correctness.  
 
Relevant information must include:  
 Personal details  
 Next of kin  
 Medical, etc.  
 
Itinerary must include:  
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 Travel arrangements, scheduled appointments, venues, etc.  
 
Movement must include:  
 The activity of moving or transferring from one venue to another.  
Venue must include:  
 Appointed meeting place for an event, also means place locality.  
 
Portfolio must include:  
 Documented records, written typed or electronically stored.  
 
Threats must include:  
 Specific threats  
 None specific threats.  
 
Threat Assessment must include:  
 Validate and analyse information regarding threats.  
 Estimate threat probability and impact.  
 Categorise risk level.  
 Low Risk.  
 Medium Risk.  
 High Risk.  
 Extremely High Risk.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1  
1. Principals portfolio contains his/her/their relevant information.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2  
2. Principals portfolio contains itinerary of scheduled movements and events.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3  
3. Principals portfolio contains relevant information regarding threats to the 
principal.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4  
4. Principals portfolio verifies conducting of threat assessment.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 5  
5. Principals portfolio verifies principals risk level.  
 
SPECIFIC OUTCOME 2  
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Plan the transit/foot/venue protection operation of a principal.  
OUTCOME RANGE  
Documented instruction must include:  
 Responsibility to plan operation.  
 Level of Authority.  
 Scope of operation.  
 
Protection must include:  
 In transit protection  
 On foot protection  
 Venue protection.  
 
Operational plan details, overall operational requirements and procedures, must 
include:  
 Human resources  
 Logistical resources  
 Budget/Financial resources.  
 Transport arrangements.  
 Accommodation arrangements.  
 Operational command structure, control measures and procedures.  
 Operational communication methods and procedures.  
 Operational contingency and emergency measures and procedures.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 1  
1. Documentation verifies tasking of responsibility to plan the protection 
operation of the principal.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 2  
2. Documentation verifies compilation of protection operation plan based on 
principal`s brief and risk profile.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 3  
3. Resources required are calculated and designated in planning to sufficiently 
meet operational requirements.  
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERION 4  
4. Contingencies and emergencies with a high likelihood are listed and 
appropriately planned for.  
 
SPECIFIC OUTCOME 3  
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Protect a principal during transit/foot/venue movement.  
OUTCOME RANGE  
Advance reconnaissance must include:  
 Physical inspection of venue/route/area.  
 
Information gathering must include:  
 Investigation  
 Interviewing /questioning  
 Venue layout (maps, floor plans, photographs, description of topographical 
features etc.)  
 Existing physical and electronic security measures and procedures at venue.  
 Hazards and or threats at or against venue.  
 
Documented must include:  
 Recorded in writing, typing or electronically  
Operational command structure and control must include:  
 Command structure and control measures and procedures are implemented 
and adhered to as per venue operational plan.  
 Effective communication is established as per venue operational plan.  
 
Transit/foot/venue protection plan must include:  
 Timeous advance reconnaissance of the venue/route/area.  
 Timeous liaison with relevant authorities stakeholders.  
 Existing and additional physical and electronic security measures and 
procedures required to protect principal at/on the venue/route/area.  
 Existing and additional contingency and emergency measures and procedures 
required to protect the principal at/on the venue/route/area.  
 
Communication methods & procedures at/on the venue/route/area must include:  
 Voice procedures  
 Call signs  
 Type of net, etc.  
 
Operational order of events for the venue/route/area must include:  
 Ground  
 Situation  
 Mission  
 Execution  
 Service Support  
 Command and signals  
 
Responsibilities & tasks of team protecting the venue/route/area must include:  
 Protection Advance Party  
 Residential Security Team  
 Counter Surveillance Team  
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 Counter Sniper Team  
 Resource requirements for protecting the principal at the venue/route/area.  
 Operational command structure and control measures for protecting the 
principal at the venue/route/area.  
 
Operational command and structure must include:  
 Command/control room requirements  
Maps Of Area.  
Telephone Numbers (Emergency Services, On and Off Duty Protection 
Personnel, Other Security Services, Key Corporate Personnel).  
Logs (Keys, Vehicle, Personnel)  
Checklists (Advance and Route Reconnaissance, searches).  
Emergency Plans.  
Principals itinerary.  
Spare Keys.  
First Aid equipment.  
Search Equipment.  
Firearms and Ammunition.  
Radios, Telephones, Cellular Telephones, Pagers and Chargers.  
Telephone Directories.  
Fire Extinguisher.  
CCTV Monitors or Portable Alarm Monitors.  
Toilet Facilities.  
Refreshments.  
 
Fit for purpose must include:  
 Suitable clean and in working order:  
 
Searching must include:  
 A building for a threat  
Angling Technique - minimise exposure to threat.  
Room Entry Methods  
Ability to engage threat with firearm.  
Unsecured areas are covered.  
 A room for any surreptitious devices (bugs and IEDs)  
 Floor.  
 Walls.  
 Ceiling.  
 Furniture.  
 Appliances.  
 Adjacent and surrounding areas.  
 Electronically  
 
Verification must include:  
 Inspection  
 Testing.  
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Relevant protection techniques must include:  
 In transit  
Protective escort techniques:  
 Defensive Driving.  
 Offensive Driving.  
 Evasive Driving.  
Convoy/motorcade procedures.  
 
Protective transit formations and formations:  
Embuss and debuss drills.  
2,3 &,4 vehicle formations.  
Immediate action drills:  
 Engage in arcs  
 Provide cover for principal(s)  
 Evacuate principal(s)  
 On foot  
Protective foot formations.  
 Counter Surveillance Team  
 Restraint and suspect control  
 
Contingencies and emergencies must include:  
 Power failures  
 Fire  
 Medical.  
 Physical attack/threat on or to principal or venue or vehicles.  
 Explosive.  
 Sniper.  
 Ambush.  
 Close quarter attack.  
 Threat from sabotage.  
 Threat from surveillance.  
 
 
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
 
UNIT STANDARD ESSENTIAL EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE  
Refer to the Specific Outcomes and the Assessment Criteria contained in 
this unit standard and specifically:  
 
 A comprehensive understanding of emergency/non emergency 
incidents & procedures.  
 A comprehensive understanding of tactical movement & approach 
techniques.  
 A comprehensive understanding of the relevant legislation.  
  263
 A comprehensive understanding of client relations.  
 A comprehensive understanding of dealing with lethal/non lethal 
confrontations.  
 A comprehensive understanding of physical security and technology.  
 A comprehensive understanding of Lawful Arresting & restraining 
techniques.  
 A comprehensive understanding of search & seizure.  
 A comprehensive understanding of persons & property protection  
 A comprehensive understanding of observational techniques.  
 A comprehensive understanding of counter surveillance techniques.  
 A broad understanding of crime/incident scenes.  
 A broad understanding of operating effectively within a specified 
control room environment.  
 A broad understanding of handling victims of crime.  
 A broad understanding of electronic security.  
 A broad understanding of threat/risk assessment  
 
Critical Cross-field Outcomes (CCFO):  
 
UNIT STANDARD CCFO IDENTIFYING  
Identify and solve problems related to the relevant protection operation 
of the principal(s).  
 
UNIT STANDARD CCFO WORKING  
Work effectively with others as a member of a close protection 
team/group.  
 
UNIT STANDARD CCFO ORGANIZING  
Organise oneself and one`s activities so that all requirements are met in 
achieving effective venue/transit/foot protection of designated persons.  
 
UNIT STANDARD CCFO COLLECTING  
Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information related to 
the principals portfolio to conduct a overall threat assessment.  
 
UNIT STANDARD CCFO COMMUNICATING  
Communicate effectively when dealing with 
confrontations/clients/public/official institutions.  
 
UNIT STANDARD CCFO DEMONSTRATING  
Understand the world as a set of related systems in that advance 
reconnaissance is conducted timeously and relevant information is 
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gathered and documented to provide a integrated protection plan.  
 
UNIT STANDARD NOTES  
Supplementary Information:  
 
Specified Requirements  
Specified requirements include legal and workplace specific 
requirements and are contained in one or more of the following 
documents:  
 
Legal  
 Applicable sections of the Firearms Control Act 60/2000.  
 Applicable section of the Criminal Procedures Act, 1977.  
 Applicable section of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993.  
 Applicable sections of the Dangerous Weapons Act.  
 Applicable sections of the Road Traffic Act  
 Applicable sections of the SIRA act 56/2001.  
 Private defence  
 Moral & humanitarian considerations (proportionality)  
 Continuum of force  
 Vicarious liability  
 Civil liability  
 M.I.S.S (Minimum Information security standards)  
 
Site Specific  
 Standard Operational procedures  
 The employer`s work specifications, and policies and procedures  
 
Resources required for Assessment:  
 
 Safety equipment and protective uniform/clothes  
 Communications equipment.  
 Necessary administrative and stationary issue.  
 First aid/fire fighting equipment.  
 Vehicles.  
 Criterion referenced assessment instructions/tools.  
 A suitable venue: workplace and classroom.  
 Relevant shooting range.  
 Shooting exercise order.  
 Tools, equipment and materials for mock-up and/or range set up.  
 Drill rounds and replica firearms  
 Relevant Firearms, magazines and ammunition.  
 Holsters and magazine pouches.  
 Firearm cleaning equipment  
 Relevant shooting range standing orders.   
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ANNEXURE 6: SUMMMARY OF THE NATIONAL SKILLS 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
 
The below information has been taken from the Train-the-Trainer manual of Behaviour 
Systems Development (Pty) Ltd (BSD) and summarised in terms of relevance to this 
paper. It is included as an overview and explanation to the relevant role player 
organisation’s and groups that oversee training and standard setting for all industries in 
South Africa today. This information has been utilized with the written permission of 
BSD.  
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (NQF) 
 
The Vision 
 
The vision is an integrated skills development system which promotes economic and 
employment growth and social development through a focus on education, training and 
employment services. 
 
The Objectives 
 
In relation to the country: 
 
• To facilitate a general increase in the skill profile of the population, through 
accredited high quality education and training links to the National Qualifications 
Framework. 
• To increase the quality and quantity of intermediate level skills in the country. 
• To facilitate, through uplifting applied competency levels, more efficient social and 
infrastructural delivery. 
• To raise the quality, relevance and cost-effectiveness of skill development throughout 
the country. 
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In relation to industry: 
 
• To facilitate more structured and targeted skills formation within the enterprises. 
• To increase access by workers to education and training. 
• To increase the proportion of intermediate level skills in enterprise. 
 
In order that workers achieve recognized qualifications and are able to assume increased 
independence and responsibility, and employers achieve rising levels of productivity and 
competitiveness. 
 
In relation to target population: 
 
• To support target groups to enter regular employment or to sustain micro-level 
income generating activities. 
• To support the establishment of viable small and micro enterprises. 
• To increase access to entry-level education and training. 
 
In order that people that are most vulnerable in the labour market, including those in 
micro enterprises are able to enter and successfully remain in employment, self 
employment and enjoy a good standard of living. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE NQF 
 
South Africa instituted a new education and training dispensation, of which the South 
African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), the National Standards Bodies (NSB’s), 
Education and Training Quality Assurers (ETQA’s) and the Secor Education and 
Training Authorities (SETAs) are the core drivers. This new education and training 
structure – The National Qualifications Framework (NQF) – is being developed in the 
form of a matrix. All learning is done according to national standards and these are 
positioned on the matrix in various fields of learning at specific NQF levels. 
 
There are two Government departments involved in the above process, namely: The 
“Department of Education” (SAQA Act) and the “Department of Labour” (Skills 
Development Act and Skills Development Levies Act). Each of these departments and 
their roles will be discussed in this section. 
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Statutory Bodies governing the NQF and National Skills development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Education 
Minister of Education 
Department of Labour 
Minister of Labour 
South African Qualifications 
Authority 
This structure is the home of the 
National Qualifications 
Framework. This integrated 
framework seeks to: 
X provide access, mobility and 
progression within education 
and training career paths; 
X enhance the quality of 
education and training 
National Skills Authority 
(through Skills Development Act) 
The NSA will: 
X advise the Minister of Labour on the nature 
and implementation of Skills Development 
Policy and Strategy 
X liaise with and oversee the workings of Sector 
Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)
National Standards Bodies 
(NSBs) 
X Recognises and establishes 
SGBs 
X Recommends registration of 
unit standards and 
qualifications to SAQA 
X Updates and reviews 
qualifications 
X Liaises with ETQAs 
X Defines moderation across 
ETQAs 
Standard Generating Bodies 
(SGBs) 
X Generate unit standards and 
qualifications in sub-fields 
and levels and recommend 
these to NSBs 
X Recommend criteria for 
registration of assessors and 
moderators 
Sector Education and 
Training Authorities 
(SETA) 
The body has the 
following functions: 
X to develop a 
strategic focus and 
sector skills plan 
X establish and 
register learnerships 
X perform ETQA 
functions 
X allocate grants 
X monitor education 
and training 
Education and Training Quality 
Assurers (ETQAs) 
SAQA accredits three kinds of 
ETQAs. SETAs are economic 
sector ETQAs. They report to 
SAQA on ETQA functions. Some 
functions include: 
X Accrediting the education 
and training provider, 
monitoring and evaluating 
the quality of provision 
X Register assessors 
X Certify learners 
X Evaluate assessment and 
moderation 
X Recommend new standards 
and qualifications 
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THE INVOLVEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY (SAQA) 
 
In 1995, the Department of Education formed the South African Qualifications Authority 
(SAQA) and passed an Act determining the way in which qualifications would be 
developed, recorded and assessed. 
 
SAQA is the core driver for “outcomes-based” learning. Outcomes-based learning is 
learner-driven, which means that learners must (in their own time) demonstrate the 
achievement of an outcome and will be assessed as being competent or not yet 
competent. Learners (students) will also have to master the foundational knowledge 
(theory), skills, techniques and methods that can be applied in similar and new situations. 
Outcomes-based implies that education and training will now be defined by its outcomes 
at specific NQF Levels and will be assessed in a practical or simulated environment. 
 
SAQA’s Mission 
 
SAQA’s mission is to ensure the development and implementation of a National 
Qualification Framework, which contributes to the full development of each learner and 
to the social and economic development of the nation at large. 
 
The Objectives Of The National Qualifications Framework Are To: 
• Create an integrated national framework for learning achievements; 
• Facilitate access to, and mobility and progression with education, training and career 
paths; 
• Enhance the quality of education and training; 
• Accelerate the redress of past unfair discrimination in education, training and 
employment opportunities; and thereby 
• Contribute to the full personal development of each learner and the social and 
economic development of the nation at large. 
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SAQA Functions 
• To oversee the development of the National Qualifications Framework 
• To oversee the implementation of the NQF 
• To formulate and publish policies and criteria for: 
o The registration of bodies responsible for establishing national education and 
training standards (NSBs and SGBs) 
o The accreditation of bodies responsible for monitoring and auditing 
achievements in terms of standards and qualifications (ETQA) 
• To register National Standards and Qualifications 
• To ensure international comparability of standards and registered qualifications 
• To accredit courses in the absence of ETQAs 
 
Representation on SAQA 
 
SAQA comprises representatives from the following groups: 
 
• Employer organizations 
• Unions 
• Training providers 
• Professional bodies; and 
• Government 
 
THE NATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORK (NQF) 
 
The Objectives Of The National Qualifications Framework Are To: 
 
• To facilitate more structured and targeted skills formation within the enterprises. 
• Facilitate access to, and mobility and progression with education, training and career 
paths; 
• Enhance the quality of education and training; 
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• Accelerate the redress of past unfair discrimination in education, training and 
employment opportunities; and thereby 
• Contribute to the full personal development of each learner and the social and 
economic development of the nation at large. 
 
The NQF classifies all education and training according to eight levels. The levels 
measure how difficult the learning for different qualifications is and allows for 
comparisons between different courses. For example, Level 1 of the NQF comes at the 
end of ordinary, compulsory school up to Grade 9 but can also be reached through Adult 
Basic Education and Training (ABET) for adults who did not get a chance to study at 
school. 
 
NQF 
Level 
 Band    
8 
 
7 
 
6 
 
5 
Higher 
education 
and 
training 
Post-doctoral research degree 
Doctorates 
Masters degrees 
Professional qualifications 
Honours degrees 
National first degrees 
Higher diplomas 
National diplomas 
National certificates 
Universities 
Technikons 
Colleges 
Further Education and Training Certificate 
4 
3 
2 
FET School 
College 
Trace 
certificates 
Private schools 
Government 
schools 
Technical, 
community, 
some police, 
some nursing, 
private colleges 
RDP and 
labour market 
schemes, 
unions, 
workplaces, 
etc 
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General Education and Training Certificate 
Std 7 / 
Grade 9 
(10 
years) 
ABET Level 4 Formal schools, 
Urban, rural, 
farm, special 
schools 
Occupation, 
work-based 
training, RDP, 
labour market 
schemes, 
upliftment 
programmes, 
community 
programmes 
NGO’s, 
churches, 
right schools, 
private 
ABET 
programmes, 
unions, 
workplaces, 
etc 
Std 5 / 
Grade 7 
(8 years) 
ABET Level 3 
Std 3 / 
Grade 5 
(6 years) 
ABET Level 2 
Std 1 / 
Grade 3 
(4 years) 
ABET Level 1 
1 
1 year 
reception 
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SAQA FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The CPO unit standard is rated at an NQF level 5 (National Certificate). 
 
Purpose of the NQF 
 
To integrate training, education and prior experience into one system 
To make training and education more directed and portable 
To ensure that one level of learning progresses to another 
 
LEVELS 
 
 
LEARNERSHIPS 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
NQF 
Funda-
mental 
Core 
Specialisa-
tion 
 
 
   
8  Doctorates 
7  Degrees 
6  National Diploma 
5 Learnership Level 5 National Cert 
 
Higher Education & 
Training 
   
  
4/N3 Learnership Level 4 
3 Learnership Level 3 
2 Learnership Level 2 
 
Further Education 
& 
Training 
  
 
Secondary 
Technical 
Vocational 
   
1/A4 Learnership Level 1 Std 7 
 
General Education 
& 
Training 
A3 
A2 
A1 
ABET levels at: 
Primary and early childhood 
Components of level 1  
Learnership 
Std’s 5 & 6 
Std’s 3 & 4 
Std’s 1 & 2 
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To ensure the articulation of learning, ie a national certificate should have the same, 
nationally defined interpretation. 
 
Benefits of the NQF 
 
To Learners 
 
• Access to national qualifications 
• Choice in where and how to learn 
• Recognition of prior learning 
• National record of learning 
• Portability 
 
To Employers 
 
• On-the-job training and assessment 
• Training against measurable outcomes 
• Standards generated by the sub-field 
• Accurate skills profile of employees 
• Increase productivity 
• Improved safety ratio’s 
• Fit for Purpose 
 
Above and beyond a Quality Assurance Management System, attention must be given to 
the quality of work which each and every Employee exhibits each day. The quality 
displayed by a person in his or her finished product is a measurement of that persons:  
 
 
 
 
 
Pride 
Motivation 
Competence 
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To determine this level of competence a learner will be evaluated according to the 
specific outcomes and knowledge components of a unit standard.  
 
WHAT IS COMPETENCY? 
 
Being able to perform "whole" work roles (perform, not just know about or 
understand) to the standards expected in employment (not "training" standards or 
standards divorced from work expectations) in real working environments (including  
all the related pressures and variances of work). 
 
WHAT ARE UNIT STANDARDS? 
 
Unit standards are the building blocks of the national Qualifications Framework (NQF) 
and of a qualification. Unit standards can be described as follows: “Unit standards are 
packaged into qualifications at specific NQF levels. They are nationally agreed and 
internationally comparable statements supported by specific outcomes and their 
associated assessment criteria together with other relevant and needed information, 
which will form the building blocks of the NQF”. (Dr. Olivier) 
 
The purpose of a unit standard is to act as: 
 
• An assessor guide 
• A learner guide; and 
• A guide to educator’s and trainer’s for preparing learning material 
 
Standards are also therefore to be seen as an indication of the standard / level of 
competency a person has achieved. This competency has been defined as: 
  
The ability to perform the activities in an occupation (This includes everything a person 
should be able to do at work if they are effective and efficient in a job), which lead to the 
defined outcomes of that portfolio. 
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NATIONAL STANDARD BODIES (NSBs) 
 
SAQA established an NSB for each of the 12 fields of learning. Each NSB will identify 
sub-fields of learning. 
 
Functions of the National Standard Bodies 
 
• To ensure that national standards are written for that particular field of learning 
• Define and recommend to SAQA the boundaries of the discrete field for which it is 
constituted 
• Recommend to SAQA the registration of standards and qualifications on the NQF 
• Establish and recognize SGBs (Standard Generating Bodies) 
• Recommend the registration of unit standards on the NQF to SAQA. 
 
STANDARD GENERATING BODIES (SGBs) 
 
Each NSB will identify sub-fields of learning in which Standard Generating Bodies will 
develop unit standards and qualifications and ensure that the unit standards recommended 
by SGBs meet the requirements of SAQA. 
 
Who are the people/bodies/representatives on the SGBs? 
 
• The State / Government 
• Business 
• Labour 
• Providers of Education 
• Critical interests groups 
• Community / learners 
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Once a standard is developed, it is published for public comment – usually on the 
Internet. Only when all stakeholders are satisfied with a standard, is it sent through to the 
NSB and to SAQA for registration. 
 
SGB Functions 
 
• To generate unit standards and qualifications in the various fields of learning in 
accordance to the criteria and requirements of SAQA 
• To recommend unit standards and qualifications to the NSB 
• To update and review standards 
• To interact with ETQA’s in a continuous quality improvement cycle. 
 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING QUALITY ASSURERS (ETQAS) 
 
SAQA will accredit an ETQA to address the problems of variable standards, with 
reference to the provision of learning and the monitoring of the standard of assessment 
for registered unit standards, The ETQA will therefore, on behalf of SAQA, oversee the 
implementation and maintenance of the NQF. 
 
ETQA Functions 
• To promote quality amongst providers 
• To facilitate or ensure moderation across providers 
• To accredit providers in terms of quality management 
• To submit reports to SAQA 
• To register assessors 
• To moderate assessments 
 
NATIONAL SKILLS AUTHORITY FUNCTIONS 
 
• The NSA must advise minister on: 
o National skills development policy and strategy 
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o Implementation of strategy 
o Allocation of subsidies from National Skills Fund 
 
• Liaison with seta’s 
 
• Report to minister on implementation of strategy 
 
• Conduct investigations 
 
SECTOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING AUTHORITY (SETA) 
 
The key role player to ensure that the levy system runs smoothly will be the Sector 
Education and Training Authority (SETA). 25 Economic sectors have been identified and 
the relevant SETAs have been operational since April 2000. Many of the existing 
Training Boards have applied to become SETAs for their economic sector, for example 
the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) and the Police, Private 
Security, Legal, Correctional Services & Justice Sector Education & Training Authority 
(POSLEC SETA). 
 
The Role of the SETAs 
 
• To receive Skills Development Levies from SARS and pay grants according to sector 
and national priorities. 
• To design, register, manage and promote learnerships – A learnership is an integrated 
skills development system aimed at integrating theoretical education and skills 
training. 
• To perform the quality assurance and certification functions through their Education 
and Training Quality Assurers (ETQA) functions, under the auspices of SAQA. 
• To develop and monitor training programmes, which lead to qualifications that are 
recognized by SAQA. 
• To develop a Sector Skills Plan. 
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QUALIFICATIONS 
 
A qualification is defined as an “Applied” competency. It must therefore contain the three 
main competencies as defined in the ETDP Practitioners Project. These three 
competencies are: 
 
Practical Competency 
 
“The ability to apply your knowledge in such a way as to achieve Specified Outcomes.” 
 
It is not good enough to have achieved the academic portion of a qualification and not be 
able to perform in the workplace. The learner being assessed must therefore be able to 
demonstrate his /her competency in such a way so that it can be observed by the 
Assessor. 
 
Foundational Competency 
 
“The ability to understand what you are doing.” 
Foundational competence is therefore found in the underpinning/embedded knowledge 
that the learner has acquired. It is thus the component, which enables the learner to make 
sense of what s/he is doing. 
 
Reflexive Competency 
 
“The ability to change your activities and actions to compensate for changing con-
ditions in the workplace.” 
Reflexive competency is therefore embedded in the generic skill of being able to evaluate 
situations and conditions in such a way as to make a decision and change what you are 
doing for changing conditions to achieve the same outcome. This competency can never 
be achieved by a learner should one of the above two competencies be neglected.  
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CONSTRUCTION OF QUALIFICATIONS 
 
To understand how qualifications are constructed you have to understand that they may 
be “Unit Standard Based” (These mainly reside at the NQF Level 4 and down with 
some of them residing at NQF Level 5) or “Curriculum Based” such as those in the 
Higher Education band. (These mainly reside within NQF Levels 5 to 8 and are those 
obtained through Technikons and Universities. The industries through their Sector 
Education and Training Authorities (SETA’s) are entering into partnerships to ensure that 
the practical competency is achieved in the workplace through structured training 
programs. 
